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PART ONE 
Introduction 
A brief survey of leading theories aiming at the explanation of the 
nature of law reveals that all of them contain an implied agreement at 
least on one point: they consider law as a system of ordering conduct 
and adjusting hmnan relations in a fixed, predetermined way. To phrase 
it differently, all of them recognize that the main concern of law is not 
a solitar,r mode of human existence, but its counterpart, the social mode. 
Despite the forceful and sophisticated argmnents of leading and classi-
cal schools of legal thought (reaching its peak in the categor,y of legal 
thought called by Max Weber 'logical rationality'), we find it difficult 
to understand law simply as a system of legal concepts in the form of 
1 
highly abstract and dehumanized rules. In such interpretations the beau-
tiful and almost immaculate structure of law seems to hang, so to speak, 
in a psychological vacuum. True enough, some of these theories take 
account of psychological and sociological elements; but, even these do 
not understand law either as originating in a full-fledged interaction 
process, or the theories do not come fullY to te~s with relevant aspects 
2 
of sociological morphology related either directly or indirectlY to law. 
It is felt, therefore, that the literature in the field of law needs 
1Here we refer mainly to the school of analytical jurisprudence as 
represented chiefly by ideas of J. Austin, Lectures on Jurisprudence (1869), 
T.E. Holland, Jurisprudence (1880), E. Roguin, La Science Juridique Pure 
(1923), and H. Kelsen, Reine Rechtslehre (1934). 
2Reference is made to the American branch of the school of realistic 
jurisprudence as represented by the vrork of J. Frank, Law and the Modern 
~ (1930), and to earlier trends in sociological jurisprudence. 
2 
to be supplemented by a study which would first help us understand both 
the notion of norm in general and legal norm in particular, by utilizing 
some of the more advanced concepts and ideas developed by various schools 
of psychological and sociological thought. This approach may also throw 
additional light on the nature of the concept legal consciousness, a term 
. 3 
preferred to legal conscience. 
Secondly, it is felt that the relationship between the legal system 
and the social system could be bett-er understood if studied on a more 
elen{entar,i level. For this reason we shall turn to preliterate societies. 
However, because we doubt the unconditional and intrinsic relationship 
between law and politically organized society, or state, for that matter, 
we support a hypothesis according to which law does not depend upon the 
existence of a politically centralized power. In order to test our propo-
sition, we have decided to study secondary anthropological data concerning 
a selected group of·societies all of which lack centralized power, thereby 
lacking one of the most important premises of legal order, as set forth 
in the conventional definitions and axioms of law. 
Before taking up the anthropological material, however, it will be 
necessar,r for us to develop and clarif.r some of the more important ideas 
and concepts related to our study. This will be done in Part I. The 
organization of this part may be briefly outlined in the following way. 
To advance the idea that order in the group depends largely upon 
the existence and observance of binding expectational models (norms), 
3aur endeavor will not, of course, be without any precedent. We 
should recall primarily LeonPetra~cki 1 s pioneering and insightful ideas 
in the second half of the nineteenth century; also, more recent and fruit-
ful contributions of the Scandinavian school of jurisprudence, accused in 
some quarters of monistic interpretation of law in terms of sanctions. 
3 
we will first give attention to the role of normative elements in human 
action (Chapter II). Chapter III will turn to the analysis of interaction 
processes so that we may explore the bases for the emergence of expecta-
tional models (norms). The ensuing three chapters (IV-VI) will deal with 
the structure and differentiation of normative systems. Chapter IV will 
turn to the problem of the plurality of norms and their structuring; Chap-
ter V will be concerned with the question of the differentiation of expec-
tational models (norms) in terms of their effectiveness and imperativeness; 
Chapter VI will attempt to analyze the ways of articulation and differen-
tiation of normative systems. 
Following the presentation of the general normative framework, the / 
next chapter, Chapter VII, will attempt to specify and circumscribe the 
attributes characterizing legal norms. Finally, Chapter VIII will briefly 
recapitulate, and simultaneously define, the essential components of 
legal norms, will formulate a definition of law, and will examine the 
nature of legal consciousness. 
4 
Normative Elements in Human Action 
Sociologists have noted the inadequacy of utilitarian models pro-
pounded by classical economists to explain satisfactorily the proble~s 
arising out of the contest of interacting individuals and, equally, their 
general failure to explore the nature of mechanisms by means of which a 
social relationship m~ develop into a system and maintain itself as a 
system. This has led to an effort to revise the existing major theoreti-
cal premises. It was Vilfredo Pareto who first drew attention to the im-
portance of the value elements in nonlogical action. The analysis of non-
economic elements of action has made it possible to carry the analysis of 
the structure of the social system much further than would thE;l use of a 
utilitarian scheme. In this way, the role of the normative elements be-
gan to emerge. However, despite this fresh approach to the nature and 
function of normative factors, Pareto did not clari:fy the methodological 
1 
status of the normative elements in systems of action. 
The true turning point in a systematic methodological treatment of 
normative elements is to be found in Emile Durkheim' s writings. In his 
early work, Division of Labor, Durkheim already began to lay emphasis on 
the normative rule- as a factor controlling individual conduct. As Profes-
sor Parsolls has put it, " ••• stable social relations in general, and even 
the personal equilibrium of the members of a social group, are seen to be 
dependent on the existence of a normative structure in relation to conduct, 
lTalcott Parsons, The Structure of Social Action (Glencoe, Illinois: 
The Free Press, 1949), p. 295. 
5 
generally accepted as having moral authority by the members of the commu-
2 
nity, and upon their effective subordination to these norms. 11 More impor-
tant, however, was the final theoretical standpoint of Durkheim according 
to which the element of social constraint, originally treated as external 
to an individual, was transferred from 11the category of conditions to 
3 
that of normative elements. 11 From this position then it may be deduced 
that as long as the actor maintains an attitude of moral obligation, the 
norm is not exterior to the actor. Moreover, it may become a constitu-
tive part of the individual personality and, as such, it may exert a di-
rective influence upon the action of the particular individual or indi-
viduals. 
Following Durkheim, Talcott Parsons set himself the task of analyzing 
the role of normative elements in human action. Parsons starts with the 
basic assumption (he speaks about 11the fact of experience11 ) that men not 
only respond to stimuli, but in some sense 11try to conform their action 
to a pattern which by the actor and other members 0f the same collectivity 
4 
are deemed desirable." He maintains that stability of social order is 
impossible without the effective functioning of certain normative elements. 
In this way, a normative order, being relative to a given system of norms, 
stands against a factual order representeQ. by randomness, or chance phe-
5 
nomena, conforming to the statistical laws of probability. 
These ideas, somewhat sketchily formulated above, were presented by 
2~., p. 377. 
3~., p. 383. 
4~., p. 76. 
5~., p. 91. 
6 
Parsons in his earlier work, The Structure of Social Action; they form a 
skeleton of his theoretical orientation. However, Parsons gives them 
more systematic thought and elaboration in his later work, The Social 
System. Here he reiterates that 11It is inherent in an action system that 
6 
action is, to use 0ne phrase, 'normatively oriented' .n According to him, 
this follows from the concept of expectations. These expectations, he 
argues, in combination with the 'double contingency' 0f the process of 
interaction, create a crucially imperative problem of order; and he adds 
that the two aspects of this problem of·order may be distinguished: one, 
order in the symbolic systems which make communication possible; and two, 
order in the mutuality of motivational orientation to the normative as-
7 
pect of expectations. 
While Parsons, in The Structure of Social Action, admits that 11not 
merely are already existent systems of ultimate values integrated into a 
social system, but that the ult'imate values of individuals themselves are 
8 
developed in the processes of social interaction, 11 he does not shed light 
upon these 'mechanisms' which influence the functioning of the system. 
Equally, he operates with crucially important concepts such as, for ex-
ample, "system of expectations,"''normative expectations, 11 "conditional 
standards," etc., without attempting to unravel processes leading to 
their emergence. This seems to be a strategic weakness of his theoreti-
cal system. 
~alcott Parsons, The Social System (~lencoe, Illinois: The Free 
Press, 1952), p. 36. 
7Ibid.' 
-· 
Bparsons, The Structure of Social Action, p: 401. 
7 
8 
. 
There is no doubt that the concept 11normative expectations" occupies 
a significant, if not a central, place in Parsonian sociological theor,r. 
It is a key concept; the acceptance of other concepts sucb as "social 
system, 11 "equilibrium, 11 and "boundary maintenance" depends upon the accep-
tance of the concept in question. The concept 11normati ve e:xpectations, 11 
as it stands now, has a limited va:lue; yet its true significance might 
come with deeper analysis and comprehension of psychodynamic and socio-
logical processes on a more elementary level. For this reason, we are 
going to direct our attention to this problem. 
Social Foundations of Normative Orientation 
To analyze the interactionprocess, it seems advisable to start with 
the simplest sociological formation, the dyad. For, as Georg Sinnnel 
succinctly stated a long time ago, 11 [The dya4] contains the schema, germ 
and material of innumerable more complex forms. Its sociological signi-
ficance, however, by no means rests on its extensions and multiplications 
only. It itself is a sociation. Not only are ma.ey- general forms of soci-
ation realized in it in a ver,r pure and characterized fashion; what is 
more, the limitation to two members is a condition under which alone sev-
1 
eral forms of relationship exist. II 
Thinking about a more specific aspect of a dyad, we· may say that in 
a dyadic situation neither person is able to influence the other by 
bringing a majority to bear against him. Consequently, as small group 
theorists, such as Bales and Borgatta assert, each person is under pres-
sure to behave in such a way that the other will not withdraw but will 
2 
cooperate even though he may yield a point at a given time. There are 
still other unique aspects of a dyad which may reveal themselves as we 
present and analyze this elementary model of interaction and relationship. 
As a point of departure, we shall begin with the proposition formu-
lated by Robert R. Sears. According to his theor,r, " ••• the fact is that 
la. Sinnnel, The Sociology of Georg Simmel, trans., ed., intro.~ Kurt 
R. Wolff (Glencoe, Illinois~ The Free Press, 1950), p. 122. 
2Robert F. Bales and Edgar F. Borgatta, 11Size of Group as Factor in 
the Interaction Profile, 11 in Paul Rare, E.E. B(l)rgatta, Robert F. Bales, 
Small Groups'(New York: A.A. Knopf, 1955), p. 403. 
9 
a large proportion of the properties of a person that compose his person-
ality are originally formed in dyadic situations and are measurable only 
3 
by reference to dyadic situations or s;ymbolic representations of them. 11 
The moment we disregard any ephemerality of such an interacti0n, and, 
similarly, if we eliminate any dissociative elements such as aversion, 
antagonism, feelings of mutual alienation, or repulsion as elements im-
peding the interaction, we may assume that any repetitive process of this 
interaction may lead toward the stabilization of patterns of interaction; 
likewise, it may result in some degree of interdependence. Therefore we 
may speak, with a high degree of restraint, about a dyadic system. It 
should be emphasized, however, that before we can speak about any inter-
dependence, the interaction must display some fundamental properties. 
First, unless the interaction is based on something other than simply 
simulated, or fortuitously useful conjunction of individual actions, there 
cannot exist any dyadic system, but just an accumulation of parallel mon-
adic sequences. Secon~, any ascertained frequency and constancy of 
behavior toward, or in regard to others, would be incomprehensible unless 
one could discover the presence of the factor which Max Weber calls "ade-
quacy on the level of meaning. 11 11If adequacy with respect to meaning is 
lacking, 11 says Weber, "then no matter hm-r high a degree of uniformity and 
how precisely its probability can be numerically determined, it is still 
ant incomprehensible statistical probability, whether dealing with overt 
4 
or subjective processes. 11 
3Robert R. Sears, 11A Theoretical Framework for Personality and Social 
Behavior," The American .Psychologist, VI (1951), 479. 
4Max Weber, The Theory of Social and Economic Organization (New York: 
Oxford University Press, l95o), p. 99. 
10 
Enunciating Weber's postulate of 'adequacy on the level of meaning' 
(sinnhafte Ad!quanz), we are reaching the point when it appears necessar.y 
to direct our attention to the crucial significan~e of speech in social 
interaction. For that reason let us turn for insight to George H. Mead's 
theory of meaning. 
It is Mead's basic tenet that meaning arises, and indeed its mecha-
nism lies, within the field of interaction. He asserts that: "A gesture 
by one organism, the resultant of the social act in which the gesture is 
an early phase, and the response of another organism to the gesture, are 
the relata in a triple or threefold relationship of gesture to first or-
ganism, of gesture to second organism, and of gesture to subsequent phases 
of the given s0cial act; and this threefold relationship constitutes the 
matrix within which meaning arises or which devel0ps in the field of 
5 
meaning. 11 Thus, meaning is a product of social interaction, and language, 
in the form of the vocal gesture, provides the mechanism for the growth 
of the mind, which is a social: emergent. Mind, then, is the internaliza-
tion of a process of communication within the individual. The meanings, 
resulting from this communication, are neither subjective, nor private~ 
but are objectively existing in the social situation. They, however~ 
cannot achieve a true social dimension unless they become significant 
enough to call 0ut similar or identical responses in the interacting in-
dividuals. Yet when we think in psychological terms, another qualifying 
statement should be added. The meanings can not become significant un-
less the participants are motivated t0 communicate or interact, and 
5George H. Mead, Mind, Self and Society (Chicago:: The University of 
Chicago Press, 1952), p. 76. 
11 
concentrate upon what they are doing. To put it differently, we may 
quote Maurice Halbwachs who says, 11 ••• si on n 1a ni le d~sir, ni le besoin 
6 
de 1 1 apprendre, n 'Y fera pas attention. 11 When we recall at this point 
the Parsonian theory dealing with the problem of order, we may recognize 
the first aspect of this problem, that,is, order in the symbolic systems. 
The significance of this ordering process seems to be evident. It is 
one of the important mechanisms contributing to the systematization of 
expectations. 
Let us return to Mead 1s formal model of threefold 0r triadic rela-
tionship constituting the matrix within which meaning arises. Its impor-
tance is far from being exhausted, for in it Mead created a solid base 
upon which he builds other theoretical assumptions and propositions con-
cerning the structure of u s~lf. 11 It is Mead r s main contention th~t the 
11self11 is essentially socially structured and arises in social experience. 
In expounding his theory, he asserts:: "The individual experiences himself 
as such, not directly, but indirectly from the particular standpoints of 
other individual members of the same group, or from the generalized 
7 
standpoints of the social group as a whole to which he belongs." We may 
add a passing note at this p0int; Mead did not realize that non-membership 
groups may also c0nstitute a.significant frame of reference. 
That the .self-conception of the individual is defined and redefined 
in terms of existing social interaction and experienced relationships is 
also the leading thesis of another theorist, Charles H. Cooley. According 
~aurice Halbwachs, Les Cadres Sociaux de la Memoire (Paris: F. Alcan_, 
1925)' p. 83. 
7Mead, op. cit., p. 138. 
12 
to Cooley, the "self" idea consists basically of three parts; the imagina-
tion of an appearance to another person, the imagination of his judgment 
in that appearance (his famous concept of the 11looking-glass self"), and 
8 
some sort of self-feeling and mortification. It is apparent that while 
Mead puts accent upon cognitive elements in action and perceptien, Cooley, 
on the other hand, accentuates reflective and affective elements. What-
ever the difference between these two theories m~ be, both, nevertheless, 
converge in the assumption that psycho-social factors, not biological 
factors, are crucial in the process of learning, in the structuralization 
of the "self," and, by implication, in the structuralization of e:x:pecta-
tions. The critical appraisal of b0th theories, however, may lead to the 
question whether or not Mead's cognitive elements and Ceoley's affective 
elements, taken either separately or together, fully account for the 
formation of the "self. 11 When the problem arises as to how the "self" 
gets integrated, it seems necessar,y to add the third element, that is, 
evaluative. 
The two mentioned concepts were exposed to severe criticism. Thus, 
for instance, Bartlett Stoodley remarked that Cooley's concept of the 
"looking-glass self" is an oversimplification, and Head's concept of the 
9 
"social self" has little psychological validity. However, while it is 
true that both of the above-mentioned concepts were not fully elaborated 
and not tied into a general theoretical frame, it should be recognized 
Bcharles H. Cooley, Human Nature and the Social Order (New York: 
Scribners, 1902), p. 152. 
9Bartlett H. stoodley, The Concepts of Sigmund Freud (Glencoe, Illinois: 
The Free Press, 1959), p. 12 • 
13 
that both Cooley and Mead, by casting doubts upon the working of simple 
phylogenetic mechanism, displayed a scholarly insight into the nature of 
processes contributing to the genesis of the 11social self. 11 
When, later, Sigmund Freud formulated his concept of the "ego-ideal, t( 
he also conceived it to be a social product, maintaining that the state 
of self-evaluation is significantly related to the idea of others about 
ego. Quoting Stoodley again, 11 ••• self -evaluation is derived from 'other r 
10 
evalu~tion and importantly dependent on it. 11 It represents a new prin-
ciple of motivation. For the ego-~deal can take punitive action against 
the ego and it is capable of mobilizing energy. Furthermore, the inter-
personal experiences of an individual contain the potentialities for 
11repression, 11 through the mechanism of which the individual narcissism 
is kept under control. Still further, the ego-ideal, when held in common, 
represents the foundation of identification with others. 
After having examined this set of basic assumptions and propositions, 
we m~ proceed further and discuss other queries raised by the conception 
of the "self" in relationship. To starl with, self-consciousness, accor-
ding to Cooley and Mead, refers to the ability to call forth in ourselves 
a set of definite responses which belong to another person, or others, 
with whom the individual is, or was, in actual or symbolic (implied) rela-
tionship. This theoretical position m~ also get its support from Norbert 
11 
Wiener's theory of a "feed-back mechanism." To put all this in fmgura-
ti ve speech, let us quote Simmel: u ~ocietYJ 1 in front of 1 the individual 
10Ibid., p. 129. 
llNorbert Wiener, The Human Use of Human Beings (Garden City, New 
York: Doubleday & Company, 1954), p. 33. 
14 
12 
is, at the same time, a 'within 1 • 11 The inner forum, pervaded and imp reg-
nated with the presence of anticipatory reSponses, becomes a social forum. 
Once we start to incorporate these theoretical assumptions and ideas 
into our own theoretical speculations~ then, we may also accept Sear's 
proposition that anticipatory reactions to the behavior of another are 
the expectancies @.talics our~ that make the behavior of the two people 
13 
truly interdependent. In order to justify the acceptance of this propo-
sition, we shall attempt to reconstruct theoretically the interaction 
process, and assess its implications, first, with reference to the dyadic 
unit. 
12simmel, op. cit., p. 258. 
13sears, op. cit., P• 480. 
15 
. 
structuralization and S,rstematization of Expectational S,rstems 
Interaction on a qyadic level may be described as a process invol-
ving a minimum plurality of actors oriented to a situation. Considering 
the action from the point of view of psychodynamics, we may assume that 
action is propelled b,v one or several motivational forces which deter-
mine the individual expectations as well as prepare and direct the in-
dividual's actions, pro-actions, and reactions. Furthermore, it may be 
assumed that this interaction on the dyadic level revolves primarily 
around two sets of idiosyncratically structured expectations being rela-
tive to the prospective action, behavior, or attitude of another actor 
in an actual or potential relationship. We shall call these idiosyncra-
tically structured expectations~ i d i o - c e n t r i c e x p e c t a -
t i o n s. 
Once the interaction is initiated, or, even before the interaction 
has started, one of the most important elements of this process is "cogni-
tive mapping," to use Tolman's phrase. It involves perception, identifi-
cation, judgment, or figuring out of the other's intentions or expecta-
tions. Each party to the process faces new conditions which taken together 
represent a field, or, using S.E • .Asch's terms, "socially generated real-
1 
ity. n It seems to be logically correct to presume that in this complicated 
socio-psychological process the inner-felt reality of idio-centric expec-
tations of one actor is exposed to the test of the reality or potentiality 
lSolomon E. Asch, "A Perspective on Social Psychology," in Sigmund 
Koch, Psychology: A Study of a Seienc~ (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1959), 
Stuqy I, Vol. 3, p. 380. 
l6 
of the idio-centric expectations of another participating actor. Due to 
this fact, an actor, supposedly, directs his attention to the expectations 
of another actor, and becoming an object to himself, confronts and tests 
his idio-centric expectations against the exposed or anticipated expecta-
tions of another actor. By virtue of making response to oneself, or, to 
put it differently, due to this covert "interpersonal" process on the 
intrapersonal level, (which is, as we hold, a sociological process, be-
cause it involves a minimal group), the actor may withhold expressions 
of certain wishes, jeelings, and desires. Similarly, the actor m~ in-
hibit tendencies to act according to his expectations, and suspend his 
overt action. To inhibit the disposition to act requires self-discipline, 
a ver,y important phase of the unfolding process of social control. 
While it is true that the power of the individual 1 s will affects the 
holding of one's own expectations in abeyance, restraining them, and con-
sequently delaying an action, it is also true that such constraint is 
imposed from the outside. It is the part and function of the situation. 
To use one's own terminology, it is a group-generated constraint, based 
upon a definition of the situation. Though this statement may appear to 
be premature, we may say that at this point we can already detect the 
beginning of a sociologically important fact:- that is, the structuraliza-
tion of sociologically relevant expectational schema, or, what amounts 
to the same, the location of the foundations of a social system. 
To be sure, in any dyadic unit, both associative and dissociative 
powers are constantly at work. One may be led to the hasty conclusion 
that cohesive elements stimulate and promote interaction, while anti-
thetic factors are sociological liabilities. We would argue, however, 
that as long as alienative and antithetical powers do not result in a 
complete breakdown, rejection~ or severance of the relationship, they may, 
2 
as Simmel asserts, 11resol ve the tension between the contrasts, 11 contribute 
positively to the restructuralization of motivational forces, and facili-
tate interaction. Consequently, on account of the duality implicit in 
any interaction setting, and impending reciprocity, or complementarity 
pattern, the individual motivational hierarchy may undergo a rearrange-
ment; equally, the expectations may lose their strictly monomorphic and 
idiosyncratic character. They will become polymorphic, acquiring simul-
taneously a new form and different weight of meaning. We shall call 
them: s o c i o - c e n t r i c e x p e c t a t i o n s. They will 
refer to a probability of behavior, action, or attitude of another indi-
vidual (or individuals) related through particularized constellations of 
interpersonal ties. We may enlist some support for our assumption by 
referring to the Freudian psychoanalytical theory. As Stoodley notes: 
"I!reudian outgoingl}-es~ is object oriented in that it strives to dis-
cover in the outside world the means of its gratification. And the out-
side means can be effective (in the case of the heterosexual impulse) if 
the object is preserved as itself, as other, and not traRsfor.med into an 
3 
extension of ego. 11 When Freud later postulated Eros, not only in the 
individual but also in the society, then 11 ••• the outgoingness of the in-
-
dividual was not based on organic facts but on the influence of another 
Eros~ the cultural system and the interpersonal experience of the 
2a-eorg Simmel, Conflict, trans. Kurt H. Wolff (Glencoe; Illinois: 
The Free Press, 1955), p. 14. 
3stoodley, op. cit., p. 242. 
18 
4 
individual in this system," (Italics ours~) 
This seems to give an affirmation to our next statement that the 
social object system is to be considered a crucial component of reality. 
And when we, in this connection, think about Freud's Eros, then Eros will 
refer to such types of motivations as, for example, to join in coopera-
tive action and to conform to relational regularities. Yet in spite of 
the imputed impact of the interpersonal relationship, it might be argued, 
some of the idio-centric expectations may still be left intact as they 
were forged in the individual's mind~ or, new idio-centric expectations 
may emerge. No attempt will be made to deny. such an argument. Indeed, 
. 
there is a high probability, if not a certainty, that some of the idio-
centric expectations will persist and affect the interaction process. 
Some of the idio-centric expectations, further, may be repressed, yet 
they can stand ready to exert an infltience from the unconscious level. 
Finally, the newly emerging expectations may ?reate an innovational prob-
lem for the already established and working expectational schema. In 
spite of all readily acknowledged, idiosyncratic ferces we maintain that 
the overbridging of the two idios.yncratic expectations through the common 
socio-centric expectational schema should be considered as having a great 
import on the developing social system. Social psychologist Asch seems 
to cenfirm our position when he says: "··.a group event ..... includes 
the structure of initiated events and the regularities these exhibit 
5 
whether or not they are known to the participants. 11 Comparably, Kurt 
Lewin speaks about "freezing effect'' when he- refers to the structural 
4Ibid. 
5Asch, op. cit., P• 373. 
19 
6 
impact of a group's events upon individuals. 
Having secured the theoretical support for our assumptions, we may 
advance another proposition. It is in the social field, or within the 
developmental zone of these socio-centric expectations, where we should 
7 
search for other mechanisms functioning as 11starting mechanisms," using 
Alvin Gouldner 1 s terms, which bring about, or reinforce, the already 
existing, rudimentary normative orientation. Speaking more specifically, 
we maintain that at the point where these two individual- expectati0nal 
forces meet in a vectorial field, they restrict, incorporate, 'transfigure, 
or modifY each other, whilst the value of order, carrying with the pre-
dictive weight for future actions is felt or visualized. Here we may 
locate the primary socio-psychic base, both necessary for mobilization 
of motivational forces, and for grounding of those collective constancies, 
such as values, ideas, and beliefs, underlying impersonal order. Further-
more, another idea might be brought forward. The socio-centric expecta-
tft.ons may gradually acquire the quality of an ideal which, through cathexis. 
and hypercathexis, will appropriate for itself a place of objective power. 
And here again we may be helped by quoting Freud: nwe have learned that 
libidinal impulses are fated to undergo pathogenetic repression if they 
come into conflict with the subject 1 s cultural and ethical ideas. But 
this we do not ever mean: if the individual in question has a merely 
intellectual-knowledge_ of these ideas; we always mean: if he recognizes. 
6Kurt Lewin, Resolving Social Conf~ict: Selected Papers on Group 
Dynamics (New York: Harper, 1948), pass1m. 
7Alvin w. Gouldner, 11The Norm of Reciprocity, 11 American Sociological 
Review, XXV (April 1960), p. 176. 
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them as constituting a standard for himself and acknotiledges the claims 
8 
they make upon him." (Italics ours.) 
If the above mentioned Freudian proposition and our assumptions are 
correct~ then the expectations must acquire new dimension and take on 
new form. We shall call this new expectational category: i d e o -
c e n t r i c e x p e c t a t i o n s. They will refer to the proba-
bility of action, behavior, or attitude of another individual (or indi-
'viduals) contingent upon observance of particular paragons or ma.xims. 
revolving around generic ideas and/or values. The term observance would 
point to some degree of commitment to act according to recognized and 
accepted ideas and/or values in spite of variations in individual pref-
erences and expediency. This requirement to enact the paragons, and the 
concomitant commitment to implement the values, will, presumably, hold 
even though, as Freud stated, the original objects (participants in the 
" )) interaction) were lost. 
In the previous paragraph we hav~ come to the conclusion that the 
emergence of the ideo-centric expectations is related to the emergence 
of trans-individual ideas, beliefs, and values brought forward through 
the interaction process, and validated consensually through this process. 
Notwithstanding the fact that ideas and values are not specific enough 
(the area of their applicability is not always clearly circumscribed), 
it might be further argued that ideas, beliefs, and values belong to the 
dimension of potentiality. Their desirability~ however justified by 
I 
Bsigmund Freud, "On Narcissism: An Introduction," in Collected Papers, 
5 v, author, trans., super., J. Ril7iere (New York: The International 
Psycho-analytical Press, 1924-50), IV, 50. 
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reasoning, morally, or by esthetic judgment, especiallY as it is manifested 
in case of values, lacks the <qualified constraint of a.n nought. n There 
seems to be a great deal of truth in Fritz Heider r s comment:. " ••• 'P values 
-
x' ca.n give rise to ma~ different actions, or to10one at all, whereas 
9 
'P ought to do xr means there is an actual objective force present." At 
this ~oment, it seems appropriate to insert another statement by Heider. 
none might say that 'ought ' arises out of a tendency to equalize the life 
spaces of different persons as well as different moments of the same life 
10 
space. 11 Consequently, 11 ••• if p sees x and o sees x, the x of p and the 
x of o belong together even though they are seen in different ways. The 
tw0 x's form a unit and therefore cannot have contradictory properties. 
The establishment of cognitive reality rests upon a synthesis o~ these 
two different ~spects, a synthesis furthered by the intersubjective 
11 . 
validity of :~o ght'. 11 Similarly, Gouldner speaks about the emerging :- · 
- - 12 
"norm of recip ocity. 11 Also, Jean Piaget r s concept "moral realism," de-
noting the stage when the individual discriminates a rule from an· aspect 
of a concrete solidary or antagonistic relationship, seems to be addressed 
to the same problem. Even though this may seem to be marginal in regard 
to our problem, it may prove to be worthwhile to explore whether we do 
not face, de facto, a new dimension which, perhaps, could be designated 
as esthetic component. The nature of the topic, however, calls for a 
I 
9Fritz Heider, The Psychology of Interpersonal Relations (New York: 
J. Wiley & Sons, 1958), P• 224. 
10~., P• 222. 
llrbid. 
12Gouldner, op. cit., p. 171. 
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future and separate treatment. 
The command of the growing objective, intersubjectively validated 
force of an "ought" must produce a change in the expectational sphere. 
When ideas and values take on a more circumscribed and specific form as 
rules endowed with "binding stigma" (Theodor Geiger's term), then these 
norms or standards must bring into existence also specific expectations. 
We shall call this expectational categor.y: n o r m - c e n t r i c 
e x p e c t a t i o n s. They will refer to the probability of action, 
behaviorJ or attitude of another individual (or individuals), contingent 
upon observance of certain norms legitimately claiming conformity.13 
Once these normative expectations become internalized, they become the 
focus of the organization of the system of action. When we, further, 
conceive of the dyad as a social system, then we encounter the second 
aspect of the Parsonian problem of order: order in the mutuality 0f 
motivational orientation to the normative aspect of expectations. To 
underscore the importance of internalized normative expectations for the 
social system, let us quote Abram Kardiner: 11If the Superego is inade-
quate and there is no internalization of discipline) we cannot expect 
the society to have a.ny interest in social justice, in a judicial system, 
or even in a govermnent.nlh 
13A norm may be provisionally defined as a general social model for 
motivatianal ana action arientation. 
lhAbram Xardiner et al., The :Psychological Frontiers af Society (New 
York: Columbia University Press, 1956), p. 252 •. 
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Differential Effectiveness and Imperativeness 
of Expectational Systems 
After having presented a large set of assumptions, propositions, and 
definitions, it now appears necessary to elaborate on some of the under-
lying ideas, and to clarify some of the most crucial concepts. First of 
all, we may start with a general statement that the primary socio-psychic 
base, solidified and expanded by common ideational elements, is an area 
of germination and incfupient crystallization of normative orientation. 
For convenience sake, we are going to call this base~ n o r m a t i v e 
r a d i x. It would be a matter of closer~examination to find out to 
what extent our noti9n of "normative radix11 compares with the notion 
"cortically trapped universals,u propounded by some neurologists and 
introspective psychologists. 
·To add details to the suggested concept normative radix, we should 
emphasize that three analytically discernible factors are implicated in 
this concept. They are: responsiveness, discipline, and responsibility. 
Responsiveness involves a higher degree of readiness to react to influ-
ences, appeals, efforts, etc.; it stands in contrast to a formal re~onse. 
Discipline has to be. defined as an ability or capacity to self-control. 
Responsibility, finally, denotes accountability for actions and conse-
quences; in our case, also, ger.minati ve ability to meet a burden of obli-
gation. 
As can already be inferred from the previously made statements, our 
theoretical position differs from that held by deontologists in one 
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respect mainly; the implied notion of obligation is not conceived of as 
a direct apprehension of something which is binding directly. ContrarilY, 
it is conceived as a product of an interaction, indirectly apprehended, 
and grounded in a cathexically charged interdependence. .At this point, 
still another remark must be added. While we recognize and accept the 
relevance of cognitive elements in an interaction setting, we cannot over-
look the importance of affective elements. .As a matter of fact, we put 
a great emphasis upon sentiments, emotions and feelings which play an im-
portant role in the organization and perpetuation of the beliefs and 
values. Paret-o, perhaps, would speak an behalf of our position. In this 
respect, therefore, we diverge from the position of cognitivelY minded 
social ps,ychologists. 
Two questions remain still to be answered. They may restate what we 
have previously said, but also they may clarify, to some extent, our 
notion of the normative radix. When the question as to the time aspect 
of the normative radix is raised, we hold that the past, present and 
future fuse here almost imperceptively. Our assertion seems to be in 
agreement with .Asch who maintains that: 11 ••• human actions are extended 
spatia-temporal events having a definite form. n1 Second, when the deper-
sonalization of expectations is viewed as a motivational process, we may 
assume that normative orientation does not simply occur through the 
mechanical pressure of the contingency, but rather that the creative 
powers (or needs) of individuals are building up conditions necessar.r 
for both internal and external homeostasis. When seen in terms of its 
lAsch, op. cit., p. 377. 
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functianal significance for a social system, this motivational component 
maybe described as an adaptive mechanism serving the purpose of main-
taining solidarity or cohesion of the system, on one hand, and facilita-
ting the attainment of goal, or goals, on the other hand. Thus, it 
serves both expressive and instrumental ends of the system. When, further, 
it is considered from the point of view of its functional significance for 
an individual, the anchoring of expectations in the normative radix can 
be defined as a built-in mechanism serving the purpose of holding in check 
the individual 1 s drift from reciprocal contingency, and in forestalling 
those actions which may prove to be to his own detr:iJnent. It, also, may 
be seen as an adjustive mechanism which regulates the affective ambiva-
lence and sustains the strain toward pattern consistency. 
In addition, it remains for us to clarify some problems connected 
with imperativeness and effectiveness of expectational systems. To estab-
lish any meaningful propositions in this field, we should ask, pr:iJnarily, 
two relevant questions. One, what is the nature of constraint? Second, 
how and why does this constraint differ in scope and range? 
In describing several categories of expectations, we have not tlealt 
directly with the problems of the nature of constraint; likewise we did 
not raise the question of its scope and range. Nevertheless, we trust it 
has become evident that the nature of the constraint, and also its range 
and scope was changing from category to category. While in the category 
of idio-centric expectations the constraint was rather narrowly exerted 
by psychological structure and/or a physiological organism functioning 
as a system, and the scope and range encapsuled the particular individual; 
in socio-centric expectations the nature of the constraint changed due to 
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the socio-psychic factors. Consequently, the range and scope broadened 
by taking into account a second person involved in the interaction. In 
the third category, that is, in ideo-centric expectations, a noticeable 
change occurred in the structure of the constraint. The personal factors, 
constituting the base of the constraint, were permeated and reinforced 
with other factors represented by impersonal ideas and values. Owing to 
this fact, the range reached the level of potentiality to encompass unit 
or units other than the simple dyad. However, despite _t¥-s significant· 
change, signaling the beginning of a more stable order in the dyad, the 
scope of the constraint was still limited because it worked within the 
limits of the 11desirable. 11 To put it differently, although strong beliefs 
in the rightness of the recognized and accepted ideas and values were at 
work, and though the criteria of what is right and wrong were justified 
and £elt as binding, constraint did not reach the highest level of an 
effective and specific force. 
It was not until the emergence of norms stipulating what ought to be 
done and what ought to be avaided, that the structure of constraint was 
I 
exposed to a radical change._ "While the norms have been endowed with 
authority, the strength and legitimacy of expectations, relative to those 
narms, rose to a new height. How does one explain the nature of constraint 
based, as it is, on authority? And, what is authority? In order to ex." 
plore the nature of authority, let us return to Mead's theory. 
Mead asserted that one of the basic aspects of.the social process is 
11that the social process, through the connnunication which !it:.makes pas-
sible among the individuals implicated in it, is responsible for the 
appearance of a whole set of new objects in nature, which exist in relation 
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to it. n2 Similarly, Ernst Cassirer describes the symbolic system as "a 
new dimension of reality. n3 Meaning, in Mead's words, "is a development 
gf something objectively there as a relation between certain phases of 
the social act; it is not a psychical addition to that act and it is not 
an 1idea 1 as traditionally conceived. 11 4 Once the meaning is objectively 
in the social field, it claims the conformity of actors who know it and 
want to interact on a meaningful level.5 It exerts an impersonal con-
straint on actors in both cognitive and expressive spheres, thus impera-
tivelY coordinating the interaction and relationship. It functions norma-
tively. 
The significance and applicability of Mead's formal model seems to 
be g0ing rather farther than the field of meaning only. It opens the 
p0ssibility of expanding its use to the explanation 0f the nature of 
authority. 
In support 0f this view let us first restate Mead's basic thesis. 
In advancing his theory, Mead maintains that the "three-fold relationship 
constitutes the matrix [italics 0ur~ within which meaning arises, or 
which develops into the field of meaning. n6 The mechanism of meaning 
~ead, op. cit., p. 79. 
3Ernst Cassirer, An Ess~ on Man (Garden City, New York~ Doubleday 
& Company, 1953), p. 43. 
4Mead, op. cit., p. 76. 
5The same assertion is also made by M. Halbwachs, who says:: 11Rien ne 
l'oblige a s'exprimer correctement, puisqu 1il ne cherche pas a se.faire 
comprendre par les autres. 11 See his w0rk on Les Cadres Sociaux de la 
Memoire (1925), p. 78. 
~ead, loc. cit. 
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consists of a relationship among phases of social acts; it is present in 
the social act before the emergence of consciousness or awareness of 
meaning. 
What has been said about the mechanism of meaning seems to be equally 
applicable to the field of socio-centric, ideo-centric, and norm-centric 
expectations. It is this threefold relationship which constitutes the 
matrix within which the meaning of these expectations arises. These ex-
pectations would be meaningless if viewed apart from the social acts in 
which they are implicated and from which they derive their relevance. 
The constraint which operates in and throughout these expectations is to 
some measure the joint creation of interacting individuals as actors. 
The order to which the actors are subjected requires, as Max Weber affirms, 
"a certain minimwn of voluntary submission.••7 However, there seems to be 
a difference apparently in the modes by which these expectations are sys-
tematized. In the first category, that is, in socio-centric expectations 
the order seems to be of a more or less mechanical type; it grows out of 
mutual adaptation and adjustment, and need not explicitly contain the 
principle of limiting the area of legitimacy of expectations. 
The ideo-centric and norm-centric expectations, on the other hand, 
grow out of the common pursuits of values which claim legitimacy in the 
area of their operation. But here again the system of order differs. 
While in the ideo-centric expectations the primary focus of the system 
is the belief in justifiability of the 11desirability11 of order, in the 
norm-centric expectations the primary focus of the system is the belief 
in the legitimacy of the enforceability of order. The normative 
7weber, op. cit., p. 324. 
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expectations include both:: the right to claim conformity, and the right 
to enforce conformity; in other words, they carry with them both obliga-
toriness and effectiveness. What is most important, however, they work 
within the "field of authority, 11 which is, as Kenneth Benne defines the 
term, 11the principle of limitation 0f the area of legitimate operation 
of the bearer of' authority as 'authority' • 118 Authority is conceived· not 
as mystical phenomenon, but, in Benne's formulation, 11a complex relational 
occurrence - a triadic relationship between subject, bearer and field. u9 
If we take these ideas for granted, then we may contend that in the 
field of norm-centric expectations, the actors are at once sustainers 
and subjects of authority, yet they are not bearers of authority. The 
bearer of authority is the de-individualized norm. The norm and its 
authority is in the .field; it is justified before the judgment of the 
subjects, and limited in its claim to conformity and in its right to 
enforcement. The scope and range of its legitimate constraint may well 
be designated as a 11 systemic finality." This means, according t0 Benne, 
that finality is ultimate within the field (or system) defined by the 
10 
norm. 
We may conclude this chapter with a short sunnnary statement. During 
the interaction, which can be described as a process of structuralization, 
systematization, and realization of expectations, several expectational 
systems may emerge. They permeate one another, and they impinge une upon 
8Kenneth D. Benne, A Conception of Authority (New·York~ Teachers 
College, Columbia University, 1943), p. 67. 
9Ibid., p. 39. 
10~., p. 68. 
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another. As a result of this interpenetration they may exhibit both a 
reinforcing effect and/or cancelling out effect in regard to ultimate 
(the term 'ultimate' does not imply any metaphysical notion) normative 
orientation. Pluralism of these expectational schemes, or, more speci-
fically, the relative weight of any of these expectational schemes~ 
present in the particular all-inclusive system, accounts for variations 
in existing social systems. Secondly, three processes influencing func-
tioning of the social s.ystem m~ be distinguished and defined as mecha-
nisms facilitating the emergence of norm-centric expectations: (1) mecha-
nism of meaning, (2) mechanism of normative radix, and (30 mechanism of 
authority. All of these are grounded in a triadic matrix. Generally, 
the expectations may be arranged along this continuum: personal, inter-
personal, impersonal. 
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Articulation and Differentiation of Normative $ystems 
In previous chapters we have dealt mainly with the situational and 
socio-psychic phenomena related to the smallest group, the dyad. From 
now on, we shall trace human plurals larger than the simple dyadic unit. 
However, we shall not be concerned with scattered and casual human clus-
ters, or aggregates, but with collectivities held together by a distinc-
tive set of social relations. 
Let us begin with a preliminary statement that we are not going to 
discuss ecological determinan~s of the interactional pattern, although 
they certainly maypl~ a very important role in the formation of a group. 
As previously, we shall deal with socio-psychic and cultural factors re-
lated to the grou]>, as these m~ affect or mold the conduct of its indi-
vidual members vis-a-vis other members. We take it for granted that 
common characteristics within the group, such as propinquity, status 
similarity., sense of belonging, emotional response to the notion "we, 11 
meaningfulness and persistence in interaction, lead in the direction of 
socially significant expectational generalizations. Moreover, if these 
general expectational patterns include a long term perspective and have 
a long, or longer, apperceptive span, then one can recognize certain 
structural properties involving 'nuclear' criteria for social conduct, 
which already display some regulative qualities. Applying our typology 
of expectations, they represent an intermediate type standing in between 
the ideo-centric and norm-centric expectations. These 'nuclear expecta-
tions' refer to, and depend upon, observance of various pre-ideologies, 
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or ideologies, maxims, ~nd social paragons concerning such fundamental 
issues as freedom, integrity, security, inter-~ersonal trust, and similar 
problems. We call them nuclear because, firs·t;, these expectations repre-
sent a primar,y base for any orderly interconnectedness of a plurality of 
relationships, and belong_ to the constitutive elements of the human group. 
Secondly, these nuclear expectations, when seen frnm~he point of view of 
building a system of legal expectations, form a focal point around which 
the legal system revolves and the basis from which it unfolds. 
Generally speaking, they may be defined as.organically created regu-
larities, reflecting the inarticulated, broad category of primary models 
for conduct. Georg Jellinek 1s theory of the normative power of the actual 
(Normative Kraft der Faktischen) contains similar ideas. In Timasheff's 
interpretation: "Every time a certain situation arises that seems to have 
become permanently established, the idea arises that it is as 'it ought to 
be' • ul In classifying these nuclear models for condu~t, different schemes 
of designations may be used. Thus, for instance, many anthropologists 
would speak about custom. The sociologist Geig~r would bring them under 
the category of subsistent norms. Our preference will be to call them: 
i m p e r ~ e c t ~m o r m~s. 
It is maintained that these types of imperfect·nor.ms, despite their 
attributed effectiveness, can function reliably only in non-complex soci-
etal units. For these norms lack usually both precision in the form, and 
the specificity of sociologically structured constraint, so much needed 
in any large scale society. Their perpetuation, as numbers of scholars 
lN.S. Timasheff, .An Introduction to the Sociology of Law (Cambridge: 
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Harvard University Committee on Research Xn the So9ial Sciences, 1939), p. 121. 
declare, is a matter 0f a habitual adherence, while the compliance with 
them is sustained by such diffuse acts as, for example, verbal admonition, 
deference, scorn, ridicule, ostracism, expulsion from the unit, and so on. 
The pratagonist of the 'law of effect 1 theory 1'1ould put it differently_, 
saying that patterns of interactien and related expectations will be sus-
tained or modified by the punitive or gratifying consequences of such 
interaction. 
It has bec0me evident that the weakness of these nuclear norms was 
due to the looseness of their constraint. This wealrness may lead, further, 
to another imperfection; the sanctions need not always be rigidly applied. 
Another word should still be added. We have introduced the theory accor-
ding to which the perpetuation of nuclear norms, or models, appears to be 
a matter of habitual adherence to them. Yet it should be emphasized that 
the adherence to these conduct models cannot be simply explained in terms 
ef automatic acquiescence and instinctive submission to them. As Bronislaw 
Malinowski has trenchantly suggested, to explain the binding mechanism of 
custem, it will be necessary to examine the complex or psychological and 
social inducements, and analyze motives, interests, and complex sentiments. 
Similarly, we have described some of the mechanisms facilitating the emer-
gence of nor.matively.functioning expectations. 
In the previous paragraphs we have implicitly stated that the out-
lined type of order would fit well within that type of society which 
Ferdinand T6ennies described as 1Gemeinschaft 1 • 2 For that reaso~1 we 
assume that once the structural distance increases, that is, when the 
2Ferdinand T6ennies, Community and Society, trans. and ed. C.P~ Loomis 
(East Lansing, Michigan~ The Michigan State University Press, 1957), passim. 
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members Gf the group, caught up in a complex of its relational network, 
are engaged in a variety of personal and impersonal relationships, the 
socio-structural change calls for and brings forth a change in the norma-
tive structure of the group. To put it differently, the nature of the 
'Gesellschaft' type of the societal structure, and the scope and range 
of the societal problems will generate a need for a more definite and 
specific form of existing, or newly arising expectations, fGr a new mode 
through which the pressure for conformity will be applied and power of 
the group exerted, and, eventually, for the formalization of the process 
of their interpretation. Such a situation may arise, for example, in 
primitive societies when a segmental society has to combat internal cen-
trifugal forces, deal with resulting cleavages, secure the cooperation, 
or cope with pressing external problems. In such instances, the nuclear 
models, serving the purpose of a limited number of societal segments, 
may be also transferred either gradually, or suddenly, by force (e.g., 
by conquest), or,peacefully to other segments or social groups. 
· His'tiory and the empirical studies of primitive societies are teaching 
us that this formative and transferential process is by no means simple. 
It takes time before the main core of these nuclear maxims and paragons 
become full-fledged, or perfect norms. A long time also passes before 
the various types of social norms,. existing alreaqy or emerging, become 
articulated so that they will finally represent distinguishable normative 
systems regulating different spheres or aspects of social life, e.g., 
moral, religious, legal. At this level, the verbalized norm would exert 
programmatically a pressure to the',extent that it would be regarded as 
one authoritatively imposed and unconditionally binding. Equally, the 
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norm will be sustained qy a distinct, sociologically structured constraint, 
exercised in a s.ystematic manner by a proper social agency. Simultane-
ously, normative complexes might emerge which would cluster around a par-
ticular aim-content. Once the group reaches the stage when expectations 
of its individual members vis-a-vis other members assume the form of sta-
bilized and patterned expectations on a cultural basis, so that they can 
be transmitted as organized entities, the group's order may be described 
as an institutional integration. 
Disregarding culturally defined content of various norms for this 
moment, and considering the level of their formulation, the degree of 
their norma;tive empl_lasis, and the structure of sociological constraint 
as relevant, the norms may be arra:aged along a continuum ranging from 
imperfect to perfect norms. 
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Categorical Criteria of Legal Norms 
In mapping ou~ our problem areas, and in preparing the grounds for 
a specific discussion en legal phenomena, we have found that the presence 
of certain general characteristics signalized the existence ef a normative 
syst:em. This had suggested the idea that a search for the existence of 
any normative order in any seciety should be guided by definite criteria 
related to these characteristics. To obtain this guidance, it remaiBs 
to formulate these criteria. They are: 
1. General cenformity by the members of the greup; 
2. Failure to conform treated as a subject for criticism, "you ought 
not 11 ; 
3. Demands for conformity treated as justified, 11you ought ton.1 
It has become evident that the frequency distribution, though a very 
important statistical fact revealing regularity, could not serve as the 
sole index of the normative orientation; it has been shown that the regu-
larity of action, serving as a primary indicator of a nermative orienta-
tion, must be supplemented by answering two other questions. One, whether 
the action being undertaken or omitted had an "ought" character. Second, 
. 
whether and why this "ought" was treated as legitimate, authoritatively 
given. While the scrut~ of the facts covered by the second criterion 
may simultaneously help to discover a differential normative emphasis, 
the analysis of the facts related to the third criterion may lead to the 
disclosure of the basis of the legitimacy of an existing order. 
lFor.mulated on the basis of personal discussion with Professor H.L.A. 
Hart from Oxford University. 
37 
The use of these general testing principles would likely, on the 
whole, reveal the complexity of order.. Therefore, to single out consti-
tuent parts of this normative compound, more refined criteria must be 
formulated in order to circumscribe and define individual systems com-
posing a normative complex •. In the oncoming paragraphs of this chapter, 
we shall make an attempt to discuss, first, the bases of law, and then, 
to formulate categorical criteria of legal norms. This procedure would 
also represent a systematic approach to the problem of social control. 
As it is anticipated, 2t m~ result in the specification of: (1) the 
type of the exercised control, (2) the means and methods by which this 
control operates, and ( 3) what agencies stand behind this control. 
Generalization 
Now that we have described the formative and transference period of 
of norms and standards as a process, we should next search for those 
qynarnic factors which underlie and affect the structuralization of prop-
erties or attributes of legal norms. 
In previous chapters we have already pointed out that during the 
expansion and consolidation of the human group, the heterogeneous and 
particular expectations of the nuclear type are gradually transformed 
into a more or less homogeneous and general expectational system. To put 
it differently, the depersonalized expectations are becoming desegmen-
talized, a change which we m~ describe as the transition from particular-
ism in nuclear models to general nuclear models, or imperfect norms. This 
attribute, which we shall call generality, is one of the constitutive 
parts accounting, even at an elementary level, for that intrinsic and 
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essential element of any legal rule called universality and impersonality. 
Secularization 
It may be presumed that nuclear models and expectations related to 
them are permeated with supernatural beliefs of different types. This 
would certainly apply to preliterate societies. Even here, however, a 
word of caution needs to be added. As David Schneider remarks, for in-
stance, 11The crime [with discernible frequenej] must be linked with pun-
ishment which is likely to occur if the punishment is to be regarded as 
supernaturally caused. 112 Thus, at one moment or another this penumbrated 
and often ineffective constraint, employing the wrath of vigilant non-
empirical entities, must be brought down to earth. Durkheim speaks about 
dissociation between law and religion. Malinowski. puts it very succinctly, 
saying that "There must be in.all societies a class of rules too practical 
to be backed by religious sanctions, too burdensome to be left to mere 
goodwil, too personally vital to individuals to be enforced by any ab-
stract agency. n3 Fer this reason the binding force must seek a more posi-
tive foundation, and be anchored preeminently in the human group. We 
shall call this component, which accounts for the differentiation of legal 
norms as well for their mundane effectiveness, secularity. 
In spite of this secularization, the potentiality of a help from 
supernatural entities, and the latent power to strike and punish, doe~ 
not need to be completely lost. As a residuum it may still offer its 
2navid M. Schneider, "Political Organization, Supernatural Sanctions 
and the Punishment for Incest in Yap, 11 American Anthropologist, LIX 
(October 1957), 799. 
3Bronislaw Malinowski, Crime and Custom in Savage Society (London: 
Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1951), pp. 67-68. 
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assistance, and cumulatively exercise power, or support the power of 
worldly authorities. The vanishing or weakened belief systems m~ still 
pr.oduce effects: by invisible means. As Malinowski perceptively recog-
nized, one can notice na normative influence of myth on custom. 114 The 
ascertainment of the presence of such non-empirical elements, and the 
assessment of the degree of their influence may serve as a typological 
criterion. According to Georges Gurvitch, legal typology of inclusive 
societies starts with legal systems of poly-segmentar,y societies having 
a magico-religious basis.5 
Rationalizati.on 
I 
As a consequence of the growth of a P-articular segment or segments 
and their interpenetration and, also, otiing to the growing division of 
labor and structural differentiation, social relationships would tend to 
become more diffuse. Accordingly, the patterns of interaction, being 
predominantly of a personal type, may gradually change into m more or 
,· 
.. less impersonal type. It may be presumed that due to the concomitant 
change in the emotional sphere (emotional recession), and changing type 
of solidarity--Durkheim's organic solidarity--, the expectations impreg-
' 
nated with irrJiional and non-rational elements would tend to be more 
rationally oriented. This process, then, in all probability, must affect 
... 
the structuralization of emerging norms or standards; likewise, it must 
.~'/ 
lead to a restructuralization of existing nuclear models. We shall call 
4Br·onislaw'Malinowski, Argonauts of the Western Pacific (London: 
George Routledge and Sons, 1922), p. 328 • 
. 
5Georges G~tch, Sociology of Law (London: Kegan P.aul, Trench, 
Trubner & Compaqy, 1947), p. 2o4. 
40 
this component rationality. The impact of this tendency will be felt in 
both parts of the normative system: substantive and procedural. The 
ascertainment of different degrees of rational elements in existing norms 
or standards may be utilized for classification of legal norms. In the 
way just indicated, and using Weber's categories, legal norms could be 
classified as: formally irrational, substantively irrational, logically 
rational, and substantively rational. 6 
Formalization and Systemization of Constraint 
In spite of their progressive generalization, secularization, and 
rationalization~ the consolidated normative models may show a considerable 
weakness in their operation, especially in the structure of the constraint 
exercised on behalf of normative conformity. It is assumed, therefore, 
that once a need arises to replace simple spontaneous reaction, diffuse 
approval-disapproval scheme, or casual judgments with a more or less pro-
nounced, specified, and effective control, or qualified constraint, the 
impact of this trend must be felt in three ways. First 1dll arise the 
need to make existing, socially vital and practical conduct models known 
in explicit or formal terms. This does not necessarily require an act 
of codification. The normative models might be originally verbalized in 
a simple way, reported and transmitted orally (eventually by reciting or 
singing). Secondly, the growing demand for systematic controlling pro-
cesses may carry, generate, and/or accelerate a need for standards or 
norms of implementation, and for standardization of rule-making procedures. 
6Max Weber, Max Weber on Law in Economy and Society, ed., annotated 
M. Rheinstein, trans. E. Shils and M. Rheinstein (Cambridge~ Massachusetts~ 
Harvard University Press, 1954), p. 63. 
We shall call this element formality. Third, the growing emphasis on 
effective means and ultimate secular authority will bring forth a demand 
for proper sociological media acting as implementing and controlling 
agencies. Two problems especially have to be solved. One concerning 
definition of pertinent roles; another concerning the structure fer allo-
cation and legitimizatiqn of these roles. Once such a stage is reached, 
we may designate it as a stage of institutionalization. In enacting their 
roles, and pronouncing upon the right and wrong of specific actiens, men 
will vindicate their po'tier by referring to nerms operating within the 
field of 'systemic finality•. 7 We do consider the emergence of juridical 
norms and juridical roles as a decisive moment in the process differen-
tiating legal rules or norms (law) from other nerms. We shall· call this 
critical element or property of law qualified constraint. In typological 
terms, finally, this kind of control through law will be called legal 
control. 
7Attesting to the fact of system consistencies is the tendency to 
self-limitation. In modern terminology: relevant precedent (stare decisis). 
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Conclusion and Formulation of a Tentative Definition of Law 
It is our main thesis that the social order is an aspect of the 
coordination of social life; it arises out of interaction, and depends 
upon these elements of action which we call norm-centric expectations. 
~he presence of norm-centric expectations represents one of the crucial 
elements constituting, integrating and stabilizing a social s,ystem.1 
Therefore we can call those sociologists who s,ystematically build their 
theories upon these premises sociological normativists. 
Farther, it is our contention that social order consists of a plu-
rality of normative s,ystems. Some of them belon.g to the same continuum, 
for instance, usage, convention, law. Within such or similar continuum 
one may discover a gradual transition from one type to another. In order 
to define the zones and modes of functions of existing normative systems, 
it is necessar,r to find their differentia specifica. We maintain that 
the categorical criteria of law are: generality, rationality, secularity, 
formality, and qualified constraint. 
To underscore the importance of the fundamental notions::.implied in 
the previously described criteria of legal norms, we should briefly re-
state their meanings. 
1. General means pertaining to an all-inclusive social eystem, or 
larger segment of such a s.ystem. 
2. SecUlar refers to human, or, more specifically, societal resources 
lsee, for example, Talcott Parsons, The Social System, p. 11 andp. 36. 
Note the strategic place Parsons assigns to comcepts such as "normative 
orientation," or "motivational orientation to the normative aspect of ex-
pectations. n 
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of power. Power in general is conceived of as generated by a network of 
bounded relationships performing functions of a political nature, or able 
to perfo~ functions equivalent to a politicallY organized society. 
3. Rational denotes derived from reasoning and having cognitive 
basis. 
4. F<:>rmal refers to external regularities in structure of norms, 
procedural modes, and controlling sociological units. 
5. Qualified stands for endowed with authority, structurally and 
functionallY differentiated, and with ultimatelY limited area of opera-
tion. 
6. Constraint stands for a potential or actual power to direct or 
control. 
Finally, imview of all that we have already. expoimded, we propose 
the following tentative definitien of law. Law is a system of generalized 
and formalize~ rational expectational models sustained by a qualified 
secular cc:>nstraint. In using the notion of system, we are accentuating 
the fact that law cannot be understood as a simple aggregate of isolated 
and randomly created expectational models; contrariwise, we maintain that 
it is composed of interrelated and interdependent parts excluding the 
incompatibility of expectations. B,y including the notions of generalized 
expectational models, we are underscoring the importance of the inter-
action process for the growth, of law and fer its function. The idea of 
formality, further, refers not only to the structuralization of noms or 
ex:pectational models (conduct models), but also pertains to the stipula-
ti<:>n of norms of competence (procedural or juridical models). Finally, 
by" including the notion of qualified constraint we emphasize the legitimacy 
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and differentiation of controlling agencies. Thus, when translated into 
action, qualified constraint, legitimized by impersonal juridical norms 
and ultimately operating within the field defined by these norms, is 
exercised by persons acting as incumbents of sociologically differentiated 
roles (e.g., elders, judges, etc.). In its secondar.y aspect, it is exe-
cuted by various implementing organs such as members of particular age-
groups, societies, etc. Owing to the differentiated sociological struc-
ture of control, law assumes a distinct place in the normative system of 
a society. 
In the light of the previous statement we may also answer another 
related psychological question of what may be called 'legal consciousness'. 
This may be defined as the apprehension of the relevant link between two 
sets of norms, one which defines expectational or conduct models, and 
another which defi~s and sets forth a distin~t implementing and con-
trolling mechanism operating ultimately within the field of systemic 
finality. 
In concluding we reiterate that the attribute qualified constraint 
represents the modal and crucial criterion for distinguishing the legal 
norm from other expectation models existing within a pluralism of norma-
tive systems. Because the notion of impersonality of authority underlies 
our notion of constraint, and because it is considered as the primar,r and 
most decisive component of it, our theoretical position differs from the 
general theoretical positions held by Durkheim, Weber, Hoebel, Malinowski, 
Radcliffe-Brown, and Llewelyn, who, in defining law, regard the presence 
of coercive machinery, or ppysical force, as the law's crucial element. 
• < 
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PART TWO 
" 
Selection of the Sample of Societies Analyzed 
The social greups which will be analyzed in subsequent chapters are 
exclusively African societies. As the secondary empirical data show, 
these relatively small scale societies assume various forms. But; con-
sidered as a whole, they display a common merphological characteristic 
in that they lack centralized power. For this reason, for example, the 
crude typological scheme formulated by M. Fortes and E.E. Evans-Pritchard, 
and distinguishing two main political categor~es~ Group A representing 
'primitive states 1 and Group B referring to stateless societies, would 
subsume all of them under Group B, showing lack of government.1 When cate-
gorized in this way, they would, in general, stand in a very sharp con-
trast to such societies as belong to Group A, described as 'primitive 
states'. 
While it is true that all societies included in our sample are 
generally characterized by a lack of centralized power~ we do not believe 
that they represent a simple undifferentiated typological block. Differ-
ent classes could emerge when using another set of criteria. John Middleton 
1According to Fortes and Evans-Pritchard, "Group B consists of those 
societies which lack centralized authority, administrative machinery, and 
constituted judicial institutions--in short which lack government--and in 
which there are no sharp divisions of rank, status and wealth. This group 
comprises the Logoli, the Tallensi, and the Nuer. 11 
"Group A consists of those societies which have centralized authority, 
administrative machinery, and judicial institutions--in short, a govern-
ment--and in rrhich cleavages of wealth, privilege, and status correspond 
to the distribution of power and authority. This group comprises the Zulu, 
the Ngwato, the Bemba, the Banyankole, and the Kede. 11 M. Fortes and E.E. 
Evans-Pritchard, African Political Systems (Londom Oxford.University 
Press, 19.5.5) , p. 
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and David Tait, for instance, provide us with more accurate basis for 
classification:: 
1. degrees of specialization of the roles that enter into palitical 
and administrative activities; 
2. the number of structural levels at which authority is exercised; 
3. the principle of relationship between political [juridica:iJ func-
tionary and subject. 2 
When such criteria are employed, then our societies would seem to belong 
to intermediate types standing between Group A and Group B. 
Our interest in that part of anthropological quadrivium called poli-
tical organization is directly related to our interest in law and in the 
administration of justice.3 Let us explain. It has been said that one of 
the most important functions of a politically organized society is the 
maintenance of law and order. Rigidly interpreted, law and order would 
exist only in those societies which are politically organized. In turn, 
. 
societies lacking political organization would lack also preconditions 
for maintaining law and order. They would represent a state of anarchy. 
Notwithstanding all objections of "pathetic fallacy," we may, however, 
defend the theoretical position which holds that societies lacking cen-
tralized power may perform functions comparable to those functions per-
formed by a politically organized society.4 In other words~ there would 
2John Middleton and David Tait, Tribes Without Rulers (London: Rout-
ledge & Kegan Paul, 1958), p. 2. 
3This quadrivium consists of kinship, political organization, economy, 
and religion. See S.F'. Nadel, A Black Byzantium (London: Oxford University 
Press, 1946), passim. 
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4Here we recall the phrase of Professor Seagle castigating Bronislaw 
Malinowski for indulging in 11the pathetic fallacy of primitive jp.risprudence. 11 
William Seagle, "Primitive Law and Bronislaw Malinowski," American Anthro-
pologist XXXIX (1937), 283._ 
be an equi-valence in functions but not an equivalence in structure. With 
respect to law, to be sure, the constraint will be sociologically struc-
tured, but it would differ mainly in the degree of its formality. 
As it is evident, our definition of law differs from other conven-
tional and wide~ accepted definitions of law because the meaning of the 
notion 'qualified constraint' is not restricted to the forces of politi-
cally organized society. For that reason it may provide room for diverse 
social phenomena such as, for example, institutionalized reprisal or self-
help, supported directly by public sentiments. While reprisal and self-
help are sociological~ non-differentiated modes of control, they are 
legitimized and represent, functionally speaking, a residual, or aborig-
inal method of legal contro1.5 The above-mentioned notion of 'qualified 
constraint' is also capable of encompassing ritual and supernatural sane-
tions, recognized by the whole community, and serving as indirect penal 
sanctions. Likewise, it is able to accommodate conventionally recognized 
forms of procedures supported by sentiments of the total community. 
Concretely, our representative sample will comprise these societies: 
The Bantu of North Kavirondo, 'the Hottentots, the Ibo and Ibibio, the 
Kikuyu and Kamba, the Lunda-Ndembu, the Nuer, the Tiv, the Tallensi, the 
Western Dinka, and the YakB. 
5This standpoint helps to explain the distinction between murder 
(crime) and homicide (legitimized or legalized). 
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Social Norms and Social Conduct: 
Problems of Conformity, Deviance and Variance 
In previous chapters we have been using the term ~without elabo-
rating upon it. Therefore, in order to clari:fzy" the meairl.ng of this im-
portarrt concept it seems to be useful to put the term briefly in histori-
cal context • 
. The etymology of the Latin word norma is shrouded in mystery. No 
straight Indo-European origin suggests itself. The early meaning is a 
technical one, viz., 'carpenters' square for measuring right angles, 
hence, 1rule, 1 'model.' Thus, for example, Vitruvius, a writer on archi-
tecture, speaks about "anguli ad normam respondentes. 11 The word is often 
coupled with •regula,' 'rule,' 'line,' and it is a purely classical wo~d 
without natural posterity (only learned transplanting) in the Romance 
languages. 
The technical connotation invites a ver.y crude, almost a common 
sense, definition, according to which a norm would stand £or a model for 
measuring social angles: that is, those structural properties of human 
relationship which require or beg for a regularity and stability; in sum, 
for an orderlimess. Even on an unformalized level, behavioral and atti-
tudinal patterns, representing de facto regularity of behavior and carrying 
.....__ ---
some quantum of de facto obedience to, or acquiescence in such regularities, 
function as ordering factors influencing the course of social life. Once 
generally accepted and recognized as binding models--we m~ almost say 
accepted ~ necessitate--the typical use of the norm, or reference to the 
5o 
action in accordance with the norm, represeRts a standard for criticism. 
Finally, when they are technically more developed, especially with an 
increasing element of rationality, they represent A useful coordinating 
device for planning and securing the harmonious and desired articulation 
of social parts, and contributing to the achievement of various social 
ends. 
These rather general ideas m~ help us to ref0rmulate 0ur provisional 
definition of s0cial norm. Social norm may be defined as 11 a specific 
ought or ought not" recognized explicitly or implicitly as a binding model 
for attitudinal or behavioral (action) 0rientation on both the individual 
and group level. For c0mparis0n, two other definitions of n0rm may be 
introduced. One, by Hans Kelsen, according to whom "norm is a rule pre-
scribing or forbidding a certain behavior.u1 Another, by A. Zaleznik, 
C.R. Christensen, and F.J. Roethlisberger, who define norm as na limited 
idea of what is desirable.rr2 We believe that the'tw0 latter definitions 
carry the same meaning as that contained in ours. 
A careful reader m~ notice that none of the three mentioned defini-
tions operate with the term "verbal" in qualifying the term "ought," 0r 
rule. .As far as our definition of norm is concerned, we shall shortly 
explain why. When, for example, Parsons defines norm, he s~s that a 
"norm is a verbal gtalics our;_) description of a concrete course of 
action thus regarded as desirable, combined with an injunction to make 
certain future actions conform to this course. rr3 To say that a norm is a 
lHans Kelsen, What is Justice (Berkeley: University of California 
Press, 1957), p. 210. 
2A. Zaleznik, C.R. ehristensen, and F.J. Roethlisberger, The Metiva-
ti0n, Productivity, aRd Satisfaction of Workers (Boston: Harvard Un2versity 
Press,. 1958), p. 44. 
3T. Parsons, The Structure of Social .Action, p. 75. 
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verbal description is not only inaccurate b~~ certainly wrong. Of course, 
we may verbally formulate a rule alreaqy existing and observed in a social 
life, but this does not make it a rule, or a norm. The rule or norm, and 
verbal description of the rule or norm, need to be distinguished even 
though a rule or norm involves certain types of verbal activities; for 
example, criticism of deviations. 
For the sake of clarity of our exp0sition, four other concepts remain 
to be defined. First of all, we shall define social conduct as action or 
behavior which, in its relational context, is meaningfully related to 
normative models. For the concepts of conformity and deviance, further, 
we are going to retain slightly modified versions of Parsonian definitions. 
Consequently, ·conformity will be defined as a motivational tendency 
to act according to a normative pattern; deviance, on the other hand, will 
denote motivational tendency to behave in contradiction to an accepted 
and recognized normative pattern. 4 Finally, variance, in our context, will 
refer to conduct oriented toward other than dominant normative patterns, 
existing within certain segments of a particular society. 
Before we start to analyze and discuss the 'normative order' existing 
in our sampl:~, it may well serve our purpose to introduce a few theoreti-
cal ideas as they were presented by Professor Parsons. In discussing the 
functional prerequisites of social systems, Parsons asserted that "a so-
cial system cannot be so structured as to be radically incompatible with 
the conditions of functioning of its component individual actors as bio-
logical organisms and as personalities, or of the relatively stable inte-
gration of a cultural system." Similarly he maintained that 11the social 
4T • Parsons, The Social System, p. 2.50. 
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system •••• depends on the requisite minimum of 1 support 1 • It must ••• 
have a sufficient proportion of its component actors adequately motivated 
-. 
to act in accordance with the requirements of its role s,rstem, positively 
in the fulfillment of expectations and negatively in abstension from too 
much disruptive, i.e., deviant, behavior. 115 In another place he added 
that "tendencies to deviant behavior on the part of component actors pose 
functional 'problems' for the social system in the sense that they must 
be counteracted by 'mechanisms of control' • n6 
From the preliminary analysis of the secondary empirical data it 
became evident that ali societies under our study display a large variety 
of normative models which might be defined as social norms. It also be-
came clear that these social norms show different degrees of generality, 
explicitness, and, what appears to us as a very significant fact, different 
degrees of normative emphasis. It seems to be fairly reasonable to say 
that the most fundamental norms concerning our sample of African societies 
were centered about two modes of relational orientationt lineal and 
collateral. In one of the most systematic studies dealing with aboriginal 
kinship and clanship systems, Meyer Fortes designates the rule of exogam,y, 
which prohibits marriage within the agnatic lineage, along with the levi-
ratic right as critical norms of clanship. The unit-y of a clan, or a 
lineage, at the Tallensi is of great importance; for, as Fortes asserts, 
it 11is not only a vital fact of ~xperience for its members but the prin-
cipal concept by which other corporate groups define it in jural, political 
5.t'bia.:,;.:~. 27. 
6rbid., P• 35. 
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and ritual relations. 117 Ccmtinuing his detailed analysis, Fortes also 
maintains that "In sociological terms [the kinshiP} means a system of 
rights and obligations, privileges, and quties of various degrees of 
definitiveness, in relation to other people, a code of conduct also varying 
in precision from item to item and geared to a body of moral values and 
religious beliefs, and embracing all this, in a sense, a concept of the 
person himself as occupying a definite status and position in a society •118 
Similarly, Evans-Pritchard considers rules of exogamy as very important, 
for, as he says, "the values which chiefly regulate behavior between one 
person and another in Nuer society are kinship values. 119 The importance 
of structural segmentation based upon kinship ties among the Nuer is 
equally expressed in the institution 0f the blood-feud. 
To take an0ther example, urn Ndembu society, 11 as V. W. Turner states, 
"the conduct has been regulated over -what we may assume to have been a 
very long period of time by norms, values, beliefs and sentiments associ-
ated with kinship. 1110 However, unlike the societies of Tallensi and Nuer, 
usually described as prototypes of segmentar.y societies, in which rules 
concerning lineages form a permanent and rather rigid framework for social 
relations both on the intra-clan and inter-clan level, basic rules in 
7Meyer Fortes, The Dynamics of Clanship ~ong the Tallensi (London:. 
Oxford University Press, 1945), p. 41. 
~eyer Fortes, The Web of Kinship among the Tallensi (London: Oxford 
University Press, 1949), p. 344. 
9E.E. Evans-Pritchard, The Nuer (Oxford~ Clarendon Press, 1950), 
p. 225. 
lCV.w. Turner, Schism and Continuity in an African Society (Manchester: 
Manchester University Press, 1957), p. 90. 
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other societies in our sample reflect the concern with general, and not 
always well-defined, kinship and affinal ties. At this point one general 
question may be raised: to what extent do biliood-ties form a primary basis 
fer the accretion of sentiments with respect to the basic rules and axioms 
in our African sample? As Peter M. Worsley points out in referring to the 
Tallensi, it might well be that economic relations have a critical signifi-
cance in Tallensi social life. 
The import of the critical remarks made by Professor Worsley with 
respect to our study of the normative order seems to. be twofold. First, 
when we, as he suggests, "break ~he} kinship system, which is unitary 
system of relatiens between persons into its compenent purposiwe systems 
of different kinds (economic, procreative, ritual, etc.), 1111and when we 
then examine the relations between these systems, the simple unitary order 
appears to be a more complex one. Thus, for example, the T~le lineage 
system has t.o be viewed in the light of Tale land usages and land holding. 
Similarly, structural changes affected by fragmentation of lineages caused 
by the secession of sons who 11 cut their own gateways, 11 or who 11quarrel 
over chicken and eggs," should be seen as a result of conflict of economic 
interests rather than simply those concerned with kin. This, of course, 
suggests that 11 equilibrium11 in cempact segmental societies is not simply 
a question of a cycle described as 11fissien and fusion, 11 but that the 
maintenance of the balance requires complex mechanisms of social control. 
This leads us to the second point. Not -only 11Ndembu society," and 
other secieties of a similar type, depend 11 en strength of its mechanisms 
llPeter M. Worsley, 11The Kinship System of the Tallensi: A Revaluation, u 
The Journal of the Royal Anthropelogical Institute of Great Britain and 
Ireland LXXXVI (19$6), 64. 
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for resolving conflict which arises from the weakness and instability of 
lineage organization and from ambiguous character of kinship and affinal 
ties, n12but also societies with a developed segmental system must counter-
act schisms, conflicts, deviances and varianc~s arising from the complexity 
of societal factors and diverging trends. 
It should be said that types of control, methods used, and agencies 
of control often var,y from society to society. There are also different 
degrees in the formalization of control. However, what appears to be an 
almost universal type of social control in our sample is that the most 
important controlling agency is the family. It functions in two ways: 
by implanting basic values and teaching basic norms, and by resolving 
conflicts on a primar,y level. It is a unit of a maximum surveillance of 
conformity with societal norms. 
The pressure for conformity and control of deviance on more inclu-
sive societal levels is exercised by more inclusive social units. For 
instance, among the Ibo, sub-lineages are generally responsible for the 
conduct of their members; age sets, further, exercise some control over 
their members in case of their misbehavior; and, also, women societies 
have a limited authority over other -women, especially young ones. In 
other societies local (territorial) units guard the normative order. We 
do not intend to enumerate, describe or evaluate all of them now because 
we may deal with them in subsequent chapt13rs. Instead we shall discuss 
three interesting aspects of the normative order in question. 
First, the conception of conformity and deviance does not always 
seem to carry a uniform meaning. The judgments on deviance and conformity 
12Turner, op. cit., p. 287. 
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depend upon the ideas held in common among the members of a particular 
society. Thus, for example, among the Ibo "· •• in some cases erratic 
or arlti-social behavior is held to be the,result of some circumstances 
in a former existence rather than the direct fault of the individual con-
cerned.1113 Second, despite the efficiently working agencies of informal 
control, there seems to be a need for a more or less formalized agency 
of social control as evidenced in institutionalization of semi-structured 
juridical bodies. Third, the lack of the i'ocalized political unity and 
general c·ontrol is supplanted by the focalized unity and control of ritual. 
This point is ver,r weilil illustrated by Fortes, who in referring to Tallensi 
Great Festivals, states:. "Ritual is the appropriate mechanism of social 
organization at this [all inclusiv~ level because the interests involved 
are not of a practical or utilitarian kind but of a moral kind--in fact, 
the most general moral interests of the natives, the maintenance of their 
existing institutions and norms of social behavior. 1114 And when he elabo-
rates on the symbolism of ritual and the significance of totem~. or quasi-
totem animals 11teeth-bearers 11 (nyindem--reptiles and carnivores) repre-
senting the immortality of ancestors, he may then make another interesting 
comment: 11They tteeth-bearers~ symbolize, in particular, the potential 
aggressiveness of the ancestors as the supreme sanction of Tale cultural 
values. They serve-to crystallize in simple, concrete unequivocal impera-
tives and images the notion of the binding i'orce of the moral code which 
is not clearly apparent in the diffused and particularized impera·tives 
13M.M. Green, Ibo Village Affairs (London: Sidgwick and Jackson, 
}.947), p. 93. 
14Fortes, The Dynamics of Clanship, p. 103. 
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that make up day-to-day e:xperience of it. nl.5 In somewhat similar vein 
runs also the statement of Meek who affirms:- 11The ancestors of the people 
live under the control and aot as agents of Ale. ~hey are guardians of 
morality and regard any departure .from custom as a breach of morality .rrl6 
To sunnnarize, in this chapter we have shown that each of the studied 
societies has a complex of covert and overt norms defining normative ex-
pectations. The differentiation in value emphasis underlies the di.f.feren-
tiation in the normative emphasis. Perhaps it is correct to say that the 
normative order is a .function of social situation. For illustration let 
us quote M.M. Green. In Ibo society "where the land is over-farmed and 
it is hard work to get a living, it is perhaps not surprising that there 
is almost hypertrophied sense of property. Theft is execrated as one of 
the worst and most shameful of offenses, and is considered as deserving 
extreme penalties. 1117 For that reason, we may assert that, generally 
speaking, ~alue scales peculiar to each society, assert themselves in the 
scales of sanctions attached to norms, and that they determine the .form 
of sociological constraint. Likewise, the hierarchy of value systems is 
reflected in the hierarchy of normati~e systems. 
1.5~., p. 14.5. 
16c.K. Meek, Law and Authority in a Nigerian Tribe (London:- Oxford 
University Press, 1937), p. 211. 
17Green, op. cit., p. 88. 
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Modalities of Social Control: 
Evaluation of Self-Redress, Reprisal_, and Institutionalized Remedies 
As has been partly shown, the social events in societies under our 
study follow certain definite patterns. We may say that social order is 
composed of both types of norms--imperfect and perfect. Altogether they 
represent a normative order which in different societies displays a dif-
ferent degree of complexity. For instance, the norms governing Hottentots 
are relatively simpler than the rules regulating social life among the 
Kikuyu, who surprisingly have a rather complicated land h0lding system. 
The empirical data reveal also that, in general, interaction processes 
both on the interpersonal and inter-group level run rather smoothly, and 
that social conduct is fairly predictable. This fact would certainly 
suggest that the societies succeeded in coping with the second aspect of 
the problem of order, that is, with order in the mutuality of motivational 
orientation to the normative aspect of expectations. Several descriptions 
of the socialization processes on the primar,y level attest to the fact 
that children incorporate -values and norms at an early age. Thus, for 
example, in the Ib0 village, as Green has observed, children gr0w up in 
the affairs of the COI!IDlunity. "They tend to be present at many of the 
doings of their elders and education is probably a matter of assimila-
tion rather than of formal teaching. 111 Similarly, Bohannan, describing 
an affair with a thief who was caught red-handed, notes: '~omen pushed 
lureen, op. cit., p. 78. 
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their children forward and said: 1Look closely, so you will know him. He 
is a thief.' others reminded their children: 'You see what happens to the 
people who steal. , .. 2 
There is no doubt that the most important agency of socialization 
within our sample is the family; it should be noted, however, that in most 
of the cases it is the family of the so-called extended type. Thinking 
in terms of the effects of these primary socialization processes on the 
individual, we may then assume that the conformity with social norms and 
values becomes a part 0f an individual need disposition system, or, in 
other words, it becomes a constitutive part of an individual's personality 
system. It assumes a directional force. This seems to be one of the most 
fundamental mechanisms facilitating role assumption and role performance. 
Nevertheless, the power of internalized norms and values is by no means 
the only factor underlying the ordering processes. The expectational 
calculus has a larger basis. First of all, on a strictly particularistic 
inter-~ersonal level, strong emotional elements may help to promote the 
regularity and stability of interaction patterns no!ffiatively defined. 
The threat of the withdrawal of love, friendship, emotional support, the 
danger of breaking inter-personal bonds, playing such an important role 
in closely knit societies such as we have been analyzing, must work effec-
tively as factors sanctioning normative orientati0n. Still other factors 
may enter into the relational calculus. At some moments rational con-
siderations underlying reciprocity and double-contingency will present 
themselves as powerful forces sustaining and enforcing orientation to 
2p-aul Bohannan, Justice and Judgment among the Ti v (London: Oxford 
UniversityP~ess, 1957), p. 125. 
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normative expectations. Fortes makes this point clear, saying: "in the 
social structure at large, the bonds of connnon interest, of mutual depen-
dence in ritual and secular matters, and of local unity tend to prevail 
in the long run. However deep a breach may be, the dissidents never re-
pudiate tne membership of the larger unit, for this would be tantamount 
to repudiating ancestors. n3 
Besides these sometimes mild and subtle, sometimes harsh, forms of 
pressures for confor-mity, other forms of pressure, or reaction to non-
conformity may be anticipated or rationally calculated. There is always 
a potentiality for either party to resort to self-help; in extreme cases 
self-help may take on a form of a violent action endangering personal 
integrity or material security. Schapera, for example, remarks that 
11personal disputes or grievances of a minor character were settled among 
the Cape Hottentots by the two parties themselves, either in verbal argu-
ment or more often by means of a hand-to-hand fight.n4 However, despite 
the availability of support from the part of third parties or even small 
or larger groups, the uncontrolled self-help, or, what amounts to the 
same, the uncontrolled self -right enforcement, falls as a rule outside 
the frame of legitimate means for securing conformity with normative ex-
pectations. It is not a legitimate social control in the strictest sense 
of the word. This point needs further clarification. 
On the part of some authors, depicting the "order" of primitive 
societies, there seems to be what may be called a misrepresentation of 
3Fortes, The Dynamics of Clanship, p. 244. 
4r. Schapera, The Khoisan People of South Africa (London~ Routledge 
and Kegan Paul, 19.51), p. 339. 
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facts. The term self-help is used indiscriminately by those who fail to 
realize that the term refers to two different modes of social reaction: 
one which may be properly described as spontaneous redress, and another 
which may be defined as belonging to the category of institutionalized 
means of reaction (sanction) and control backed by a corporate boqy. 
While it is true that many of the societies studied tolerate the use of 
the spontaneous self-help, its use is nevertheless limited and belongs to 
the extreme side of the practices. For that reason it seems to be accu-
rate to state that African societies composing our sample rely prevalently 
upon that mode of self-help which is normatively circumscribed. This type 
of social control belongs to those mechanisms which are designed as war-
nings to potential deviants; it is an aWa.ilable means through which the 
society, with not ful~ developed differentiated organs, checks disrup-
tions of social order. It is an e£ficacious reaction serving restitutive 
or punitive ends. Several instances may be cited to show that the societies 
draw a distinct line between these two modes of reaction. According to 
Fortes, "The Tallensi distinguished precisely between raiding, as a matter 
of self-help which they considered a legitimate jural device for redressing 
a wrong, and warfare. n5 Another lengthy quotation from Fortes may well 
illustrate the case. "· •• in the oilld days a creditor could raid the 
live-stock of any clansman of his debtor, but not those of a neighbor of 
his debtor who belonged to a different clan. In the latter case a repri-
sal raid was the penalty. In the former case the victim of the raid could 
demand restitution from his clansman, the original debtor; and I know of 
men who pawned a child or sold him into slavery in order to find the means 
5Fortes, The Dynamics of Clanship, p. 236. 
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of repaying a clansman who had been raided, rather than let the affair 
become a source of conflict in the clan. 11 He continues, 11This is a good 
illustration, incidentally, of ~he statement previously made that collec-
tive responsibility is not a principle of Tale jural relations. It is not 
the clan but the debtor himself who is responsible for his debt. Self-help 
is a technique for putting pressure on a debtor through the mechanisms of 
clan and lineage cohesion. 116 And still at another place, Fortes asserts: 
11The right of self-help by raiding, and the notion that. retaliatory war-
fare and retaliatory abduction of women are simply 1 canceling a. debt 1 be-
long to the same category of ideas. 117 The self-right enforcement pro~edure 
is also discussed by Meek who designates it as a method of obtaining re-
dress through those who were in a position to bring pressure •. Thus, II • • • 
in cases of debt, if the creditor could not induce the debtor to repay the 
loan, he would go to the compound of any of the accused's relations who 
happened to be absent on their farms, and capture goats or any other 
articles equivalent to or in excess of the amount of the debt. Later in 
the day he would send word to the ewner of the property informing him of 
the reasons for his action. The owner in turn would bring pressure on 
the debtor to pay the sum owed. n8 It should be added, however, that Meek 
in contradistinction to Fortes considers it as the collective responsi-
bility of the kinship group. 
In another example taken from the Ibo society Green notes that the 
6Ibid., p. 245. 
?Ibid.' p. 216. 
Bc.K. Meek, "Ibo Law, 11 E.E. Evans-Pritchard and Others, Essays Pre-
sented to C.G. Seligman (London: Kegan, Paul, Trench, Trubner & Co., 1934), 
p. 214. 
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offender caught red-handed, in flagrante delicto, so to speak, was dealt 
with by those present on the spot. And this action was not considered 
to be mere mob violence but a recognized method of dealing with such a 
situation.9 An interesting small episode is described by Meek in a case 
of insulting behavior among the Ibo. An old man who had been insulted 
by a junior might deal with the offense himself, by merely pointing his 
finger at the young man and saying, 11Very well, never mind, you will see. 11 
Then on the first occasion on which ~ misfortune or illness overtook 
him, he would ascribe it to the old man's spell, and would ask his parents 
to intercede with the old man, presenti'tl.g him with an egg and saying, 
"Ono lolo." The old man, now appeased, would blow on the egg and say, 
"What I said to the youth was not intended--may it pass away l" Then .• 
putting his hand on the young man's head he would say, "Nothing shltll hap-
pen to you. I have cleared my heart of vexation, and if I continue to 
harbour ill-feeling may Ani (i.e., Ala) take away my life! n10 Bohannan 
brings the point home very succinctly when he affirms:: 11Ti v will tell one 
that 'taking something for debt' is not a crime or ifer, as stealing is. 
In terms of our analytical system, we can see that stealing is a breach 
of norm,; taking in (SiC] a matter of de-bt is a counteraction using self-
help. It is the social circumstances and the situation which determine 
whether or not Tiv apply the word ifer or the word 'steal' to a specific 
act. Similarly, it is a matter of the preceding and succeeding social 
acts which leads us to determine whether an instance of this sort is a 
breach of norm or a counteraction. n11 It is interesting to note, however, 
9Green, op. cit., passim. 
lDMeek, Law and Authority in a Nigerian Tribe, p. 231. 
llBohannan, op. cit., p. 129. 
64 
that according to Bohannan self-right enforcement_, such as in the case 
of steali~g, was C0nsidered as an act "repairing the tar" Gerving we~Ll 
to the community end~, while reprisal, such as in the case of taking 
another's property as compensation for debt, was thought of as 11 spoiling 
the tar.u 
Whatever has been said about the regulative function of self-help, 
the same may be asserted with respect to another mode of social control: 
reprisal. While we may admit that sp·ontaneous reprisal is tolerated, 
its use in general is limited to specific instances of a breach of norms. 
A prototype of institutionalized reprisal is the feud. From available 
data we learn that some societies as, for example, the Tallensi and Nuer 
have institutionalized feud~ while in other societies, like the Tiv, 
institutionalized feud does not and never did exist. Because the most 
extensive description of the bl0od-feud is given by Evans-Pritchard, let 
us avail ourselves of this information, and discuss the function of feud 
with respect t0 the maintenance of order in Nuer society. 
In defining feud, Evans-Pritchard affirms that 11Blood-feuds are a 
tribal institution, for they can only 0ccur where a breach of law is recog-
nized since they are the way in which reparation is obtained. Fear of in-
curring a blood-feud is, in fact, the most important legal sanction within 
a tribe and the main guarantee o~ an individual's life and property.ul2 
-Within the context of the \1Uoted definition, two concepts particularly 
attract our attention: these are 'law' and '~egal'. The search for the 
meaning of these conc~pts leads us, however~ t0 a surprising discover,y, 
when a few pages further Evans-Pritchard declares that 11In a strict sense 
12Evans-Pritchard, op. cit., p. 150. 
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Nuer have no law. ul3 This certainly is a cause for our _questions: If 
Nuer society has no law, why then operate with such terms as 11breach of 
law, 11 or "legal sanction"? Why not use a more neutral term like 'norm,' 
and by adding further qualifications, or enumerating its attributes, put 
it in the proper place in the hier§..rchical structure of the normative 
system of Nuer society? We may conjecture at this point that Evans-
Pritchard felt that the institution of blood-feud approximates or amounts 
to a legal institution, but he failed to evaluate fully two aspects of 
this institution. Two modes of reaction are involved~ one, reprisal or 
retaliation, another, payment of compensation. To put it differently, 
there is a bi-modality. From these two standardized modes of social re-
action or control, the second is, if not directly in the categor.y of 
legal control, then on its borderline. It is so·because it requires the 
presence of a neutral organ who exerts a qualified constraint on behalf 
of a corporate body, on one hand, and it requires formalized procedure, 
-on the other hand. We shall elaborate these points in the coming chapter. 
In the functional evaluation of feud, two interesting Yiews should 
be presented. Quoting Evans-Fritchard first, "The balanced opposition 
between tribal segments and their complementar.y tendencies toward fission 
and fusion, which we have seen as structural principle, is evident in the 
institution of feud which, on one hand, gives expression t0 the hostility 
py occasional and violent action that serves to keep the sections apart, 
and, on the other hand, by the means provided for settlement, prevents 
opposition developing into complete fission. ul4 According to this statement 
13Th·..;~··· 6 
___::;:;.-' p • 1 2 • 
14Ibid. , p • 161. 
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we may assume that feud w0rks as a balancing mechanism almost by design. 
Second, when Green, in context different from feud, discusses the question 
of bloodshedding, he says~ "In pursuing a policy of ancestor propitiation 
instead of one of witch hunting these inland Ibo avoid a menace to their 
social stability and economize in the lives of their individual members.·· 
[italics our~ • This same economy is seen in their method of appeal to 
the supernatural in the testing of innocence. Whereas some of the neigh-
b0ring tribes have taken recourse t0 a poison ordeal the Ibo people are 
content with taking an oath. nl.5 Green 1 s statement seems t0 correct Evans-
Pritchard's view preoccupied with the problems and principles of balancing 
structural segments. 
E.r studying the map 0f regulative institutions designed to maintain 
the existing 0rder and to control arising conflicts, we came across one 
institution which distinguished itself by a specific machinery aiming at 
the enforcement of specific norms of condu.ct. This was the case of feud-
settlement in Nuer. However, this is not an isolated case. In other 
societies, too, we have found mechanisms of social control employing 
special methods, and exerting constraint through distinct agencies. Pri0r 
to giving it a proper name or a proper classification, let us discuss 
first its system and modes of operation. 
15Green, op. cit., p. 95. 
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The Meaning, Range, and Scope of Jurisdiction 
In one of the modern pioneering studies exploring the nature of 
norms, Muzafer Sherif asserts that "social norms are not absolutes; they 
develop in the course of actual relationship between individuals. They 
presuppose for their formation the contact of individuals striving toward 
the satisfaction of their needs and the realization of what they consider 
'.I' or •we.,• the latter indicating the group with which 'I.' identif'ies. 111 
It is our belief that we do not distort the meaning of this statement if 
we restate it in this w~: liorms are concrete or specific forms of exis-
ting social v~ues. Taking•this proposition for granted, we may further 
assume that in subscribing to social values, a diffuse mass, or an aggre-
gate in the sociological sense, transforms its.elf into a community., into 
a programmatically arranged and ideologically welded whole. To put it 
differently, the whole begins to operate under the guidance of a ''charter" 
or a constitution, and any day-to-day realization of these values, or 
conformity with rules may be described as a "ratification" of the consti-
tution as a whole, or of its parts. Any act in conformity with normative 
patterns is implicit~y an act of submission to the authority of a norm, 
or a normative system as a whole. This assumption may serve, in general, 
to explain the relative stability of existing social systems, the preser-
vation of order in society, its continuity, and the predictability of 
social conduct. 
lMuzafer Sherif, The p·sychology of Social Norms (New Y0rk: Harper 
Brothers, 1936), p. 17. 
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It would be fallacious, h0wever, not to assume simultaneously the 
wulnerability and instability of the normative system. The charter or 
the censtituti0n, or its individual parts for that matter, are incessantly 
challenged, and underlying values are exposed to many tests. It would b'e 
non-realistic to discount the existence of individual idiosyncratic expec-
tat ions carrying with them their own notions of right and wrong. Equally 
important, the normative 'idiosyncrasies' of sub-groups must be taken into 
account. From time to time new social values emerge, and wit~ different 
degrees of vehemence they assert autonomy for their own authority. Still 
ether problems have to be resolved. For example, the latitude of a norm 
invites various interpretations, or different norms claim applicability 
to the same case. Although many other instances of "normative conflictstt 
could be cited, we do net intend to do so. For our main point is to em-
phasize that any society needs some mechanism which will reduce, exclucle, 
mitigate, or resolve such conflicts. As Turner has remarked, 11 ••• a 
number of mechanisms, ef institutionalized ways of behavi0r, which have 
arisen in response .~talics our~ to an almost endless reduplication of 
such conflicts, and which have been designed by group experience to miti-
gate, diniinish or repair them.•! 2 We may also agree with Turner when he 
further asserts that 11 each instance 0f breach in social relations is made 
an occasion of a restatement of their regulative norms. 113 
During our previous discussions we have already suggested that some 
norms are critically connected with the unity and persistence of the 
group. They stand at the top level of genera+ity and desirability of 
2Turner, Schism and Continuity in an African Society, p. 90. 
3Ibid., p. 92. 
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normative patterns. Their functional superiority makes it almost impera-
ti ve to match their impersonal connnands with equally superior impersonal 
controlling processes. In other words, the expectations relative to 
these types of norms will be backed by the qualified constraint resting 
ultimately upon entities transcending arbitrarily eomposed others, OT 
arbitrary quantities of others. But not only that, th~ method, through 
which this qualified constraint will be exercised, will also take on a 
specific form clearly distinguishable from other existing modes. Two 
mechanisms~ employing specific but different means would unquestionably 
belong to the highly efficient type of social control. They are ritual, 
and jural or juridical structures. 
While we are not directly concerned with the first menti~ned system 
of rites, nevertheless a brief description seems to be desirable; it might 
help to throw a light upon functional differences. 
In his detailed analysis of schisms and continuity in Lunda-Ndembu 
society, V .w. Turner points out that "Ritual mechanism tends to be uti-
lizedwhere conflict is at deeper level. Here conflict expresses itself 
through projection--it appears to the members of the society as though 
mysterious forces are attacking the ver,y foundations of the moral and 
social order, not from within, but by projection from without--in the 
form of witches, spirits and mystical porrers. 114 According to him, also, 
ritual seems to emerge in time of some natural disaster. It is so be-
cause 11 ••• when disaster strikes, there is no legal remedy. One cannot 
sue mystical beings and powers in any court and obtain compensation. Yet 
the disaster has to be made intelligible in terms of moral order of the 
4Ibid., p. 126. 
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universe @.talics our~. This can be done • • • by a confession of one's 
own guilt in a ritual context, or by a projection of the guilt outwards 
onto an external enemy, a witch or sorcerer. 11.5 Turner then aptly adds that 
IIRitual, like beliefs in witchcraft, is a customary device which lifts the 
emotions of people and the values of society to a~ystical plane where 
they have power b~yond their secular effects. n6 
With respect to the juridical machinery Turner maintains, on the 
other hand, that 11 ••• jural machinery is employed when conflict between 
persons and groups is couched in terms of an appeal by both contesting 
parties to a common norm, or, when norms conflict, to a common frame of 
values which organize society's norms into a hiera~c~.u7 And while in 
the ritual the conflict is more or less a "projection," "Judicial ldecha-
nisms tend to be invoked to redress conflict where the conflict is overt, 
and these judicial mechanisms involve rational @:talics our~ investiga-
tion into the motives and behavior of the contending parties. 118 Moreover, 
"Recourse is often made to law when the living quarrel. The nature of 
the conflict brought to light is usually specific ~talics "'our~;: attempts 
are made to find a remeqy, and if possible to bring about reconciliation 
between the 0pposing parties. The conflict is man-made and immediately 
intelligible. n9 The judicial machinery is deliberately and consciously 
brought into play. 
5Ibid., p. 128. 
6rbid., p. 125. 
7rbid., p. 122. 
8Ibid.' P• 126. 
9~., P• 127. 
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Our rather extensive quotations from Turner's work were intended to 
show that legal norms are characterized by certain attributes which we 
have described in one of the previous chapters. At this time the presence 
of generality, secularity, and rationality should have become evident. 
As for the fourth attribute, that is, formality, we intend to introduce 
evidence in the forthcoming chapter. 
Let us return again to our primary concern with the nature of the 
juridical system. Whatever its importance, our interest was not so much 
in the content of legal norm as in the availability and efficiency of the 
reme~ to attain the ends for which the precept was devised. Once we 
' 
speak about remedy, should we not ask, remeqy for what? Does this reme-
dial process concern only the involved parties, or do the effects of the 
process reach much ~arther? Bohannan, among others, gives an affirmative 
answer to this second point. He says that the function of 1 jir' (court 
in action) is to "repair the tar, 11 that is, restore peace in a territory 
occupied by a lineage segment. Also Lambert, in delineating principles 
of justice among the Kikuyu, maintains that "rights of individuals are of 
minor importance in comparison with peace and equilibrium in the group or 
10 between the groups." But the answer instantly raises another question, 
repaired by whom? Arbitrary others, or all others? And again we may 
learn about the universality of specific others engaged in this process. 
Unfortunately, the picture of the nature of the process is still incom-
pmete. We should ask another question; does the specific other, who is 
supposed to decide a particular case, act arbitrarily without disengaging 
lOH.E. Lambert, Kikuyu Social and Political Institutions (London: 
Oxford University Press, 1956), p. 112. 
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himself from personal biases, or dbes he (or they) base his (or their) 
judgment upon elements of objeet:fuve nature? Is the entire process just 
a simple random arrangement of actions and reactions, or is it an orderly, 
process guided by constants or principles regulating this type of social 
control? And again, in studying our sample, may we ascertain that this 
juridical 'system' includes not only principles but also a second line of 
norms which are functionally equivalent to rules usually defined as juris-
dictional norms? It is due to this fact, perhaps, that we may assert that 
the de-individualized norms o-f 'Conduct may be called "legal" if, and only 
if, they are sustained by other de-individualized procedural norms e~er-
ting legitimate constraint and operating within the limited field which 
may be designated as a "systemic finality." 
What is the meaning of this systemic .finality? Let us illustrate ·, 
with concrete examples. 
When Meek criticizes Roscoe Pound for defining law as social control 
through the systematic application of forces of politically organized 
society, he points out that this definition would exclude 11 one of the 
foremost prominent features of primitive law, viz., private boards of ar-
bitration, which though obviously a legal institution, do not systemati-
cally apply force, as there is frequently no compulsion, moral or other, 
to accept the recommendation of the board. n11 Unfortunately, Meek does 
not give any example of these 'private boards' so that we cannot judge 
to what extent these boards reallY represent legal institutions. Despite 
the persuasiveness of Meek's statement, we would prefer more cautious 
llMeek, ~-aw a:i:td. • .fl.:qthar.li.:tif. in a Nigerian Tribe, p. xiii. 
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steps. Though the arbitration procedu~e resembles closely the juridical 
process, it lacks some qualities typical of th~s process, mainly its 
formality and its qualified constraint. For these reasons it seems to 
be useful and also correct t0 draw a distinct line between two types of 
processes: informal procedural reme~, and formal procedural reme~. 
Only the second, according to our judgment, deserves the term 'legal,' 
as can be illustrated by some examples. 
It is Fortes who asserts:: "Though a lineage head. has no judicial 
authority, he is often asked to arbitrate in disputes or conflicts between 
segments of the lineage. What he generally tries to do is to bring about 
a compromise and reconciliation, for he has no powers of enforcing his 
decision. When he is successful in adjusting differences it is on account 
of his prestige and beca~se he has the public opinion of the lineage on 
his side. No lineage head would attempt to adjust a dispute in the line-
12 
age without the advice and backing of the elders of the lineage. 11 From 
the above mentioned statement it follows that parties voluntarily elect 
this mode of adjustment and voluntarily agree to submit to the final judg-
ment. What is m0re important, however, is that nowhere can we learn about 
principles or norms regulating this method of settlement of disputes. 
Similarly, Forde and Jones maintain that among the Ibo and Ibibio, 11 each 
-
lineage of whatever scale is .subject to the moral authority of an Ikpara--
the head of the senior branch in larger lineages--who holds the lineage 
ofo (a staff symbolizing the authority of the ancestors), arbitrates in 
internal disputes and represents the g~oup in its external relations. 
His authoritx is ritually strengthened by his role as ~ntermediary between 
12Fortes, The Dynamics of Glanship, p. 227. 
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the lineage and its ancestors. 1113Thus, this and other similar instances 
would fall under the first category. 
The effects of distinguishing between informal and formal procedural 
remedy may be illustrated by quoting Green who reports that if the small 
bo~ of chosen ~talics our~ arbitrators could not find a solution accep-
table to both parties and they had no means of enforcing their decision, 
the litigant who felt that he could not abide by their verdict would take 
further steps. _He could beat a drum through the village announcing that 
he had a grievance. The elders would then, in the course 0-f the next few 
days, arrange for the whole village to come to judg~ the case.24 Despite 
the high degree of informality~ the last mentioned juridical bodies con~ .. 
sistently apply some procedural norms and adhere to specific principles. 
In discussing the second type of the redressive machinery~ that is, 
formal procedural remeqy, our main concern will be with the range and 
scope of jurisdiction. And again we shall attempt to show, by examples, 
variations in units to which juridical procedure is subordinate. Using 
legal terminology, it can be said that here we are dealiDf; with the ques-
tion of 1venue 1 or juridical competence. 
In general, there-is a wide range of competence of juridical struc-
tures. It covers small lineage segments, as well as whole villages or 
large territorial units. Thus, for example, the Tiv in his 1 jirs 1 re-
solves disputes concerning smaller lineage segments living within a tar 
and occupied by males who are agnatic members of the associated lineage. 
13Daryll Forde and G.J. Jones, The Ibo and Ibibio-Speaking Peoples of 
South-Eastern Nigeria (London: Oxford University Press, 19$0), p. 1$~ 
14Green, op. cit., p. 106. 
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Among the Cape Hottentots serious cases arising within the kraal were 
referred to a 'court' consisting of the 'captain' and all the adult men 
of the kraal, while the main tribal council, consisting of the chief and 
the kraal headmen, as Schapera reports, dealt only with disputes between 
different kraals.l.5 According to Butt, in Dinka society "Each village is, 
to a large degree, autonomous. Legal disputes are s-ettled by the elders 
of the village and the local spear-chief. n16 Among Limda-Ndembu society 
most disputes were settled at the level of vicinage. Turner relates that 
"Men skilled in advocacy of cases, known as mahaku, or in judgment, known 
as akwakusompesha, were jointly invited by the plaintiff or his represen-
tative- and a defendant or his representative to discuss the case and give 
their verdict ~talics our~. Such men were often, but need not neces-
sarily have· been headmen. , If -there were a senior headman (an important 
ehilolu) in the vicinage mest cases in that vicinage would be settled in 
his village.nl7 Another example is given by Forde who reports about Yak6 
society. "The Ogbolia ~he Ward Hea<!J, advised by the Yakamban ffi"arci_ 
Elders] , is expected to intervene to compose any serious disputes between 
members of different patriclans, to maintain friendly relations with other 
wards,'and to represent their own in matter of trespass on lands or other 
property inv0lving other wards. nlB Finally, Lambert, describing Kikuyu's 
1.5schapera, op. cit., p. 340. 
16Audrey Butt, The Nilotes of the Anglo-Egyptian Sudan and Uganda 
(London: International African Institute, 1952), p. 125. 
l7Turner, op. cit., p. 16. 
18naryll Forde, nward Organization among the Yak8, II Africa XX (19.50), 
274. 
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institutiom of elders, reports that the Embu, the Mbere, and the Kikuyu 
recognize a third grade of the Kiama ~eneration of elder-s,). 11It is 
particularly this grade, 11 he says, 11which is empowered to deal with 
serious cases such as murder, and ~hose jurisdiction is regarded as ex-
tending beyond the boundaries of the individual's locality. Members 
from a distance, if they"are athamaki Cachiri leaders) are frequently 
called in to assist in important or difficult cases. ul9 And he notes 
interestingly that ''Cases irr' themselves likely to cause disruption in 
the mwaki (?eighborhood--or a group of village~ such as homicide or 
serious damage to the person, and disputes between mbari as to the boun-
daries, are regularly referred at once to athamaki from outside.n20 
Before concluding this chapter, a few instances of special 'judicial' 
structures should be mentioned. The most interesting cases are reported 
by Bohannan who describes 1market-jir 1 as a court which decides those 
disputes that grow directly out of the trading or 0ther events occurring 
within the market place; 'age-set jir' limited to pleading the case of 
one of its members; and the 'moot' which deals mostly with mystical acts. 
In spite of all limitations and ambiguities of those structures 
described and defined as juridical, it is possible to maintain that our 
sample of African societies has fairly well developed and differentiated 
institutions aimed at coping with major functional problems, mainly with 
maintenance and continuity of normative patterns, integration, and C0opera-
tion. Defining institution as a normative complex centered around a rela-
tively specific aim content, we may then proceed to discuss degrees or 
19tambert, op. cit., p. 83. 
2oibid. , p. 109. 
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levels of institutionalization of juridical process. 
Degree of Institutionalization of Juridical (Quasi-Judicial) Processes: 
Presence or Lack of Juridical Levels 
In the preceding chapter we have used systematically and purposely 
the term 1 juridical 1 in designating and qualifying the standardized process 
of hearing and determining controversies. B.r using this term we have been 
seeking to emphasize that the activities such as, for example, those of 
Elders, Heads of Lineages, and so on, are de facto para-judicial activities. 
Despite our claim that these specific others are endowed with delegated 
power and authority, this power and this authority do not reach the level 
as experienced in fully developed and functionally differentiated societies. 
Also, and this seems to be most relevant to our discussion in the present 
chapter, the second line of norms, which we have compared with jurisdic-
tional norms in modern societies, lacks manifest systematization. Thus, 
the term juridical in the context of our discussion carries with it more 
restricted meaning, and, for that reason, juridical process when evaluated 
typologically represents an intermediate class standing between informal 
and rigorously formal procedure. 
Adequate analysis of the juridical process concerning our African 
sample is hindered by ma~ factors. First of all, there is a general spar-
sity of data covering this aspect of social life. Further, the available 
descriptive account very often lacks most needed details, with an outstan-
ding exception being the work of Bohannan on the Tiv. At last, but not at 
least, the adjudication processes are permeated and/or fused with magico-
religious events and activities so that it is difficult to draw a distinct 
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line between them, and give them a proper functional evaluation. 
Despite all these deficiencies~ the studies dealing with various 
societies included in our sample, offer a valuable contribution to our 
knowledge of the method of social control called juridical. For under 
an apparent simplicity and seeming absence of rules, principles, and 
technicalities, we may discover.certain common features which might at 
once suggest that we are facing some sort of a system. What are, then, 
these alleged common features of this process? If we are thinking in 
terms of temporal sequence, they can be enumerated and provisionally 
arranged in the following way: (1) presentation of the case, (2) Hearing 
and admission of witnesses or experts, (3) media of oath and ordeal, 
(4) deliberation and the announcement of the decision. 
To illustrate, let us begin with the Tiv. Bohannan in his well 
documented and theoretically soundly developed treatise on the Tiv 'judi-
cial process 1 asserts: "That part of calling a jir which most resembles 
the European idea of 'pleading' is the actual presentation of one's com-
plaint or defense before the assembled mbatarev. n1 And using his own 
words: "A man who calls a jir well, presenting his story in a concise 
and orderly manner, is said t0 be a 'man who knows things' (or:!: fan 
kwagh). This phrase, indeed, is used of any person who is well versed 
in Tiv custom and belief, and who governs his external life according to 
the standards of propriety compatible with such custom and belief. 112 The 
' 
procedure for hearing the jir is for the plaintiff to speak first and 
then the defendant.. Among the Kikuyu, similarly, the presentation of the 
1Bohannan, op. cit., p. 33. 
2Ibid. 
Bo 
case shows a definite sequence; it is the plaintiff who speaks first, then 
the defendant is followed by witnesses and other persons alleging a know-
ledge of facts. There is, however, an additional interesting feature in 
the Ad Hoc Bench in Kikuyu. As Lambert reports, ". • • parties have the 
right to determine the composition of that bench. Each will be permitted 
to choose up to the number agreed upon (two or three a side as a rule) 
but in practice he is always advised by his own athamaki. n3 But much more 
important is Lambert's further assertion: "The bench when convened; may 
add to its own number as it thinks fit. Some of the members, for instance, 
may know of a muthamaki somewhere else with a special knowledge of the 
type of case before it. 114 These two examples, .:though not fully adequate, 
bring in some evidence of the existence of procedural regularities, or 
presumably rules, underlying the presentation of the case. We do not, 
however, assert that the 1plea 1 takes on a legal form, that is, that it 
is framed in formal terms. By way of inference we may only assume that 
the 'plea' is couched in some vernacular terms, referring to acknowledged 
norms of the group. 
There is another point to be made before proceeding to examine the 
second common feature; that of hearing the witnesses. As Meek reports, 
in some Ibo localities the plaintiff and defendant might, at the outset 
of the case each make a solemn asseveration that he would speak the truth. 
In that case, "The Ofo of the priest of Ala or of the senior elder present 
is sometimes used as a medium for swearing. 115 "As regards public trials 
3Lambert, op. cit.~ p. 110. 
4Ibid. 
5Meek, op. cit., p. 235. 
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and investigations, 11 Meek continues, 11the proceedings were frequently 
opened by an appeal to the gods and ancestors to punish arry elder who, 
from malice or because of a bribe, would express a dishonest opinion, and 
any witness v-rho would give false evidenc~.n6 Similar procedural device 
to insure the impersonality and objectivity of the adjudication process 
is mentioned by Green. Acc0rding to Green, the seni0r man utters such 
words as quoted: 11Whoever sees the truth in this case and does not say 
it, may .:>f:J kiihl him, ha! Whoever speaks a lie, may ofo kill him, ha! 
Whoever hears a word in this case and does not speak it, may of3 kill him, 
ha! "Whoever does not judge right, may "'Jf~ kill him, ha! n7 Green states 
explicitly that invoking the supernatural sanctions belongs to the Ibo 
"judicial methods 11 ~talics ours]. Also, the Tiv rely heavily upon this 
kind of supernatural assistance. In Bohannan's words 11when all, or major 
portion of the court officials had arrived and taken their seats, the 
chief would go into his reception hut and bring out ~ [pot of ashes 
and medicine~ which is the. symbol of right and justice and plays a large 
role in both religious and political life. It is also used for oath-
taking.118 
The fact-finding part of th~ j-p.ridical process is not exhausted by 
the presentation of the case by the plaintiff and defendant. Unless the 
case will be clear and simple, and the juridical body may dismiss the 
case in what might be called 'summary proceeding', witnesses or experts 
are called in to give the needed testimony. While the parties usually 
~id. 
7Green, op. cit., p. 121. 
BBohannan, op. cit., p. 12. 
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bring their own witnesses, the juridical body is free to call in and ad-
mit any witness whose testimony might bring facts relevant, or even irre-
levant,1to the case in question. Before being questioned or cross-examined, 
the witness might be sworn in. .And as Bohannan remarks, "Once a witness 
is sworn, judgment on perjur,y is between him and the supernatural forces 
(unless detected). 119 
A peculiar type of witness-duty is mentioned by Bohannan. He notes, 
and we quote, "Once the relationship between a man and his witness has 
been established, it is incumbent upon the witness to go before a court, 
if he is called, and state whatever he 1knows 1 about the transactions to 
which he was witness.n10 To exemplify this institution, one instance of 
it can be recounted. When a man makes a payment ef bridewealth to his 
wife 1 s guardian, he usually does so by handing money to his witness (his 
shieda) who, in the presence of participants counts it and hands it to 
the shieda of the guardian. 
In a different context we have emphasized the function of publicity 
in legal matters. Now, it is tempting to draw an example from the Bantu-
Kavirondo in order to support our previous assumptions about the function 
of witnesses. For that reason let us quote Wagner. 11 ••• agreements 
between particular individuals are kept valid by their public restate-
ment on occasions where people are assembled who may later be called upon 
as witnesses. Every economic transaction, such as the sale of a cow or 
the division of a garden, to begin with, takes place in the presence of 
witnesses, who are invited to a beer-feast which marks the transaction. 
9Ibid. 
lOibid., p. 36. 
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Later on, when the non-fulfillment of some other obligation is discussed 
~ 
before the elders or when property is re-distributed after someboqy1 s 
death, various'people make use of the occasion to restate their own 
claims, not because they want to realize them, but because they want to 
keep them generally known. The elders then nod in agreement and the 
validity of the claim is thereby publicly recognized. nll 
In order to assess the facts presented by the litigants, and to 
evaluate other evidence presented by witnesses and experts, the juridical 
bodies employ various criteria and techniques. While there are not any 
hard and fast rules for sifting evidence, such as, for example, exist in 
European judicial process; and, also, while these techniques and criteria 
vary from one society to another, one almost universal phenomenon can be 
ascertained; the juridical process is dominated by an appeal to the irra-
tional media of the oath and ordeal. As Forde and Jones indicate for Ibo 
and Ibibio societies, "· •• manipulation of oracles sh0wed skill in sif-
ting evidence.n12 
And again, in the presentation of the case and the hearing of wit-
nesses, the oaths and ordeals are not administered haphazardly, but they 
are applied at specified points of the proceeding, and in particular 
cases. It is for that reason th~t we can, perhaps, speak again about 
standardization and latent systematization. Let us justify our claim by 
some concrete examples. 
Middleton maintains that three types of oaths can be generally 
lJ.utmter Wagner, "The Political Organization of the Bantu of Kavirondo," 
M. Fortes and E.E.Evans-Pritchard, African Political Systems, pp. 211-212. 
12Forde and Jones, op. cit., p. 25. 
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distinguished in the Kikuyu and Kamba of Kenya: ene, called ~' which 
may be ordered in minor disputes; it consists in lickiDg a brushful of 
the contents of a lamb's stomach mixed with sacred herbs. If abused, the 
oath will take effect in three seasons. Second, koinga thenge, also used 
not in serious disputes, but it may be used if the parties are all males; 
it consists of breaking the limbs of a ram, and in saying that the llln.bs 
of the swearing person should be broken if the person lies. Third, 
githathi, administered in most serious cases, such as murder, sorcery, 
theft. Githaki is an object having great power, usually made bf stone 
or clay and kept secret by a member of the Aithaga clan~ The offender 
who takes the oath is ritually unclean. When he, on the other hand, re-
fuses to take an oath this is regarded as an admissien of guilt. 
The second mode of trial to determine guilt or innocence, that is, 
ordeal, takes on different forms such as, for example; licking a red-hot 
knife, taking poison, earrying fire, or having a medicine put in the eye-
:)..id. Among the Kamba., according to Dundas, two kinds of oaths are adminis-
tered; one, kiviu, which is believed to harm only the guilty, and kithitu, 
ordered by elders in cases of disputes or disagreement on matters of fact; 
it is believed to kill or vindicate the swearer within six months. Simi-
larly Lambert affirms that Kikuyu tribes have several forms of oath. 
Among many, one muuma ~ ng 1onda (oath of the sheep) is used when the 
kiama (elders of one generation) is unable to satisfy itself as to the 
facts in a suit for the payment of an alleged debt. Another form of oath 
is used particularly in cases of compensation for homicide when the 
accused person denies complicity.l3 He also notes interestingly that 
l3J ohn Middleton, The Kikuyu and Kamba of Kenya. (London: International 
African Institute, 1953), p. 123. 
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methods of using the oath vary from tribe to tribe. Thus, i'or example, 
in the Meru tribe the oath takes on a unilateral form; it is sworn by the 
claimant only in a civil suit. Am0ng the Kikuyu the oath is bilateral; 
.it is sworn to by both parties. 
Another example of institutionalized trial by ordeal is presented 
qy Meek. In referring to the Nsukka-division of Ibo society, Meek reports: 
"If a person charged with adultery. denied the cha~ge, the Onyishi ~enior 
elder irrespective of any particular extended family to which he belong~ 
of his kindred called upon him to prove his innocence by (1) undergoing 
the sasswood ordeal ~asswood is strychnine poise~, or (2) swearing an 
oath by the ancestors of the kindred or qy some well-known deity. nl4 With 
respect to Onyishi 1 s influence, Meek remarks that his authority is sus-
tained by the fact that he has charge of the shrine of the original fore-
father--Ezoka. If, on the other hand, the accused himself demanded trial 
by ordeal, the matter became one of the public concern and 11 • • • the 
sasswood trial was administered by the senior Ishi-Iwu of the whole local 
group (Ihe), in the presence of all the elders and titled men of all the 
kindred in the gr01~p. nl.5 With reference to Ndishi-Iwu Meek e:xplains that 
these men were the principal officers of the law in numerous groups. 
Simultaneously, Meek unequivocally asserts that the word Iwu is almost 
synonymous with the word 1lawr .16 
A significant comment on the 0ath and its function in the Tiv is 
further made by Bohannan. Owing to its relevance, we introduce a rather 
14Meek, op. cit., p. 148. 
1.5Ibid. 
16~., P• 149. 
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lengthy quotation: 
Oaths are in the nature of minor ordeals. Their purpose is not, 
however, to judge guilt or innocence but only to act as penalty 
if norms associated with that oath are breached. Oaths are ad-
ministered to witnesses because the witnesses' only concern in 
the dispute is with what we would call the truth ~talics our~ • 
Oaths are not, however, administered to the principal litigants. 
The oath-ordeal would judge principals not merely on the possible 
breach of norm of truth-telling '\1-talics our~, 'but also on the 
breach of norm before the jir. Were an oath of this sort to be 
administered to the principals of the case, the purpose of the 
jir would no longer exist. The dispute would be removed from 
the social to the supernatural plane, and the penalty wou11lii be 
supernatural instead of one administered and controlled by human 
17 
beings gtalics our~. 
ThereTis, however, still another explanation for this type of arrangement. 
As Bohannan asserts, the Tiv have no single criterion of truth. Due te 
this fact, the litigants are expected to speak 1mimi' (the word mimi 
means literally 'right 1 -and connotes morally and socially good thing; 
but this term does not necessarily imply, though it may do so, the factu-
ally correct thing), while the witness is supposed to speak 'vough 1 , that 
is, to give precise facts. 
However important and dominant the oath and ordeal may be as tech-
niques of measuring the reliability of the testimony, they are not the 
17Bohannan, op. cit., p. 47. 
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only ones. For, as Bohannan in his descriptionrof particular cases in 
Tiv shows, the juridical bodies may test the reliability of evidence by 
exposing its internal inconsistencies or contradictions, by assessing 
the conduct of witnesses before the court, and in other ways resembling 
European judicial techniques. 
It might seem to be paradoxical that legal norms having as one of 
their alleged basic attributes rationality, are connected with a second 
line of norms having in certain instances the basic attribute irrationality. 
One tentative explanation suggests itself. Once the breach of the rule is 
held to be not only illegal but also an offense against a supernatural 
power, then the resort to supernatural means appears to be not entirely 
logically contradictory. 
Once the facts are made available to the juridical body., 1the court 1 
has to come to some decision. On the basis of the statements of the liti-
gants and the witnesses, and also on the basis of the examination and 
weighing of the relevance and pertinence of all the facts brought before 
the juridical body, a decision is reached usually by discussion among the 
members of the 'court t • This statement, however, needs to be supplemented 
by another detail which seems to be typical of the native t courts t • As 
some studies reveal, certain elements of prejudgment may enter into the 
process of decision making. Bohannan makes this point explicitly clear: 
11Tiv consider silly any suggestion that a judge should not utilize all 
his knowledge, however acquired, in the actual hearing of the case.nlB 
Also Lambert, elaborating on 'principles of justice• in Kikuyu, says, 
11The best court to adjudicate on any particular cas!=l is one that knov1s 
18Ib·d 30 
--=--·' p. • 
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all about it to begin with and is personally interested in it.nl9 Lambert, 
h0wever, j,.mmediately clarifies his statement by asserting: "This does n0t 
mean that the African does not recognize the value of impartiality. His 
theory is rather that the muthanaii or mugambi should be impartial even 
though he is essentially a party to the suit. n20 The question automati-
cally arises first whether, and second, to what extent these facts affect 
the impersonal nature of the juridical process. While we cannot answer 
the second part of the question without guessing, we certainly may give 
an affirmative answer t0 its first part. Such an answer would seemingly 
undermine the claim of objectivity which characterizes the juridical 
process. Though it does so theoretically, it does not do so in practice. 
For those who are familiar with the ideas of the 'realistic school of 
jurisprudence' may readily agree that in a legal field (we may add in 
almost every institutional field) there is a gre~t difference between an 
'ideal' and 1facts 1 • 
In the previous paragraph we have said that the 1 court 1 evaluates 
the facts presented to him in a more or less orderly fashion. To thou-
sands of words and hundreds of sentences the court must give a meaning 
in order to arrive at any decision. Moreover, the whole range of indi-
vidual expectations must be funneled into one place where, seen in the 
proper context of generalized expectations, they can be measured against 
certain existing patterns recognized as binding in a particular society. 
Many doubts may be cast upon that part of the native juridical pro-
cess called 'law finding 1 • They may run the whole gamut, ranging from 
19Lambert~ op. cit., p. 120. 
20Ibid. 
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simple and categorical denial of it to partial or qualified recognition 
of it. A good example of the latter may be presented from Bohannan's 
work. "· •• the· jir settles disputes. The judges or mbajiriv do so in 
terms of their knowledge of Tiv institutions, they d,o not do so in terms 
of rules of those institutions which have been resystematized specifically 
for purpose of jural action. The 'rules 1 in Tivland are the norms of 
institutions. The organization of-the ~les is the institution itself.n21 
Still more important seems to be Meek's comment: 11The decisions of judges 
were not always tamely accepted. An unsuccessful litigant might dispute 
the decision and call on the judges to swear finally on their ofos that 
their decision was in accordance with precedent ~talics our~.u22 
We contend that the decision process, however arbitrar,r and simply 
adjustive it might be, is geared to the boqy of rules, norms, or standards 
bearing relevantly upon the case in question. The seeming absence or lack 
of statements explicitly referring to norms underlying the action in the 
'court', can be explained in two ways. First, the litigants themselves, 
by framing their case, or clearing themselves from a charge of fault or 
guilt, may refer to norm-centric expectations, and in this way furnish a 
standard against which their conduct can be assessed. Second, in any 
juridical process which does not adhere to the principles of strict for-
mality, obvious, or well-known and well-established norms would not need 
any explicit declaration during the procedure. 
Finally, we might point out that the existence of a structured or 
semi-structured process of decision making is shown in some societies by 
21Bohannan, op. cit., p. 96. 
22Meek, op. cit., p. 222. 
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the fact that the decision is formally announced by a specific member of 
the 1 court 1 • As Meek describes this role among the Kikuyu, al!ltl.ouncers 
-were "men of good address, having a sound knowledge of the customary pro-
cedure."2.3 
We have left the last question, that is, the question of existence 
or non-existence of juridical levels for separate discusSion. It seems 
fairly reasonable to argue that at least in some soeieties the 'verdicts' 
or juridical decisions are subject to review both with respect to facts 
and applied norms. One of the most interesting cases is shorm by Lambert 
in his study on the Kikuyu. According to Lambe±rt, wheh the ndundu (Kikuyu 
ad ~ bench~· has arrived at a decision, "a dissatisfied party may be per-
mitted to chokia chira riiko ('return the case to the fireplace'). The 
case will then be reheard by the same court with the addition of extra 
independent athamaki, At first the ~hoc bench (chosen athamaki of the 
groups and chosen athamaki from the outside) will merely listen to the 
new presentation of the case; then the new athamaki will, if they can, 
say what they think the judgment ought to be. If this differs from the 
judgment of the ad ~ bench the latter will argue the matter with the 
new athamaki going through the Bubject matter issue by issue. Agreement 
will generally be reached and judgment proclaimed accordingly; otherwise 
there will be a reference to the supernatural by way of oath. A party 
can only 'return the matter' once.n24 
We may quote several other examples. Though the Teports speak about 
1 appeal 1 , the phrasing is not entirely unambiguous and therefore the data 
2.3Ibid. , p. 216. 
24Lambert, op. cit., p. 112. 
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must be taken cautiously. Among others, Turner, reporting on the Lunda-
Ndembu, states: 11If there were a senior headman (an important chilolu) 
in the vicinage most cases in that vicinage would be settled in his 
' 
village. Cases were seldom brought to Kanongesha's court of appeal 
\j.talics ours~. Kanongesha in fact was politically hardly more than a 
senior headman writ large arid his effective authority was confined to the 
few vicinages m:fi his immediate area. n25 Similarly' Forde Is statement is 
not completely clear when he asserts: 11 • • • interclan disputes within a 
ward t:eruic~to be taken up by the Ward Head and Elders ·in the .first place 
before there is resort @'."talics our~ to the Village Council or to 
leading men's associations of the village which investigate and give 
. . 26 judgment ~n such disputes." 
. To an equal degree, three other accounts on the Kikuyu juridical 
~stem are not entirely free of vagueness. First, as Meek noted, if any 
matter arose which concerned the whole of the nchi (local group) or the 
whole of the village group, the various Ikoro-Oha ~lass of younger elders 
usually called the gongs, i.e., heralds of the titled elders or heads of 
kindred~ would meet, and, if the matter were a simpler affair, they would 
deal with it summarily, reporting their action to Oha. An appeal existed 
from Ikoro-Oha to Oha n?ha consisted of heads of families, rich influen-
tial men, members of the €lzo society, and priest of important public 
cults]. 27 In Nsukka division, further, a different arrangement was regis-
tered by Meek. An attempt was made first to settle the dispute by 
25Turner, op. cit., p. 16. 
26Forde, 11Ward Organization 
27Meek, op. cit., p. 148. 
• • •
11
, p. 274. 
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arbitration; if two kindred failed to resolve the dispute satisfactorily, 
the dispute was referred to. the village tribunal; in the last stage of 
appeal, the dispute was referred to the tribunal of the whole commune. 
However, if we read the statement made by Meek correctly, then the secu-
lar juridical levels were ultimately topped by a supernatural, inasmuch 
as Meek asserts that the 'highest court of appeal' (italics ours) were 
three oracles: one, oracle of Chuku at Aro-Chuku; second, oracle of 
28 Igwe-Ke-Ala at Umunoha; third, oracle of Agbala at Awka. 
28rbid., p. 44. 
93 
Analysis of Juridical (Quasi-Judicial) Roles 
Ih~the preceding chapter we have analyzed a special type of inter-
action process which we have defined as juridical. Either explicitly or 
implicitly we have called attention to the fact that some specific others 
were engaged in a seciologically relevant behavior showing some degree of 
constancy. More important, however, was the partial evidence gained from 
the data to the effect that the described regularity was not simply a 
statistical regularity but a recurring, stable pattern. Furthermore, the 
analyzed data indicated that those men engaged in juridical activities 
shared some coDD!lon attributes and occupied a unique position within their 
ovm societies. Thus, in describing the differential behavior of indi vi-
duals occupying a juridical position we have either directly or indirectly 
defined it as an institutionalized mode of behavior involving a set of 
normative expectations vis-a-vis alters and alters vis-a-vis them. All 
these facts together then indicated that these significant individuals 
were playing roles, and because the actors were playing roles ~elative 
to one another, the obtained relationship suggested at once some structu-
ral properties. 
The ascertainment of such general uniformities calls for further ex-
ploration. Our task is twofold. First, we should inquire what are these 
common attributes; secondly, we should examine the conditions which set 
forth the process shaping these sociologically relevant positions. Both 
problem areas could be subsumed under one paradigm modelled after Nadel's 
role analysis system. For that reason we are going to deal subsequently 
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with four more or less specific matters: (lry prehistory of the role, 
(2) its internal structure, (3) principles of the allocation of the role, 
and (4) role's assumption. 
Before dealing ~th the above mentioned topics, we should emphasize 
one general aspect of the role setting. In spite of many variations, the 
situations in which juridical·roles materialize usuallY require a particu-
lar locus. In other words, if they do not have a precise locus, then 
they at least have some "situational focus," as Nadel defines it. Indeed, 
in many societies which we have studied there is seme definite location 
where the 'court' meets and where the juridical process takes its place. 
It may be beneath a large, shady tree as, for ~xample, among the Tiv, or 
in the market place, in the village 11 cormnons, 11 on a pasture (sitting 
around the fire (oluhia), in a 'ward shed', or elsewhere. Still other 
important details should be added. The 'court-room' does not often lack 
decorum. The existence of various paraphernalia and their symbolic meaning 
adds to the dignity of the juridical atmosphere. But not only that, such 
equipment is significantly related to the differentiation of roles. Taking 
another example from the Tiv~ the mbatarev (the judges) only may sit on 
chairs which are carried to the meeting by one of their younger sons. Tax 
collectors, for instance, customarilY sit on ~GW stools or on sheep skins. 
SimilarlY, among the YakB the right to a seat on the great forest log in 
the ward shed is restricted to Yakamben (Ward Elders). 
After noting some of the fundamental features of the institutional 
framework, we may now turn to 'prehistory of the rale, 1 a term which in-
cludes not only the short range, but also the long range time aspect. 
UnfortunatelY, with respect to long range time aspect we have found only 
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one illustration; namely, the role of leopard-skin-chief in the Nuer 
society. This will be taken up in the general discussian on feud-
settlement in the last paragraph of this chapter. 
As regards the short range time aspect of the prehistory of the juri-
dical roles in our African sample, many examples may serve as good illus-
trations. We may recall the Tiv habit according to which one of the 
junior sons carried the chair for their fathers to the juridical session. 
It was deemed to be a privilege for the youngsters, and it represented an 
opportunity to 'learn things of fiv' and to prepare themselves for the 
positi:on of mbatarev. Another example from the Ti v' s juridical system 
refe~s ~6 tax collectors who were not official~ members of the 'court.r 
Their sitting with the jir was considered as a stepping stone towards the 
position of ortaregh, for it made tax collectors knOim to the 'judges,' 
whose concurrence was necessary in the appointment of mbatarev. This ele-
ment of expediency was probably not the only one factor which counted, for 
Bohannan adds that some tax collectors were elders with real knowledge of 
Tiv custom,1 An extensive treatment of thl.s subject is to be found also 
in Lambert's description of Meru social life. He stated: 11 • • • the young 
leader of the age set (if he retained his reputation for intelligence and 
a quiet mind) • • • may be invited to sit near the elders of the kiarna in 
their determination of suits. In small cases he may be called upon for 
his views on the appropriate decision. This is in the nature of an intelli-
gence test. If he succeeds, he "Will be regarded as a mutharnaki ~ chira 
( 'leader in law' ) in training ITtalics our~ 1md will be hurried along the 
2 
road to seniority of his fellows." Consequently, as Lambert reported, 
lBohannan, op. cit., p. 12. 
2Lambert, op. cit., p. 104. 
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"As his reputation in the determination of suits and for knowledge of 
precedents grows h~ will become known over a wider and wider area both as 
discerning judge and as an expert advocate • • • u3 An unusual specimen of 
the juridical role among the Ibo is represented by the elaborate ritual 
of title taking in Ozo society. Because membership in the Ozo society 
was considered as a condition for assuming the role in ~ ~uridical 
body], we shall discuss it in the part dealing with the principles of 
allocation in general. 
Prior to turning to the new question concerning the internal struc-
ture of the juridical role, we should pay attention first to two special 
attributes of the juridical role, namely, role's name, and 'diacritical 
signs'. 
In describing personnel and organization of a grade-D court in Tivland, 
Bohannan reports that besides the official called tyo-or (referred to as 
the 1 clan-head')~ the most important persons were officials called o~aregh, 
pl. mbatarev. In early days the term meant 'the important people of 
countryside' • The author further asserts that both tyo-or and mbatarev 
are called 'tor' used to remind a person that he occupies a position in 
which he has obligation to them. 1rJhat is most important to us, however, 
is Bohannan's specific statement according to which: "One of the duties 
of an ortaregh • • • is that he attends and acts as a judge. In this capa-
city he is usually called or-jir, man of the jir (plural mbajiriv) which 
can be adequately translated 'judge 1 j}.talics ours]. 114 To take another 
example, in the Embu and Mbere tribes the term muchiri stands for a 1 judge 1 
3Ibid. 
4Bohannan, op. cit., P• 11. 
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( -chira means to argue the rights and wrongs of somethingi. Lambert main-
tains that 11Muchiri is also used in Kikuyu, generally in the mere specialized 
sense ef 'judge 1 , one of a bench of justices .n5 
As far as 'diacritical marks' are concerned, a number of different in-
signia could be ascertained. Such are, for example, ofJ (staff) in Ibo, 
matathi leaves, matanguru leaves and a special ear-ring known as icohe or 
ichui in Kikuyu, whisks made from buffalo bene, and bags from skins of 
wild cats in Asoqwa, Are or iron staff and stool, or ofo stick and buffalo 
bone in Eze, leopard-skin in Nuer, sacred spear in W. Diruca, and others. 
All such insignia serve both as badges of the office and as s.y.mbols of 
supernatural power which stands ready for intervention. 
The anthropological studies coverillng our sample of African societies 
do not provide us with sufficient details enabling us to analyze satis-
facterily internal structure of juridical roles. Particularly, it appears 
to be difficult to arrange the various attributes of the role hierarchi-
cally, or~ as Nadel uses the term, arrange them according to their 'graded 
relevance•. However, in spite of the paucity of data, we shall utilize 
all.material which may potentially serve as a criterien for grading vari-
ous attributes. 
To start with, we may shortly examine the semantic content of the 
conventional name of the role. The utilization of this approach was very 
well demonstrated by Nadel who stated, and we quote, 11 • • • role names 
(like all class names) are shorthand s.ymbols for the arr~ of properties 
which the entity named is presumed to possess. In this sense the role 
name is prescriptive and stands directly for the role norm gtalics our~, 
5L~bert, op. cit., p. 100. 
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with its given telerance. 116 Thus, as Nadel suggests~ the verbal clue may 
serve for the purpose of identifying the basic, _·or pivotal attribute of 
the role. Applying this method to our sample, then such terms as mbatarev 
or muchiri denoting the judgeship is most unambigous. As it holds true 
for our society, the same may be said about African societies; the term 
judge refers to a man who is expected to pass a judgment, or, to put it 
differently, to form and present an opinion or conclusion as from circum-
stances presented to his mind. There is more te it. As it was amply 
shown in previous paragraphs, the man who is expected to pass a judgment 
:is bound to do it in accordance with the recognized "i'olk system, 11 to use 
Bohannan 1 s terms~ or, as we prefer to call it, normative system. By 
saying normative system, we refer both to norms prescribing conduct and 
jurisdictional norms. While the meanings are quite clear in the case of 
terms like 1 judge 1 , other terms are not so clear. This is particularly 
true about the term or role name of elder. 1\.s it has been noticed, many 
if not most of the jurisdictional bodies are composed of a number of in-
di vi duals called elders. While the name elder indicates sociologically 
important differentiation related to the biological age, the name, if 
properly read in the context o£ a societal structure, indicates als0 some 
qualities or properties bearing significantly upon our problems connected 
with graded relevance. At this occasion we may' recall the Ibo society 
making distinction between 11youngertt elders and "older" elders, an impor-
tant issue with respect to qualification for different jurisdictional 
levels. Similarly, the Kikuyu recognized two kiama grades--junior 
6s.F. Nadel, The Theor,r of Social Structure (Glencoe, Illinoist The 
Free Press, 1957), p. 33. 
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(kamat~nu) and senior nama. At this point one interesting m;,te should 
be interposed. Lambert maintains that corresponding to some extent to 
the higher grades of the Kikuyu kiama was the njuri of Meru. He says: 
"Possibly the best translation of njuri is 1 committee 1 • The correspon-
dence between the njuri and the higher grades of the Kikuyu kiama is not 
cemplete. The thinning out in Meru is (or was) more deliberate ••• 
definite selection ~as mad~ with the object of reducing the wornng 
nama of a wider area to a committee of the most intelligent and most 
influential. Age grade was of comparatively slight impertance. "7 Lambert 
brings forth, further, another interesting view. "· •• the principle of 
adjudication and assessment by the aged is based on the belief (formerly 
well just~fied in African ~ociety) that as man grows older he leaves his 
hot-bloodedness of youth behind and is able to think and act impartially. 
He is less earth-bound. 118 But the true significance of Lambert's state-
ment cemes with his following assertion. "The word for elder (muthuri) 
is itself derived by the Kikuyu from~' 'pick and choose,' and denotes 
a man who selects carefully, one who deliberates and does not come to 
hasty conclusions. The general idea is neatly expressed in the Kikuyu 
saying 'an old goat does not spit for nothing'; the word~ refers to 
snort and stobber of the he-goat when sexually excited. They also put 
it more politely, 'old people do not tell lies' ."9 The name elder also 
implies that the elders were generally considered as repositories of 
social custom. In sum, the name elder denotes a man who is able to judge 
7tambert, op. cit., p. 90 • 
8~., p. 117. 
9Ibid. 
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objectively, impartially, rationally, and with reference to social norms; 
for that reason the meaning of the role name 1elder 1 compares well with 
the established meaning of the role name 1 judge 1 • Both imply qualities 
guaranteeing the impersonality of the adjudication process. The less pro-
nounced junidical status and prestige of elder is enhanced by his genea-
logical status and higher degree of temporal closeness to ancestral 
spirits. He is considered to be a mouthpiece of ancestors. In general, 
it seems to be quite evident that the name 'elder' does not indicate 
simply -old age, but that it denotes a particular social position, in our 
case a position directly related to the juridical process .and juridical 
structure. 
Referring to a lower hierarchical level of relevance, some suffi-
ciently relevant attributes of the juridical role can b~ brielly mentioned. 
These are primarily good character, esteem, and respect of others. Gen-
erally, as Wagn~r points out, it is 11 • • • ~bility] to talk gently and 
wisely ••• §bility] to make people listen and return to reason when 
10 
they want to quarrel or fight." 
Finally, thinking in terms of peripheral attributes, a few attributes 
may be referred to. Among them primarily: married or unmarried status, 
and state of wealth. However, these do not apply universally, varying 
from one society to another. 
It can be seen that in dealing with the prehistory of the role, ancil. 
in analyzing its internal structure, we have already partly touched upon 
the third topic of the allocation of the role. For by tracing the ante-
10Guenter Wagner, The Bantu of North Kavirondo (London:: Oxford Uni-
versity Press, 1949), I, 77. 
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cedent conditions, er, as Nadel has defined it, the progressive acquisi-
tion of different qualifications, and, by identifying the pivotal attri-
butes, we have de facto dealt with the method and principles of the allo-
cation. It is for this reason that we shall limit ourselves chiefly to 
the further elaboration of the basis for allocation, and application of 
it to concrete cases. 
In order to treat and describe the allocative processes s.ystemati-
cally, we have chosen the familiar dichotomy: ascription - achievement. 
It equals basically the newly accepted Parsonian dichotomy:. quality -
performance. What seems to us more important, however, is that in exam-
ining concrete cases, the dichotomy may turn into a continuum. 
On first judgment, it caR be concluded that juridical roles in our 
African sample are allocated primarily on the basis of ascription. 
Onyischi, the important figure in Ibo, for exampilie, is the senior elder 
irrespective of any particular extended family to which he belongs. In 
Nsukka division the general council is presided over by the head of the 
family which had first settled in the district, or had first introduced 
the Ozo title, or from time immemorial had provided the priest of the 
most important local deity.11 InLunda-Ndembu society, according to 
Turner, 11Maternal descent determines succession and inheritance. In 
succession to headmanship uterine brother succeeds uterine brother, and 
if the village is a large ·one with a deep matrilineage it sometimes 
happens that matrilineal parallel cousins succeed one another. When the 
row of brothers and classificator.y brothers has died out, or if there 
are no suitable candidates among them, the right to succeed passes down 
llMeek, Law and Authority in a Nigerian Tribe, passim. 
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to the next senior genealogical generation of sister's sons. 1112 Among the 
Kikuyu, also, the membership in adult kiama has an ascr:hptive allocative 
basis. As Lambert rep0rts: "The adult kiama is linked with a social 
status which is defined in the nomenclature applied to stages of biologi-
cal maturation. n13 But here the case is not entirely automatic, for an 
obligatory; payment precedes and conditi0ns the membership. Moreover, the 
membership in the adult kiama does not occur before the circumcision of 
the individual's child. 
More complicated principles seem to govern the Yak8. Th0ugh the 
description of the system is not entirely clear, it seems correct to say 
that both ascriptive .and achievement principles are at work. According 
to Forde: 11Membership 0f the Yakamben ~ard Elder~ is automatically open 
~o all men in the ward who are priest leaders 0f either patri- 0r matri-
clans, and also to other acceptable men of distinction ~talics ourSJ who, 
like the priests, can provide, with the help of their kinsfolk if need be, 
the substantial admission fees valued at 200 to 300 or more brass rods 
which are used for the feast and distributed among those already members. nl4 
The role of the Ward head (Ogbolia), on the other hand, is allocated on 
the basis of an achievement. Forde makes this point clear saying: "Sue-
cession to the office of Ogbolia is not a matter of kinship. The Yakamben 
choose a new Ogbolia as occasion arises and they usually select one of the 
younger and more active members of the group. nl.5 Forde also notes that the 
12Turner, op. cit., p. 89. 
13Lambert, op. cit., p. 81. 
14Forde, op. cit., p. 274. 
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Ogbolia nominates, subject to the approval of the Yakamben, his deputy 
Ogometu. 
Another example of the combination of ascription and achievement 
allocation may be demonstrated by a case -from the Kamba. Middleton relates 
that the nzama "includes all elders (atumia), but not all take part in 
deliberations.nl6 Only Asili, men skilled in law, are participating. An 
exceptional case of the charismatic allocation of the role is submitted 
. 
by Forde and Jones, according to wh0m Ale priests were drawn from certain 
lineages in a locality and often selected by divination. As the authors 
assert, Ale priests have quasi-judicial functions, acting as presidents 
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of meetings held to decide serious disputes and especially impious offenses;7 
The last example of an allocative principle hased on achievement 
which we would like to mention deserves special attention. It is a case 
where we use the term achievement with great hesitation. :Perh~1.ps some 
special term like re-qualification should be us€d. The case in question 
is the juridical role of the member of the Ozo society in the Ibo tribe, 
who ceremonially undergoes a death t0 his former self and rebirth into a 
higher state. We shall discuss the O~o 1 s role assumption in one of the 
coming paragraphs. 
It is time to revise our first judgment that the juridical roles in 
our African sample are largely allocated on the grounds of some quality, 
like age, birth, or sex, over which individuals have no control. As is 
evident, some further qualities were almost always added. Speculating 
on the basis of marginal comments found in our anthropological studies, 
16Middleton, op. cit., p. 81. 
17Forde and Jones, op. cit., p. 25. 
and/or conjecturing to some extent we are able to conclude that none of 
the studied societies allocated rele exclusively on the principle. of bio-
logical maturity or blood-relationship. 
Our last question concerning the role's assumption is closely related 
to the preceding one. Thinking about the stage of role's assurnpt~on in 
analytical terms, two aspects may be distinguished. One, psychological, 
another, sociological. In assuming the role, an individual declares that 
he connnits himself to the role's various implications. It is an external 
sign of integration af his motivational orientation with culturally de-
fined pattern and expectations of others. In devising formal procedures, 
like ceremonial induction, or magico-religious rituals, on the other hand, 
the society either directly or indirectly makes it known that the incum-
bent of the role is occupying a social position. For a sociologist this 
is a fact of utmost importance, for it answers the sociologically relevant 
question: whence the position? For those who are interested in the morma-
tive structure of the society, this process furnishes further information 
or evidence that the particular roles are defined by the rules or norms 
of the particular society. 
Now let us illustrate formal procedure of role 1 s taking. Starting 
again with the Ibo, we may quote Meek: "· •• Onyishi ••• in some commu-
nities ••• before he is given this formal title, he is made to swear an 
oath that he will not adjudicate in secret, take sides in disputes, appro-
priate communal or other property by force, or apply public money to his 
own p~oses.n18 In Kikuyu, the candidate for admission to the adult kiama 
after the circumcision of his child, slaughters the mdurume ya kuinukania 
l~eek, Law and Authority in a Nigerian Tribe, p. 216. 
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( 1ram of the reunion') at his homestead. At this stage, Lambert reports 
"• •• he is ceremonially presented with a staff of office (muthigi) and 
may carry the muthaki leaves on ceremonial occasions. He is now a member 
of kiama kia mathaki. n19 Somewhat different information is given on the 
Kikuyu rites by Middleton. Middleton, relying upon' a report by Holding, 
writes:- 11 • • • these men are initiated into kiarna by the members of the 
retiring generation set. Tin each district, shelters are built, and in-
struction is given to the novitiates, relating to the preservation of 
traditional law and custom for the benefit of posterity' •1120 Wagner, re-
p0rting on the Bantu of North Kavirondo, refers to rather 'exceptional 
case formed by the Nyole. "Among them the omulatj'lil wamaxuwa, 'the one 
who settles clan matters' was initiated into his office and given insig-
nia--a long club, a leopard skin, a fur cap. 1121 The most elaborate ritual, 
finally, is described by Meek who presents details on title taking in Ozo 
society of the Ibo tribe. As we have alreaqy stated, the members of the 
Ozo society were very important members of the Oha, the juridical body 
......_ 
in the Ibo. They played a significant role especially in_the feud-
settlement, and, therefore, their role resembles the roles of institu-
tional figures assigned to settle feuds in other societies. 
In the last part of this chapter, dealing with the institution of 
feud-settlement, our interest centers actually about the concept of role. 
Such interest is particularly heightened by the fact that the specific 
individuals, acting as official feud-settlers, are n0t always, 0r at least 
19Lambert, op. cit., p. 88. 
20r.iiddleton, op. cit., p. 41. 
2lwagner, The Bantu of North Kavirondo, p. 82. 
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not explicitly, portrayed as individuals playing juridical roles. Some 
kind of a penumbra surrounds them. This seems to apply particularly to 
three social positions: leopard-skin-chief in the Nuer, tendaana in the 
Tallensi, and master of the fishing spear in the Northern Dinka. This 
is al~o one of the reasons lihy we think that the s~bject matter deserves 
more int:iJnate and separate treatment. To begin with, let us concern our-
selves first with the Nuer. 
To insure continuity and consistency, we shall utilize the same 
paradigm, as it was used in previous paragraphs, for the analysis of the 
social position of leopard-skin-chief. With respect to the prehistory 
of the role we have not found any data in Professor Evans-Pritchard's work 
on the Nuer. Another report, however, written by J.P. Crazzolara brings 
out a rather interesting detail. According to it, the role extends back 
beyond memory, for as Nuer mythology has it the role was instituted by 
Kot (god). As far as the name of the role goes, the name of leopard-skin-
chief is misleading. The true name of the role is Kw!UI.r mueen. While the 
etymology of the word kw!ai- is unknown, and an attempt to relate it t0 
politics is, according to Father Crazzolara, unsubstantiated, the second 
term mueen denotes soil, or ground. This carries an important meaning. 
For, as Evans-Pritchard asserts:: 11A leopard-skin-chief ••• has a sacred 
association with the earth (mun) which gives him certain ritual powers in 
relation to it, including the power to bless or curse.n22 
In referring to the 'diacritical signs', we have to return again to 
the Nuer myth. As it was stated by Father Crazzolara, the leopard-skin 
and spear was given to mueen by kot (mueen was one of the god's men) to 
22Evans-Pritchard, The Nuer, p. 172. 
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save the children of Nuer from l3d (satan?). When we then combine the 
meanings of these two factors grounded in myth, we may, perhaps, arrive 
at the functional significance of the leopard-skin-chief, and assess the 
pivotal attribute of his role. With some degree of reliability we may 
assert that he is supposed to intervene when and where an evil thi-eatens 
the Nuer. Or, to put it differently, he insures the security and stability 
of social life; in brief, he defends the social order. At this occasion 
it is also necessar,y to add that he is expected to act in this way. Evans-
Pritchard makes this crystal clear when he affirms that a feud cannot be 
settled withou-11 his intervention.· Unfortunately, we do not have suffi-
cient data to discuss relevant and peripheral attributes, but we may, for 
this purpose, put to u-se the available data regarding the principles of 
allocation of the role. Let us quote again Professor Evans~Pritchard. 
"Only certain lineages are chiefs ~ic] and only some men of these line-
ages practise as such. It is,r•perhaps, significant that in many parts 
of Nuerland • . • chiefs do not belong to the dominant clans in the tribes 
.in which they function. 1123 Evans-Pritchard then continues:. 11Since quarrels 
between tribal sections are expressed in'terms of lineages of the dominant 
clan associated with the sections, ••• the chief, having no position in 
the dominant lineages, is thereBy more fitted to mediate between them. 1124 
It is hard to understand that Evans-Pritchard, a scholar known for his 
precision and,fondness for details, is satisfied with the statement that 
11 only some men gtalics 0urSJ 0f these lineages practice as such," and 
does n0t further elaborate on it. It is also ~nteresting and surprising 
23Ibid. ' p. 173-174. 
24Ibid.' p. 174. 
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to note that he can dismiss the significant fact that 11the chief [Fas] 
no position in the system of dominant lineages" without further evalua-
tion, for it seems to be quite evident that this fact is built into the 
role as assurance of its objectivity. And, as we have seen, the.objec-
tivity belongs to one of the basic attributes of' the arbitrator's or juri-
dical role; it represents a norm having zero tolerance. Finally, there 
is a complete lack of data about the role's assumption. Before we turn 
' to more general discussion, some answers should be given to the question 
on the situational focus. While it is true that the Nuer' s 'courts' have 
no truly fixed locations, wandering from village to v-illage according to 
the need, (they could be classified as 'ambulatory courts'), it is also 
true that some cases are usually decided within the leopard-skin-chief's 
byre. 
After exposing the fundamental facts of the leopard-skin-chiefs' 
role, let us ask the question~ how do we classi~ this role? Evans-
Pritchard is ready to answer it. He says: 11We regard chiefs as a cate-
gory of ritual experts and do not consider that they comprise in any way 
class or rank. We believe their social function to be a mechanism by 
which the equilibrium of the political system is maintained through the 
institution of feud.u25 The answer as it stands is controversial. While 
~e may admit that the leopard-skin-chief engages himself in definite rit-
uals on behalf of the whole community, we would like to argue that this 
activity forms only one part of his role, and not the most important one. 
He has a ver,y mundane task, that is, to reestablish the order disturbed 
by feud, to settle it in accordance with recognized norms, and, in using 
! 
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established procedure, to 'decree' the amount of compensation in the form 
of blood-cattle. But this is not his only function. As Professor Evans-
l 
Pritchard admits, he is expected to decide, thgether with 0ther elders, 
the disputes which were brought before him. These are again very earthly 
functions, and we doubt that they require t~o much ritual expertness. 
We should also call attention to another of Evans-Pritchard's state-
ments according to which the leopard-skin-chief is "simply a mediator 
~talics our~ in a specific social situation and his mediation is only 
successful because community ties are acknowledged by both parties and 
because they wish to avoid, for the time being, at any rate, further hos-
tilities.1126 Evens-Pritchard contradicts himself, for he asserts in 
another place that' "The Nuer has a keen sense of personal dignity and 
I 
rights ~talics our~. The notion of right, cuong, is strong. It is 
recognized that a man ought to obtain redress for certain wrongs.n27 Thus, 
if the leopard-skin-chief is expected to redress certain wongs he is more 
than a simple mediator and ritual expert. He is, as we believe, an incum-
bent of juridical role. This is, of course, a controversial statement, 
which is related to the question as to whether or not the Nuer have legal 
norms. W,e intend, however, to discuss this question in the next chapter. 
We cannot apply the same procedure as we have used above to the 
analysis of the roles of tendaana and master of the fishing spear for the 
simple reason that the data are very scarce. We shall limit ourselves to 
the emphasis upon some similarities and differences. 
First of all, it is quite interesting that the conception of the 
26rbid. 
27~., P• 171. 
110 
tendaana's role is similar in its mysticism to the conception of the 
leopard-skin-chief's role. The primordial tendaanas 'emerged fDom the 
Earth 1 or 1 descended from Heaven 1 • In spite of the fact that 11 • • • namoos 
scoff at these myths as physiologically absurd, 11 says Professor Fortes, 
"~hey] recognize that they express a claim to priority of occupation.n28 
In commenting upon this fact, Fortes makes a ver,y remarkable statement. 
He ~¥s, in essence, that myths conceptualize and postulate a beginning 
for the role of tendaanas, which they invest with the sanctity of unchal-
lengeable antiquity. 
The pr.estige and social status of tendaanas is furthermore enhanced 
b,y two other factors. The office of tendaana is vested in a maximal line-
age. They suceed by right of seniority or are chosen by divination from 
amongst the segment heads. 29 And when they enact their roles, they wear 
dressed skins of domestic or wild animals. On a solemn occasion, Fortes 
rel~tes, a tendaana has an appearance of hieratic dignity that is most 
impressive. 
The name tendaana, if we interpret the statement of Professor Fortes 
properly, means 1 custodian of the Earth 1 • And because "the Earth abhors 
bloodshed, 11 says Fortes, "tendaanas have rftual power to stop fighting and 
mediate in disputes. 11 30 The full meaning of this 1 abhorrence 1 , however, 
comes out with the following statement. "Homicide was and is regarded as 
equally grave sin against the Earth and the ancestors, as an injury against 
28Fortes, "The Tallensi," M. Fortes and Evans-Pritchard, African 
Political Systems, p. 246. 
29rbid., p. 261. 
30Ibid. 
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the corporate unity e:talics our~ of the victim 1 s lineage and clan. If 
a man killed a clansman, whether accidental~· or deliberately, the elders 
of ~he murderer's segment sent to beg the forgiveness of the chie~ or 
tendaana for this act which threatened to 'destroy the community•. The 
chief or tendaana and the clan elders would then determine the.number of 
cattle and sheep which must be offered by the culprit 1 s family as expia-
tory sacrifices to the ancestor spirits and the Earth. The victim 1 s 
family, too, must contribute animals to these sacrifices; for they serve 
not only to expiate the bloodshed, but to reconcile the two hostile seg-
ments {~talics our~ .n3l We have introduced this lengthy quotation on 
purpose, because it may very well serve as a basis for critical analysis 
of the institution of the feud-settlement in Tallensi. 
First, it might be noted that not only 'earth abhors bloodshed' but 
also the Tallensi; second, the murder or homicide is not only 'a grave 
sin agallinst the Earth and the ancestors' but also 'an injury against the 
corporate unity of the victim's lineage and clan'. Both elements are 
present at once; supernatural and secular. Consequently, tendaana' s role 
involves both ritual and secular activity. This assertion gets its i'ur-
ther support from another statement that 'animals to these sacrifices ••• 
serve not onlY to expiate the bloodshed, but to reconcile the two hostile 
segments•. The nse of the adjective 1hostile1 is puzzling. Does acciden-
tal killing involve necessarily any hostility? Three other questions 
should be further formulated. First, why the tendaana, an expert in rit-
ual expiation, needs 'the clan elders' for determination of the number 
of cattle and sheep which must be offered as expiatory sacrifices? Second, 
31~.' p. 269. 
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isn't this process of determination ef the number of heads of·animals 
bound qy some norms, existing alrea~ and recognized as binding? Lastly, 
what is the form of these expiatory sacrifices? Balancing all the avail-
able facts and judging them objectively, we are led to the cenclusion 
that the tendaana exerts that kind of authority which might be character-
ized as juridical. Though his role might.not have been well defined, it 
has attributes which permit it to be described as 1 juridical'. 
In turning to the third role. functional~ relevant to the institu-
tion of feud-settlement--the master of the fishing spear--we notice that 
in Northern Dinka, as well as among the Nuer and Tallensi, there is a 
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myth attached to the role. "Every spear-chief," Butt reports, "has innna-
nent in him the spirit of a great ancestor who has come to him down the 
generations, and it is this which gives him his special powers and wisdom.tt32 
Moreover, the badge of his office, the sacred spear, is believed to have 
originated in the time of the mythological figure Aywill Longar. Though 
the literature aesoribing and defining this role is confused, as Butt 
asserts, "All authorities agree that the office of spear-chief is heredi-
tary. n33 But there are strings attached to the succession. The eldest 
son does not necessarily.succeed his father if he does not show such qual-
ities as good character~ temperance, and preneness to forgiveness rather 
than punishment. The spear-chief is ceremonially installed, a big feast 
is held, and it is followed by a religious ceremony. 
As might be expected, one of the main duties of the spear-chief is 
to settle or compose feuds. Butt, reporting on murder, notes:- "When 
3aButt, The Nilotes of the Anglo-Egyptian Sudan and Uganda, p. 123. 
33Ibid. 
cattle are being gathered for compensation and both parties are reaqy to 
. 
settle their differences and end the feud, the elders of each section are 
led by their spear-chief. Relatives of the deceased and of the killer 
are present and they sit separately while independent elders 8-talics our~ 
act as·mediators. 1134 The spear-chief is also responsible for handing over 
the blood cattle and arranging the necessary sacrifices. It is enlight-
ening to learn that, for example, in case of homicide the compensation 
amounts to 20 to 30 head of cattle. The description of the spear-chief's 
role would not be complete without adding another important fact. As 
Butt relates: "Legal disputes gtalics our~ are settled by the elders of 
the village and the local spear-chief .n35 Even if. we ignore the term 
'legal', which is left undefined and unclarified, we believe that the 
evidence shows that the spear-chief's role falls within the category of 
roles bearing the name 'juridical'. 
In closing this section, we might note one other case, somewhat re-
lated to the institution of feud-settlement. When Lambert refers :Parti-
cularly to the case of homicide, he declares that three modes of settle-
ment can be ascertained in Kikuyu society. One,.·settlement by force, 
when the concerned section takes up arms against another section (feud); 
second, settlement by talion, meaning a retributory action limited to 
the magnitude of the offense; third, settlement by compensation. This 
statement by itself does not go beyond what is alreaqy known. The unique-
ness of the case comes with its further account. The report reads: 11In 
cases of homicide there is occasionally practiced what appears ailimost to 
34Ibid., P· 124. 
35~., p. 125. 
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be a ritual recapitulation of the three stages in the m0de of settlement, 
seen in the manner of instituting suits for compensation. 11 36 Thus, at first, 
the clan of the murdered man may take up arms and invade the territor.r of 
the man believed to be the murderer. The clan proceeds to the banana and 
sugar-cane gardens and statts to cut down the plants. When the 0ther clan 
hears 0f it, it arms itself as though to start a fight. However, there 
is no actual fighting, for the Kikuyu heed their axiom: tutingihe hiti 
keri, which in Lambert 1 s translation means:. 1'We wouldn't give to the 
hyenas twice. 11 While this simulated fight taikes its place, the athamaki 
of the senior lodge c0me down t0 intervene. They stand between the two 
opposing forces and hold their mithigi as a reminder of their power to 
arbitrate. Then they take up seats on their ceremonial stools and start 
to investigate. If the people of the alleged murderer admit that the accu-
sation may be true and promise to pay the migw:i. goats or ram, or if they 
de~ the accusation, then, finally, the elders promise to convene an ad 
hoc bench to hear and to decide the case. 
36Lambert, op. cit., p. 116. 
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Emergence of Legal (Quasi-Legal) Nerms 
and Assessment of Their Attributes 
We have defined norm as a specific ought (ought not) recognized 
explicitly or implicitly as a binding model for attitudinal or behavior 
(action) orientation on both individual and group levels. The term norm, 
as it is used in our discussion, always means the social n0rm. By adding 
an agjective 'legal' we have not intended to change the intrinsic meaning 
of the definitien of the norm. A legal norm, as well as a general norm, 
is in its substance a 'binding model'. Yet, the adjective legal ascribes 
to the norm specific attributes which make it distinguishable from other 
binding models. Thus, the term legal assumes a classificatory function. 
The adjective 'legal' has no meaning by itself. It 9-erives its 
meaning from another concept:. law. Consequently, this must mean that the 
legal norm falls under the general category called law. We have defined 
law as a s.ystem of generalized and formalized rational expectational 
models sustained by a qualified secular constraint. If, then, a legal 
norm belongs to the s.ystem, we may then derive a definition of a legal 
ne~ from the definition of law. E,r definition, then, a legal norm is a 
generalized and formalized ratienal expectational model sustained by a 
qualified secular constraint. A specific legal norm may be termed a ttlaw, u 
while law as a general term refers to a system of norms. 
- In saying that legal norms have such and such attributes, we do not 
assert that all attributes are alrrays present in the same degree. On the 
contrary, we assume relativity in the degrees of rationality, generality, 
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secularism, and formality. For this reason we maintain that, in general, 
legal norms may be arranged along this continuum: imperfect--perfect 
legal norms. 
Our preoccupation with four classificator,y attributes,may lead to 
the impression that these attributes represent the only, if not the most 
important point. While it is true that the mentioned attributes differen-
tiate legal expectational models from other models, if standing alone they 
do not acquire full differential weight. It is the fifth attribute, that 
is, qualified constraint, which completes and significantlY contributes 
to the differentiation. 
This issue bears upon the issue of norm-centric expectations. If we 
recall our discussion of differential effectiveness and imperativeness of 
expectational systems, then it can be said that the forces (we do not mean 
physical forces) sustaining expectational (conduct) models defined as 
legal, operate within the field of systemic finality. In other words, the 
constr~nt existing within the field is confined, and ultimately defined, 
by a specific norm cor norms. This, as we believe, explains the meaning 
of the term 11qualified11 • Let us follow its implications in three different 
spheres. From the normat.ive point of view, the normative system called 
law appears to be now composed of two mutually inextricable subsystems: 
expectational (conduct) models, or legal norms or 11 laws11 in a strict sense, 
on one hand, and jurisdictional norms regulating constraint, on the other 
hand. Both are equal in one quality: they are impersonal. But they dif-
fer in kind, and refer to different parts of the processes~ though both 
subsystems are present in the field. Thinlcing in terms of psychology, 
this means that expectations related to ntlr.ms defined as legal are 
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accompanied by expectations of qualified support. They are, in a sense, 
guaranteed. Both cognitive and expressive value is enhanced by the belief 
in their legitimacy. Finally, seen from the point of view of sociology, 
qualified const~aint signifies the presence of specific others playing 
roles relative to one another; or, in other words, it represents a differ-
entiated sociological structur.e. 
After this theoretical review of our approach to legal norms, let us 
briefly discuss two definitions of law found among our case material. In 
!Jrofessor Evans-Pritchard's work on the Nuer, we read: "We speak of 'law' 
here in the sense which seems most appropriate when writing on Nuer, a 
moral obligation to settle disputes by conventional methods and not in 
the sense of legal procedure or of legal institutions. 111 Even if we take 
into consideration the fact that this definition is an 'ad hoc' defini-
tion concerning Nuer, the definition calls for some comments. What Evans-
Pritchard in his definition really emphasized, as David Tait has correctly 
stated, was a positive obligation to act according to some customary 
standards. But he fails to indicate that the law works also in a norma-
tive way. 2 If we read the definition more carefully, we may note that 
Evans-Pritchard recognizes implicitly two kinds of moral obligation; one, 
to settle the dispute at all, some sort of a purely imperative compulsion, 
unilaterally binding; another, to settle the dispute in accordance with 
some recognized and binding standards. That these standards usuallY 
operate on the basis: if not • • • then • • • , Evans-Pritchard passed 
lEvans-Pritchard, The Nuer, p. 168. 
2David Tait, "The Territorial Pattern and Lineage System of Konkomba," 
J. Middleton and D. Tait, Tribes Without Rulers, p. 187• 
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over in silence. There is no need to argue with Evans-Pritchard whether 
the Nuer have law or not. The subsequent studies on the Nu.er by J.P. 
Crazzolara andP.P. Howell bear witness to the existence of a certain 
class of "obligatory custom" equal in its attributes, potency, and func-
tion to law. Father Crazzolara, for that matter, asserts that the Nuer 
have a special term for law: bedth. 3 
In Bohannan's work on the Tiv we m~ take notice of another defini-
tion of law which represents a general and joint definition of ethnologi-
cal and comparative jurists. It reads: "'Law' is a:rry system of jural 
institutions which controls, wholly or in part, the 'force' , inherent in 
any politically or.ga~ized society' • n4 We are not sure to what degree 
Bohannan subscribes to this definition. But the definiticm as it stands 
is very obscure. If i1Te take, for instance, the word 11 jural" and trans-
late it encyclopedically as 'legal' or 'pertaining to law', then the 
definition loses its value because it is circular. When we translate the 
term 1 jural' as pertaining to rights and obligations, then the terms 
rights and obligations coupled with the word institutions do not give any 
clear cut sense. The definition is not free from other ambiguity. What 
does the phrase "controls the force" mean? Is it a mono]l:J.olization 
of force in a society, or is it a central of forces working in a society?. 
How much clearer are the ideas which the Tiv have about law. Let us turn 
now first to the Tiv law, and then to the law existing within socieites 
under stuqy here. 
The Tiv's word for law is tindi. When Tiv explain the idea concerning 
3J.P. Crazzolara, Zur Gesellschaft und Religion der Nuer, Anthropos 
Institut~ Studia V (Wien-MBdl~: Verlag und Druck der M~ss~onsdruckerei 
St. Gabr~el, 1953), passim. 
4Bohannan, op. cit., p. 4. 
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tindi, they cite, according to Bohannan, the two most common characteris-
tics: (1) 11A ~ is a matter which affects everyone, not just indivi-
duals or a particular group or category of people; (2) a tindi is per.ma-
-
nent. 115 While the first idea illustrates neatly the attribute of generality, 
the second idea may refer, if our interpretation is correct, to that aspect 
of law which is usually called 1 certainty of law' • The Tiv1 s conception 
of law is de facto a notion concerning 'law' in singular. In Bohannan 1 s 
formulation it reads: 11A ~ is a rule of conduct which is recognized 
as binding on the members of the Tiv community. 116 If this definition would 
stand alone, it would correspond to our definition of a general ner.m. 
However, when put in proper cultUral and sociological context, it will 
gain the attributes which characterize legal norms, as we shall demon-
strate later. 
As Bohannan relates, the Tiv have 'laws' but they do not have 'law'. 
Tl:;Le notion 1law1 represents a single con~pt. There is no corpus iuris, 
or any other form of codification. To use Bohannan's terms there is no 
'second folk systematization'. This is, of course, not an exceptional 
case. None of these societies included in our African sample has a code, 
a comprehensive digest, or pandect. Does this then mean that these soci-
eties don't have a legal system? Does this fact detract quality, or value 
from the magnitude of unorganized,- or unsystematized but properly working 
rules carrying with them a weight of unconditionally binding norms? No-
body would probably deny that the Romans had a law prior to the appearance 
of Pandecta and Codex Justinianus. Equally, nobody would refuse to grant 
5rbid., p. 55. 
6Ibid.' p. 57. 
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a claim e>f the system for Roman law existing prior to codification. How 
do w·e explain this? To answer this question, we are apt to presume that 
a proper distinction is not always made between a systematization and a 
system. We are conceiving of a systematization as referring to a delib-
erate act of arranging data, rules, or norms according to some principle 
or design to the effect that they will form a unitary whole. System, on 
the other hand, may be thought of as the interdependence and interrela-
tionship of component parts forming together an organic whole. 
What does this distinction imply? The argument might be formulated 
along this line, While we shall readily admit that the societies included 
in our sample did not purposefully create a 'second folk systematization', 
we shall at the same moment argue that their rules or expectational models, 
manifesting those characteristics which we have ascribed to the legal 
rules, are interrelated and interdependent so that they form an organic 
whole, or a system. It might well be that particular legal in~titutions, 
being interwoven into the web of all rules, mores, and fe>lkways, are not 
c.learly discernible, and for that reason they can be described generally 
only as a 'cake of custom', a 'folk system' (Bohannan), a 'corpus ordinis' 
(Gluckman), or, as we would like to put it, as a •corpus expectationum'. 
But, as Bohannan has demonstrated, indi-vidual parts composing this 'folk 
system' could be analytically separated. As a matter of fact, Bohannan, 
using this analytical approach, was able to distinguish and describe 
various jirs, such as, for instance, 'marriage jir'; 'debt jir', and 'crimi-
nal jir'. And it was in this way that he laid open to our view the exis-
tence and interdependence of different legal institutions, indicating the 
existence of law working as a system. 
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A case of an indirect and progressive system building can be illus-
trated by an example taken from Bantu Kavirondo. When Wagner discusses 
the method of settling disputes by the sub-clan elders, he writes: 11Pre-
vious cases which have a bearing on the case under dispute are recalled 
and the settlement which was then reached is restated. It is significant 
that the restatement of previ0us cases is not limited to those which 
directly bear on the present 0ne, but that it usually embraces a much 
wider range of cases. Each legal dispute--provided that it is complex 
enough to offer scope for a difference of opinions--thus furnishes an 
occasion for recalling the juridical traditions 0f the tribe. 11 7 
That such a society as Bantu-Kavirondo m~ really have a latent sys-
tem of legal ~ules, we may infer from another set of important facts. It 
is not without significance that the Bantu of Kavirondo distinguis~ four 
types of 'breaches' of the law: (1) amagovi, (2) amagoso, (3) amatava, 
and (4) emigilu, each of which requires a different method of dealing with 
them, expecially in the part of reparation of damages. Likewise, that 
11The distinction between these different types of offenses and recogni-
tion of a particular form of conduct as constituting an offense is common 
to the whole tribal society, with the excepti0n 0f a few rules that are 
8 
observed by some clans but not by others. 11 
A further example should add the weight to the preceding ones. When 
the Kikuyu are asked about their law, they may have ready an almost stereo-
typical answer: 11 • • • we have not code apart from hearing the words of 
person and person.n9 But as far as Lambert's information goes, some 
7Wagner, 'The Political Organization of the Bantu of Kavirondo~ p. 211. 
8Ibid.' p. 215. 
9Lambert, gp. cit., p. 118. 
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qualifications shoUld be added. First, every tribe has a code, but it 
is a code of general principles~ not of detail. These p~inciples are 
applied with a latitude unknown to European courts. Second, compensation 
for homicide and damage is laid down and rarely disregarded. The naming 
and amounts of the payments seem to suggest a deliberate codification--
baf!ed upon magical significance of numbers. Third, there is indigenous 
statutory law consisting of edicts issued from time to time by the legis-
lative body (a partial code of law proclaimed by statute?). Fourth, 
because 11muthamaki or mugambi depends for his judicial @:talics our~ repu-
tation very largely on his knowledge of the principles on which the judg-
ment in pre~ous cases have been based, this, though theoretically it only 
strengthens or reiterates early principles of common law and custom, in 
practice tends to codify the detailed findings in celebrated cases into· 
precedents which acquire the force of law §:talics ours] •1110 
With regard to the above mentioned statutory law, another interesting 
bit of information should be furnished. It concerns the technique of 
promulgation. As Lambert reports: 11Laws and specific orders are usually 
proclaimed at public meetings by athamaki or agambi of the ruling genera-
tion or ·set supported by those of the other alternation. The opportunity 
is sometimes taken to make such proclamations at a spectacular dance 
(li~e the Kibata in Kikuyu) likely to attract a great number· of the general 
population. n11 Accor<ting to Lambert, no law is binding ~yond the term of 
office of the set who have passed it, so that after an ntuito (ceremony 
at which the old set hands over the rule to the new set) every law must 
lOibid., p. 118-119. 
11Ibid., P· 137. 
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be reiterated by the new ruling set. This bears a resemblance to repro-
mulgation of praetorial edicts in ancient Rome. 11There is consequently 
a customary liaison between the two divisions and in practice a new law 
is only promulgated after consultation and ~gneement between the two. 
This is effected by the references to the lodges (biama) •1112 Doesn't it 
also bespeak in favor of a s,ystem? 
To bring in more conclusive evidence with regard t0 the existence 
of a legal 1system 1 , we turn next to Middleton's excellent description 
of land-tenure in the Kikuyu. According to his report, there are two 
categories of tenantFrelationships; one based upon status-ties, another 
built upon contract. Let us describe them in detail. In the first cate-
gory, two types of 'legal' relationships can be distinguished. First, 
individual members of a domestic family acquire their holdings on the 
basis of descent from the father through the mother. The underlying prin-
ciple is the genealogical line. Second, an individual member may enter 
into new status relationship with another group qy virtue of which he is 
entitled to certain rights in land. The underlying principle is the secon-
' dary affinal line. It is a sub-category of land rights which are part of 
the complex of extra-clan kinship ties. 
In the second category, an individual may acquire temporary rights 
. 
for use of land of another mbari by entering in contractual relati0nships 
with another group. Three types of contractual relationships should be 
noted. Muguri3 when a person receives the use of land against a loan on 
livestock, on the cond.:i,tion that redemption can take place at any time. 
Muhoi, when a person acquires cultivation rights without payment on a 
12Middleton, ~. cit., p. 41. 
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basis of friendship; no rent is paid, although annual tribute of beer and 
< 
first fruits is given to the owner. Muthami, when a person acquires 
building rights on another ~ 1 ~ githaka.13 All disputes with regard to 
land come ~efore the council of elders. 
Besides its documentary value (bringing out the evidence of the exis-
tence of a legal system), this example may also serve two other purposes. 
First, its high level of technical elaboration throws a diffe!ent light 
upon H. L~vy-Bruhl 1 s 1prelogicality1 of primitives. Second, its combina-
tion of two principles mentioned above questions the infallibility of 
Sir Henry Maine's general trend of progression from status to contract. 
When Meek, in his essay on 11 Ibo law, 11 writes: "Ibo law is not a well 
defined institution by itself, but is rather the expression~ when such is 
called for, of the innumerable latent rules governing all tribal institu-
tions /].talics ourS] , ulhthis, according to the accepted terminology, 
would mean that the Ibo lack second folk systematization. But, if we on 
the other hand learn that Ibo 'legislative bodies' pass laws in a rather 
formalized way, we may interpret this activity as a partial and indirect 
codification. The moment we begin to describe the legislative activity, 
a new problem enters into our discourse, since we may note that the mass 
of secular substance of rules is permeated wiih various religious and 
magical elements. How does this affect the nature of norms? 
Among the Ibo ". • • laws were passed in an assembly of all elders 
and were given sometimes ~talics our~ formal validity by a sacrifice 
1~Ibid.' p. 53. 
14Meek, 11 Ibo Law, 11 p. 209. 
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to Ale or some other deity. rrl5 Consequently, in some cases the jurisdic-
tion and sanction were left to Ale. There was still another mode of 
legislation. 11When a law was made the elders might call on the priest 
of any cult to bring some material object from the shrine. The priests 
and elders would then say: We have made sucli and such larr. If anyone 
breaks this law may this spirit kill that person. 111P And again, the juris-
diction and sanction was taken aw~ from secular authorities and given to 
supernatural entities. Th classify these forms 0f norms, Gurvitch would 
probably speak about magico-religious basis of law, Weber would designate 
those norms as an irrational type of law, and, according to our definition, 
they would fall within the broad category of imperfect legal norms. These 
categorizations are, without any doubt, subject to controyersy. For a 
fundamental question may be raised whether these norms, owing to the ab-
sence of secularity, belong to the category of law at all. A reference 
to the general cultural context might, perhaps, justify theilLilllgi!ginal 
legality. 
In one of the preceding chapters we have already pointed out that 
some delicts were considered both an offense against supernatural entities 
as well as against the community. As Green notes, of the perpetrator of 
such an offense it would be said 11 o merolo ala, 11 ''he polluted the land.rr 
Here the ovenrhelming interest to reconcile supernatural entities dictated 
the passing of jurisdiction upon them. Still another non-empirical belief 
may substantiate the supernatural jurisdiction. If "Ale (Ala or One), 
the earth spirit, is the most prominent deity, and is regarded as the 
'1~ . -~., P• 223. 
16Ibid.' p. 224. 
126 
queen of the underworld and the 1owner' of men whether dead or alive 
Q.talics our~, n then it is understandable that the judgment and sanction 
were left to Ale.17 
The above cases of legislation were more or less exceptional instan-
ces. Forde and Jones report that offenses against Ale included hfumicide, 
kidnaping, poisoning, stealing farm products, adultery, and giving birth 
to twins or abnormal children. In general, there was a prevalence of 
legislative acts showing no signs of religious or magical sanctions and/or 
jurisdiction. Not only an assembly of all elders of the town passed such 
acts, but also Ebiri-uka (big age grades) exercised legislative powers. 
They passed, for example, such laws as fixing the rate of rent for land, 
stipulating price for wine, increasing penalties for stealing, etc. In 
turn, disputes arising out of the breach of such norms were settled before 
the secular courts. 
To our regret we have either insufficient or no information at all 
concerning legal •systems' in the rest of our sample. Nevertheless, with 
a reasonable degree of certainty we may assume that they have not reached 
the point of second folk systematization, but that they may have a legal 
system which could be defined in Max Gluckman's terms as a 'multi-referen-
tial system of institutions'. Equally, there is a high probability that 
qualified secular constraint counts on the help of supernatural entities. 
17Forde and Jones, op. cit., p. 25. 
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PART THREE 
Qualified Constraint Reconsidered 
In preceding chapters we have made an attempt to demonstrate by 
numerous examples, taken from various societies, the existence of attri-
butes which all together constitute that kind of nor.mati~e system called 
law. Lest our method 0f presenting different aspects or elements of law 
in separate chapters and on various societies obscure the comprehensive 
image of a legal system, we deem it necessary to provide a short but more 
systematic description of main facts relevant to law. 
This task is by no means simple. There is a considerable lack of 
data on many aspects of legal order and a considerable limitation of re-
sources in general. For that reason, after a careful search we decided 
to make use of only two societies, the Ibo and the Kikuyu. 
The selection of Ibo society was made mainly because Meek's work 
on the Ibo addresses itself to the question of law and its administration. 
'rt represents, also, an indirect eulogy of the 'primitive• legal system 
of the Ibo, and contains a direct plea for retaining m~y of the working 
legal institutions which preserve order in the Ibo society. The Kikuyu 
society, on the other hand, was selected principally for its fascinating 
system of rules, worthy of admiration mf any modern jurist, and for an 
interesting system dealing with the administration of justice. 
Both societies are, in many respects, generally comparable. First 
of all, their kinship system may be described as a system of exogamous 
lineages and sub-lineages operating and residing within rather restricted 
geographical orbits. The focal kinship unit is the extended family. 
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Politically speaking, both the Ibo and the Kikuyu are acephalous societies. 
They have no chiefs, no figures holding political power, no officers en-
dowed with strict political authority. In ideological orientation, they 
may be defined as egalitariam societies. Forde and Jones, for example, 
describe the Ibo as tolerant, ultra-democratic, highly individualistic, 
disliking and distrusting any form of exterior government and authority. 
Despite such traits, the Ibo and Kikuyu, in keeping with the expec-
tational schemes presented in previous chapters, are concerned with the 
problem of order. Neither of these societies tolerates random and unpre-
dictable behavior; also, idio-centric and socio-centric expectations are 
kept within proper limits~ It is true that ideo-centric expectations repre-
sent a uniting and controlling social force. Green, for example, illus-
trates this very nicely, saying: 11 ••• a man who has leased land, but not 
for money, will give the owner some yams at harvest time though' it is not 
a legal obligation, and the more yams he gives the more kudos he will get. 
People will say that he has 'aka ike' --strong hand Jitalics our~ • n1 Yet 
this sharedness of common values does not constitute full control. For 
we may testi~ to the existence of a more definite authoritative force 
which takes on the form of specific norms or conduct models. But again, 
while moral and religious norms, or more specifically, the pertinent norm-
centric expectations related to these norms, operate in most areas of 
social relationships quite successfully, the problem of order and its con-
trol is still not resolved. From the evidence presented in chapter fif-
teen, dealing with the emergence of legal (quasi-legal) norms, it could 
be seen that both the Ibo and Kikuyu, in resolving the problems of adapta-
loreen, op. cit., p. 99. 
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tion and integration, develop more specific rational expectational models, 
and sustain them by proper sociological media having definite spheres ef 
operation. 2 This applies certainly to institutional areas such as marriage, 
property, land, inheritance, debt, Btc. This is then the area which a 
~ociologically minded jurist might call the field of law. 
One can thus conclude that it is not the content or name which makes 
a rule law, but that the law signifies itself by its mode of operation. 
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'I'o put it in terms of our definition of law, it is the 11 qualified constraint 11 
v7hich is the most significant and decisive component. It was mainly in 
chapter thirteen, dealing with the institutionalization of juridical (quasi-
judicial) processes, and in chapter fourteen, analyzing juridical (quasi-
judicial) roles, that we made an attempt to show by examples taken from 
the Ibo and Kikuyu (and others) the meaning of the attribute called 'quali-
fied secular constraint 1 • More than that; we have maintained that the 
respective controlling bodies were either equivalent with or approximate 
to our notion of that type of social control defined as legal. 
Whatever may be the merit of those chapters, our position seems to 
be still vulnerable at one point. For it is open to the objection that 
the 'juridical bodies' of the Ibo and Kikuyu (and certainly of other 
societies) are nothing more than the bodies of arbitraters. To answer 
this challenging question, let us clarifY the nature of arbitration. 
First, arbfutration is usually defined as an informal process for 
hearing and deciding controversies arising between parties. Referring 
to our societies, there seems to be a substantial evidence that the 
2The most striking example of the existence of these rational ele-
ments might be shown on the elaborate land-holding system in the Kikuyu, 
the so-called 11 githaka system.n 
processes for hearing and deciding disputes among the Ibo and Kikuyu are 
fairly well formalized. On this occasion it may be sufficient to make 
reference to their elaborated method of sifting evidence taking on the 
form of oath and ordeals. If there is any difference between the form 
of the adjudicative processes among the Ibo and Kikuyu, on one hand, an~ 
modern judiciary processes, on the other hand, then it is a difference of 
degree rather than of kind. 
Secondly, it lies in the nature of arbitration processes that parties 
voluntarily elect this mode of adjustment, and appoint their own arbitra-
tors. And here again, sufficient evidence is available that in both Ibo 
and Kikuyu society, parties may be drawn before various adjudicati-ve 
organs of the Ibo and Kikuyu against their consent. Moreover, the parties 
have usually little or no chmice in these matters. We cannot help but 
think of the Ibo and Kikuyu 1 courts 1 as permanent and continuous organs. 
The composition•of the village or village area courts among the Ibo, and 
the third grade kiama of the Kikuyu certainly lend support to this view. 
Moreover, in some instances the 1court' takes action on behalf of the 
whole community. Among the Ibo, for instance, public notice was taken 
of every case which was likely to break up the solidarity of territorial 
units such as umunna, onuma, nkporo, or obodo. 
Third, as far as is known to the writers, arbitrators have no power 
to execute the decision. As our data indicate, both the Ibo and Kikuyu 
have this power; if this po-vrer is not entrusted to special organs like 
Ebiri-uku in Ibo, or warriors in Kikuyu, then the connnunity stands ready 
to exercise it. The reaction is not arbitrary; it is, most of the time, 
structured and legitimized. 
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If our conclusions, drawn not from immediately observed data but 
from secondar.y materials, are correct, then our central hypothesis must 
also be correct. The existence of law does not depend upon the existence 
of a politically organized society or state. The society which is able 
to perfonm the function ordinarily assigned to a politically organized 
group, is also able to create and implement law, and through the law, con-
trol its members. The monopoly of force carried on by political authority 
is not necessarily an indispensable index of law; the existence of law is 
indicated by the presence of impersonalized and systematized processes, 
legitimized by general consensus, and carried 0ut by personnel who were 
not self-appointed but appointed on the basis of some ~bjective criteria. 
The experience of this secular authority and the perception of the 
authority of impersonal norm in general seems to be the psychological 
force which underlies and sustains law on the individual level. The men-· 
tal processes and their justification, especially in their norm-centric 
part, may find their expres_sion in verbal utterances such as: all people 
do it so; it was always so; our forefathers did it so; it is the law of 
the land; it was said by the judge. 
We have described the general features both of the Ibo and Kikuyu 
as egalitarian; why these egalitarian-minded societies need law is a ques-
tion needing an answer. We have also maintained that~ despite their lack 
of political organization, or state, they have law. Karl Marx once pre-
dicted that with the withering away of the state the law would also wither. 
If state and law are united in death, then, per analogiam, they are also 
united in birth. Strangely, the state did not come into existence among 
the Ibo and Kikuyu, but law did. How do we explain this fact? 
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As was characteristic of Marxian theory, Marx was always preoccupied 
with the role of oppressive forces monopolized by the state and operating 
through law. This orientation tended to obscure one, and, perhaps, the 
most significant function which law may perform for anc~ndividual. For 
if we accept Erich Fromm's theory that man has an intrinsic need for a 
high d~gree of relatedness to others and simultaneouslY a need for freedom 
from restraint which prevents individuation, law may be of assistance in 
solving the individual's crucial dilemma of dependence-independence. It 
may do it, and ideally or actually does it, by defining the secular para-
meters of both sociation and individuation. 
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Forms and Functions of Law in "Ordered Anarchies" 
Our approach to the problem of social order through law was guided 
principally by tw0 ideas and interests. First, we refused to see law as 
a body of abstract, emasculated, and dehumanized rules. We were not in-
terested in catalogues of rules, but in interaction processes, both simple 
and complex, and in their final articulation through law. This part may 
b~ called a structural aspect of the problem. Second, just as Malinowski 
distrusted the idea that 1all cus~om is obeyed automatically and rigidly 
by sheer inertia 1 , we regarded with doubt the automatism of various 
mechanisms described as "fusion and fission, 11 "checks and balances,u in 
short, all preconceptions and theories based upon, or relying upon auto-
matic equilibration. We thought of law, in accordance with E.A. Ross, as 
a 1pmverful engine of social control', and we were interested in finding 
and clarifying the methods of this type of control as well as in dis-
covering and describing the agencies of th!i:s type of control. This part 
may be properly named the functional aspect of the problem. This was 
the first step. 
In our second step we selected intentionally a sample of societies 
in .Africa having no kings, no paramount-chiefs, no political or govern-
mental roles in a strict sense of this term. They were acephalous 
societies, so to speak. They were, by definition, anarchies. Our inter-
est was to find out how these societies work, how they manage to survive 
and maintain themselves as a distinct group. The sheer fact that they 
persist or subsist suggested ~priori some regularity in their interaction 
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patterns. On first inspection, the secondary empirical data confirmed 
our preliminary judgment. There were some definite patterns of interaction, 
signs of order. Paradoxically our societies then represented a type of 
ordered anarchies. If such societies may qualify as 'ordered anarchies', 
Malinovrski once ironically remarked, they must have law. Taking this 
hypothetical statement as a basis, we have set forth our plan for testing 
Malinowski's proposition. The first difficulty we met was in finding the 
meaning of the notion 1law 1 • We have found Pound's definition too narrow, 
and not applicable to our sample for obvious reasons. Malinowski's defi-
nition, on the othe~ hand, particularly the one which is most widely 
known, and according to which 11the rules of law· stand out from the rest 
in that they are felt and regarded as the obligation of one person and 
the rightful claims of another, 111was considered too broad. Not even 
Malinowski's last definition, contained in his posthumous work, was en-
tirely satisfactory. This referred both to the 'law of nature' and to 
certain 'rules of technique' which cannot be evaded if the technical 
process is to be carried out successfully. Other definitions, for one 
reason or another, were found inadequate. As a result we started our 
search for the meaning of law • 
. 
Going through the loRg speculative process, we have made, first, an 
attempt to unearth foundations of normative orientation in general, and 
simultaneously to uncover structuralization and systematization of expec-
tational systems. Furthermore, .we have made an effort to circumscribe 
differential effectiveness and imperativeness of expectational s.fStems, 
lMalinowski, Crime and Custom in Savage Society, p. 55. 
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and to enclose within bounds articulation and differentiation of norma-
tive systems. Finally, after outlining categorical criteria of law, we 
have formulated our own definition of law. The distinctive characteris-
tics of this definition lie in the fact that it conceives law as a 5,1stem 
consisting of, or implying, two subsystems. These subsystems are inter-
dependent, and due to their intrinsic quality, 5,1stemic finality, they 
are mutually controlling. This means that the constraint is legitimized 
by the norm or norms, and operates ultimately within the field defined by 
the norm or norms. Let us illustrate by means of a hypothetical case. 
One day a body of a dead man is found beneath a l;J.ig tree. The man is 
identified as .Amira~ belonging to the lineage Kura. The cause of his 
death is uncertain. Different things could have happened; the man could 
have committed suicide, he could have fallen from the tree by accident, 
or he could have been murdered. Upon the finding, and its eventual public 
announcement, there is great excitement among· the villagers. The search 
for the cause of Amira's death is emotionally colored. Then out of the 
sudden, a man, belomging to the lineage Sing, comes and s~s: Amira was 
murdered. I knOlv the villain. It is Abasan. The accuser has no proof 
of his guilt. When the, accused is brought or comes before the assembled 
villagers, he denies the accusation. From now on, or even prior to it, 
the opinion on guilt or innocence might be divi,ded. Two camps may hurl 
accusations one against another. The atmosphere is full of tension. Who 
shall divest such a situation of irrational elements so as to permit 
realistic handling of the case in question? The whole community including 
all moaning and emotionally upset women? Or all men belonging to the 
village already on the verge of a fight? In such situations a need for 
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an objective process of investigation and decision may come into the fore-
ground. And a norm could be established, or, if alreaqy existing, invoked. 
The norm will say that in such and such instances, such and such a boqy 
of men (or man), in such and such w~, should set in operation a 'court' 
acting on behalf of the whole community. The jurisdictional norm will 
limit the field of the 1court 1s' operation. Now let us suppose that the 
accused man makes a confession, or is convicted of murder. What then?·' 
Should the cou~ let him go, leave the punishment to the gods, or punish 
h . ? J.Dl. If punished, then how? Hang him, crucify him at the crossroad, 
thr0w him into a river, throw him in jail; if in jail, for how l0ng--for 
life, for 40, 30, 10, or 5 years? Again a norm is needed. The decision 
is limited ultimately within the field defined by the norm. The norms 
are publicized; the judges know them, and others comp0sing the community 
know them. They represent expectational models. To act according to 
these expectational models means to be normatively oriented, and, vice 
versa, to expect the people to act according to such norms means to have 
norm-centric expectations. A question might be raised at this point~ 
aren't there, in general, different systems of norms? And if there are, 
how can one account for differences in no,rmati ve orientation? To answer 
this question, we shall primarily refer to three normative systems: reli-
gious, moral, legal. Psychologically speaking, religious norms operate 
on the basis of an irrational fear (eternal damnation, punishment by god, 
etc.). Moral norms have at their disposal a complicated mechanilism where 
both irrational and rational forces may be at work (remorse, guilt feelings, 
loss of identity, etc.). Legal norms are rationally controlled (loss of 
face, loss of money, loss of freedom, loss of life, etc.). But this is 
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only one side of the picture; a negative one. The positive induction to 
normative orientation m~ be based upon the love of· God; it may be anchored 
in the identification with the connnunity, with the group, or in social 
solidarity. To explain the difference in sociological terms is much sim-
pler, because it lies in a different structure of constraint. While in 
religious norms, the constraint lies outside the sociological frame and 
is exerted from the supernatural plane, in moral, the constraint is secu-
lar but unorganized; in legal, the constraint is definitely soc~ologically 
structured. 
Coming back again to the question of normative systems, we are dis-
posed to assert that if normative systems are in harmony, they are mutually 
reinforcing; if they diverge they might cancel each other out. The same 
idea could be applied on an individual level. If i:q. a particular case 
norms are involved which belong to a different but concurring normative 
system, and an individual is oriented to all norms regulating a particular 
case or action, this would represent an almost ideal normative orientation. 
Otherwise, mutually cancelling or conflicting norms would affect the struc-
ture of normative orientation on an individual level, and cause a conflict 
situation. This is one part of the problem only. Another conflict situ-
ation would further arise if motivational orientation to act according 
to norms clashes with idio-centric, socio-centric, or ideo-centric moti-
vational orientation. 
This rather lengthy discussion was intended to serve two purposes: 
one, to summarize the theoretical part; second, to clarify some of the 
points which we shall discuss in the rest of this chapter. In the first 
part of it, we shall draw a resume' of some formal parts of law considered 
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to be typical of the investigated sample of African societies. In the 
second part, we shall endeav<:>r to evaluate briefly the function of law 
in the sample. 
With regard to the form of law, the emphasis will be given to the 
following aspects: 
1. Level of systematization and formalization; 
2. Polarization:. law--equity; 
3. Interpenetration of non-empirical beliefs, ethics, and law; 
4. Modalities of sanctions. 
Considerfung the second part, the function of law, we shall stress 
these points: 
1. Normative; 
2. Remedial and retributive; 
3. Hortatory. 
Resuming our discussion on s.ystematization, let us, first, review 
in a few sentences what we have said in the previous chapters. It has 
become evident that the societies included in our sample have not ration-
ally systematized their legal rules. In other words, they have no legal 
codes. Despite this, we have argued, they have systems both in legal ex-
pectational models (substantive law), and in jurisdictional models (pro-
ce.dural law). Both subsystems, considered as a whole, were described as 
a multireferential system of legal institutions. 
The question of formalization represents an integral part of the 
question concerning systematization. But in order to apply the term 
fomnal properly, two meanings of the word 1 formal 1 should be distinguished. 
Thus, if the term formal refers to a sheer perfunctoriness, implying an 
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excessive emphasis on empty form, then legal norms of our societies would 
have a low level of formalization. If, on the other hand, the term formal 
means a proper ~orm, implying accordance with conventional requirements~ 
then the described societies would show a relatively high degree of for-
mality. This applies not only to legislative processes and to the promul-
gation of laws, but also to the juridical procedure. To substantiate the 
latter case, two examples may b~ introduced. First, most of the societies 
have rigorous formalistic rules of evidence as indicated in different 
forms of ordeal, oaths, and oracles. Second, though not entirely unam-
biguously formal, some procedural rules, like waiting for the motions of 
parties, order in the presentation of the case by the.parties, evaluation 
of the merits of the case 'in camera', or by an 'inner circle', argue in 
favor of some degree of formality. At any rate, though both the law-
making and law-finding processes are not free of irrational formality, 
in a great rna~ instances they show a formality which is rationally 
grounded. This fact contributes relevantly to the elimination of arbi-
trariness and to the heightening of the level of predictability in the 
adjudicative processes. 
Coming to the next aspect, polarity: law--equity, we seem to be on 
a somewhat insecure ground because some data appear to be equivocal. 
Nevertheless, at least on one point the reports show unanimous consent: 
the dictum 'summum ius summa iniuria 1 does not apply to our societies. 
Due to the absence of rigidly formal rules such as, for example, ~ 
iudicata, judgment in contumaciam, statutory limitations, and others of 
the same or similar type, the juridical procedure is not unyielding in 
the face of the principles of 'bona fides' in general, and to the 
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subtleties of the case in particular. Moreover, the data str0ngly suggests 
the existence of some principle which could be compared with the hist~ri­
cal notion 0f "equity." 
When we speak about equity~ we do not mean any differentiated system 
of adjudication. There are no·separate 'courts of equity' and 'courts of 
law' in the societies studied. What we are referring to are e:specially 
two fundamental principles of equity; one, that the court acts 1 in per-
sonam' not 1 in J>em 1 • This means that a decree has to be given in a form 
of a personal order addressed to the litigant. Another, the jurisdiction 
is dominated b,y ethical_superiority. 
Closely related to these two principles is another idea underlying 
the native jurisdiction; the c~urts treat all cases as related to the 
total social setting. Let us quote extensively from Lambert, reporting 
on the Kikuyu: 
It is the whole that matters, not the sum. It is in just this 
way that equity to him transcends the law l}.talics our~, that 
social balance overrides the 11rights 11 of men, that native law 
is not a code of hard and fast decrees, immutable, but rather a 
set of guiding principles, elastic, capable of change to suit 
the circumstances. So when we say the native law on such and 
such point is so and so we must remember that it may be quali-
fied by functional requirements, that the law 1 s continuous aim 
is social equilibrium to satisfy both parties functionally and 
not to grant exclusive rights to one and oust the other merely 
because some adamant conception of a rigid code demands exclusion. 2 
2Lambert, op. cit., p. 97. 
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Similar ideas, differently stated, can be found also in oth~r reports. 
While the interpretations of the nature of the juridical process in 
terms of equity seem to point in the right direction, other interpreta-
tions, taking the outcome of the process as a simple. 'judgment by agree-
ment 1 , seem to ~rr. It is true, to a limited extent, that the parties 
'decree to themsel~es 1 , but the failure to recognize that this 'decree' 
was sealed by specific other or others, acting as incumbents of juridical 
roles, is critical. Bohannan throws a favorable light on this question 
when he says: 11Tiv notions of concurrence are indeed comparable to Euro-
pean notions of enforcing judgment, especially in the light of penalties 
inflicted. They bring about rightly the same end. But they must not be 
confused with them. 113 However, if Bohannan could think in terms of equity, 
his statement could come more closely to the point. 
It follows fr0m the above exposition that in our sample of African 
societies there is such a fusion of basic principles of law and equity 
that it is difficult, if not impossible at this stage of our knowledge, 
to draw a distinct line between them. Presumably the true magnetic pole 
is equity. Before this may be proven, more research should be done in 
this direction. 
The presence of magico-religious elements in secular law of our 
sample is very well ascertainable. The intermixture of irrational ele-
ments, as represented by the religious and magical beliefs, and rational 
elements is characteristic of the law of these societies. The impact of 
such beliefs is clearly visible in different spheres of the entire legal 
3Bohannan, op. cit., p. 67. 
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structure. Among the Nuer, fer instance, the religious belief accounts 
for the origin of lavT; law was given to the Nuer by kot. Among the Ibo 
religion legitimizes the supernatural jurisdiction of Ale. In other 
societies, religion strengthens the role of the judge. And in many other 
societies irrational elements contribute in this or some other respect 
to the power of the native law. We have discussed this aspect in differ-
ent cfiapters~of this study, so that we feel no further comments are needed. 
However, one point still deserves our attention. It is the intercalation 
of ethics in the juridical procedure. 
In some societies the delivery of the judgment is accompanied by 
moral preaching. As Bohannan remarks, "The purpose of these moral lec-
tures is not so much admonition as repetition of values held by the entire 
community.u4 This is one explanation of their existence. However, the 
interpolation of these moral lectures may be seen as reflections of the 
basic meaning of equity. If two of the main guiding ideas of equity are 
'conscience' and 'good faith', then the moral lectures seem to be, at 
least at this elementary level of equity jurisdiction, an integral, though 
secondary, part of the procedure. 
The question of qualified constraint involves necessarily the ques-
tion of sanctions. Up till now, we have left this problem somewhat unre-
solved. Though very important, we do not consider them as focal points 
of law. Our viewpoint probably represents the viewpoint of a minority. 
Therefore it is understandable that so many studies deal with them in a 
rather extensive w~. 
In contrast to modern societies, the range of medes of sanctions is 
4Ibid., p. 66. 
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broad. And here again, as it was in other aspects, religious and magical 
beliefs are refracted in the peculiarities of sanction:modalities. This 
does not mean that these societies do not have any secular sanctions at 
their disposition, but rather that supernatural sanctions play an impor-
tant role. We have considered two reasons which may account for this 
fact. These societies have no hierarchically arranged political structure. 
Perhaps they do not want t0 have it, because some are, like the Ibo and 
Kikuyu, strongly egalitarian societies. Therefore the ultimate power be-
fore whom they will bow must be located in the supernatural sphere. Let 
us illustrate by two cases. Meek related that in some Ibo communities 
"the elders might endeavor to enforce their authority by saying to the 
litigant who had refused to accept their decision: If you repudiate our 
decision then may you henceforth meet difficulties greater than your 
present difficulty and so be under the necessity of calling upon us con-
tinually •11 5 This would amount to a curse, and gods will impose punishment. 
Similarly, with the Kikuyu a curse represents a powerful weapon. The 
elders will curse a man if he delays answering a court summons, or if he 
refuses to pay fees or to carry on the decisions ef the council. Segmen-
tal societies, on the other hand, with lineages bound together with 
visible and invisible bonds of kinship, submit themselves rather to the 
power of dead ancestors who as spirits are, in Fortes' words "omnipotent, 
capricious, vindictive, and yet beneficent.'' 6 
The existence of supernatural sanctions, and the fact that they differ 
in kind is very important. It gives to the native law its stamp of 
5Meek, Law and Authority in a Nigerian Tribe,p. 237. 
6Fortes, The Web of Kinship Among the Tallensi, p. 235. 
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distinction and peculiarity. Of greater importance to us, however, is 
the question as to what extent and to what degree these supernatural 
sanctions are present in law in general, and in legal norms in particular. 
We don't want to commit a mistake of overgeneralization. But it seems 
to be fairly accurate to say·that the constraint of supernatural sanctions 
is prevalently restricted to specific areas of offenses qualified as an 
'abomination' (in well established terminology some categories of so-called 
public delicta), and that it is totally absent in other areas which repre-
sent a major part of law. In certai~ societies, finally~ and in some 
areas of their law, both supernatural and secular sanctions are coexistent 
and aiming at the same target. 
A final word should be said about the enforcement of law. If the 
enforcement is not left entirely to supernatural entities, then agencies 
of enforcement, and their methods or techniques, vary from one society 
to another. Thus, in some societies agencies of law enforcement are age 
grades, either young age associations, or big age grades, like Ebiri-ukn 
in the Ibo; in others women's associations; in Yak8 more specific Okeyka, 
a semi-ritual fraternity embracing the more influential Yakamben of vari-
ous grades, and so on. Now, in the course of our discussion on enforce-
ment, the question of equity comes again into the foreground, especially 
with regard to the procedure of enforcing the 1 decree 1 of the court. What 
seems to be striking to us is a great resemblance, at least in some in-
stances, in the methods of enforcement of the native courts to such methods 
used in equity courts, as duress of impending or actual imprisonment, writ 
of sequestration, and writ of assistance. Though the methods used differ 
in their form, they compare well in their function. We are inclined to 
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maintain that a solemn curse (anathema) of elders might be compared with 
impending or actual imprisonment; ritual attachment, such as, for instance~ 
Okenka ritual impoundage could be matched with an action of sheriff under-
taken on the basis of a writ of assistance; and, seizing of property of 
the party in debt shows some affinity with a seizure following the issu-
ance 0f the writ of sequestration. Our claim, perhaps, goes too far. 
Yet, we submit it as a proposition which requires empirical testing. 
In summing up this section we are prompted to assert that the presence 
of the above mentioned elements, considered as foreign to modern and fully 
developed law, cannot detract from the value of the law developed by the 
natives. Though rudimentary and not "thoroughbred, 11 it performs the same 
functions as law in highly civilized societies. To sustain this claim 
of functional equivalence, three of its main functions will be discussed 
in the last section. 
It was one of the main theses of Malinowski's theory of primitive 
law that law in maintenance is both more important and more normal ~ic] 
than the law in breach. We believe that what Malinowski was really em-
phasizing was that aspect of law which we would like to call 'normative 
guidance'. And, also, he was concerned 'With the dynamics of legal norms, 
and with the stress on socio-psychological constraint through which a 
specific 'ought' is translated into a motive and objective, and ultimately 
into action. If understood in this w~, law is 'in action' not only when 
a court starts its operation, but at any time when a legal norm deter-
mines action orientation of those individuals to which it is addressed. 
This standpoint, perhaps, m~ compare well with a statement made by 
Fortes, "As far as there was 'rule of law'--that is, general observance 
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of rights and obligations l}talics ours] in property relations in intra-
and extra-group relations subject to enforcement by explicit or implicit 
sanctions • • • 117 It should be stressed that when we speak about norm-
centric expectations, or refer to normative orientation and subsequent 
normatively oriented action, we do not mean a simple uniformity, but con-
formity. This term, in turn, implies another notion, that is, control, 
and bears relevantly upon our next point. 
The acceptance of normative guidance, and ensuing conformity with 
legal norms, be it on the basis of rational or irrational beliefs, or 
even on the grounds of sheer expedienqy, contributes significantly to 
the effectiveness of law considered by its subjects as an order system. 
There is no doubt that law works in this way in our African sample. But 
we also have compelling evidence that social order does not and cannot 
rely entirely upon this kind of motivational mechanism. As our empirical 
data shows in all societies there are tendencies both on the part of indi-
viduals as well as gToups, to act in contradiction to legally defined 
expectations. Furthermore, conflicts, stemming from different causes, 
are constantly arising, and threatening the peace and solidari~y of the 
society. For .. that reason, deviational tendencies have to be counteracted, 
conflicts reduced or excluded, and wrongs corrected. The cause of strain 
must be re~oved, ~the tar repaired', regulative norms restated, reinforced, 
or new norms created. The law is again 'in action', but at this time it 
takes on a form of impersonal process; its constraint is definitely socio-
logically structured. The potential help of qualified others is secured, 
and constraint activated. The punitive or remedial action operates within 
7Fortes, The ~ics of Clanship Among the Tallensi, p. 235. 
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' the field defined as 'systemic finality'. 
Finally, moral exhortations are added. As Bohannan put it: 11The 
purpose of these moral lectures is not so much admonition as repetition 
of values held by the entire community. The statements may be 1laws 1 , 
seen from: one point of view. But the more important point is that they 
are truisms, and the litigant cannot deny them. He must concur that 
they are right because the community considers them irrefutable. 118 
8Bohannan, op. cit., p. 66. 
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Search for Legal Universals 
In concluding this study, we are not going to recapitulate our dis-
course in its entirety, but by way of emphasis to underscore three attri-
butes which in the most significant way distinguish law from other types 
of social control. Though our statements may appear to be trivial and 
repetitive, we hope that they may serve at least the one purpose of 
refreshing our memory. The Latinproverb--repetitio est mater studiorum--
expresses this point very poignantly. 
First, law is a system consisting of two subsystems. Both are 
inextricable and mutually indispensable. Both represent binding models 
for social action. Though always present, and never ceasing to sustain 
the regulative force of the first subsystem, the second subsystem, repre-
senting adjudicative processes, is activated either periodically, ex 
officio, or when invoked. 
Second, the intrinsic idea underlying law--namely, that an impersonal 
norm should be sustained by another impersonal norm, and at a strategic 
point controlled by an impersonal process--represents a logical closure. 
It is the first 1law 1 of the human law. It is also a point of first rate 
sociological relevance. For this impersonality of norms of conduct and 
impersonality of processes of implementation, operating within the field 
of ultimate finality, must be translated in sociological structures in 
such a way as to guarantee this impersonality. For that reason impar-
tiality is built into the juridical or judiciai roles, and allocati ve .. 
processes follow this line. 
Third, law representing an ordering and controlling ~stem of an 
150 
all-inclusive society requires the existence of a transpersonalized 
power structure, or an existence of bounded relationship on a large scale, 
performing political functions, or able to perform functions equivalent 
to a politically organized society. 
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SOCIAL ORDER THROUGH LA.W 
Jaroslav G. Moravec 
This study represents an attempt to e:xplore the nature of the legal 
order and to analyze the mode of the operation of law. It is divided 
into two parts. 
The theoretical part focuses first upon general processes of ftif-
ferentiation of expectational models (norms) in terms of their effective-
ness and imperativeness, on one hand, and upon their articulation in 
s.ystems, on the other. Secon~, it is concerned with the specification 
and definition of those attributes characterizing legal norms. 
While there is strong support for the conclusion that law and social 
structure are inextricably related, there is also considerable doubt 
about the presumed necessary relationship between law and politically 
organized society or state. This migh~ even be stated as a hypothesis 
which holds that law does not depend upon the existence of a politically 
centralized power. In order to test this proposition, a group of pre-
literate African societies which apparently lack differentiated political 
roles, was selected for the study. 
The analysis of the secondary empirical data is primarily guided by 
the view of law utilized here. First, owing to the fact that law is not 
seen as a body of abstract and dehumanized rules, little effort is directed 
·toward the cataloging of rules. Second, because law is considered to be 
a 11powerful engine of social control," interest does lie in the discovery 
of the method. and agencies.of this type of control. 
For that reason, the stuqy makes an effort (1) to describe the 
modalities of social control such as self-redress, reprisal, and insti-
tutionalized remedies; (2) to answer questions related to the existence, 
meaning, range, and scope of jurisdiction; (3) to evaluate the degrees 
and levels of institutionalization of these controlling processes; (4) to 
examine the roles which may be defined as juridical, and to assess the 
attributes of norms falling within the category of legal rules. 
On the basis of the exploration and analysis of these secondar,y 
anthropological materials, several conclusions are reached. 
In general, the societies studied have a plurality of expectational 
models working normatively. Indirect evidence suggests latent systema-
tization of norms. Self-redress appears ~o be a residual category of 
social control which tends to be replaced by institutionalized remedies. 
The existence of law:is indicated by the presence of impersonal, systema-
tized, and legitimized remedial and punitive processes. Data indicate 
the existence of differentiated juridical roles, allocated on the basis 
of some objective criteria. Because data upon examination do not confirm 
the presence of any differentiated roles of a strict political character, 
the central hypothesis seems to stand the test; namely, that law does not 
depend upon the existence of centralized political power. 
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